Inside the 'post-war' debate about annexing West Bank among right-leaning security officials

Since the 1990s, the reigning security doctrine has been that mountains and hills and physical borders are no longer important.

Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas were all mostly threatening Israel with rocket and drone attacks, and no force in the region could possibly succeed at invading Israel (until Hamas shocked everyone when it did on October 7).

In that sense, annexing the West Bank would be useless for improving security, might even strain security resources by requiring more IDF soldiers to be diverted to protect settlements from "more important" fronts, and would bring about terrible strategic, diplomatic, and economic consequences.

But after October 7, much of the voting population and more of the defense establishment are again concerned about defending against physical invasions.

Bithonistim's strategy on the issue says that, in the 21st century, Israel must start from the simple position that, between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, it must have complete control, including "applying sovereignty."

Next, the strategy says, "The underpinnings of the framework are to recognize that Israeli geographic control of the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is a necessary condition to the existence of a defendable eastern border and ability to guarantee the security of the coastal plains, where most of the population and national infrastructure is concentrated."

"Israel does not have the privilege to rely on 'borders on paper': effective control of the Judea and Samaria mountain range and of the Jordan Valley creates strategic depth, a zone for warning and for preventing enemy penetration or terrorism into the airports, central cities, and critical installations on the coastal plain," the strategy states.

Further, "any waiver of complete security control creates a situation where only a short distance of a small number of kilometers separates a hostile force from the main travel routes, the central governing bodies, and economic centers of Israel."

Moreover, "an updated framework requires: complete freedom of action in the entire area, physical control of the infrastructure arteries (highways, electric lines, water infrastructure), and continued Jewish settlement in the field as a sovereign anchor, and not merely as 'spread out positions.'"

One of the speakers at a Bithonistim-sponsored conference on the strategy on February 24 was IDF Maj. (res.) Omri Cohen, who said that not only the IDF, but Israeli citizens, must "have a presence in the field, we came to live here. Settlements are a matter of principle underpinning the security presence in the field."

Put differently, Cohen explained that the IDF fights harder and takes security more seriously when it is defending Israeli citizens on any given border than when it is only defending empty land, and could easily do a temporary tactical withdrawal, followed by a later return.

This summarizes one position on the Israeli right, which is in favor of significant expansion in Judea and Samaria as a security imperative, and not merely as a matter of ideological politics.

Many of those supporting this view are also ready to take whatever diplomatic and economic consequences might come from annexing the West Bank.

There are other views within the right-wing security camp that tend to oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state and tend to be heavily in favor of stronger IDF actions and an extended presence in Palestinian parts of the West Bank, but still oppose annexation.

Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) Director and Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kupperwasser said at the same conference, "There is a mixed national security concept with diplomatic aspects about how we see issues like borders, settlements, global relations, Jewish relations – some are big on settlements and some on other issues."

The strategy asks, "What is the relationship between achieving peace and achieving security? There is a political dimension that goes beyond technicalities."

Problematically, Kuperwasser said that much of the defense establishment in the recent past was focused only on threats from Iran and Hezbollah, with Hamas's threat in the West Bank being categorized as an afterthought.

He added, "Around Oslo, we thought we were done: they’ll recognize us, so we don’t need to continue to fight."

But Yasir Arafat "didn’t think this way. Of course, Hamas did not. They cry out Allahu Akbar [god is great/powerful] - not "build Palestine!" he warned.

Kuperwasser strongly opposes a Palestinian state for the foreseeable future, until the Palestinians revise what he views as their basic anti-Israel ideology.

As such, he is in favor of a broad IDF presence in even the Palestinian parts of the West Bank.

However, he opposes annexation and is even skeptical of expanding the existing settlements much without buy-in from the US and from the majority of Israelis.

At the same conference, former national security council adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Yaakov Amidror, whose politics are known to be center-right, said that, "settlements are a political position, but not a security position. Anyone who thinks that Netiv Haasara in the South helps stop Hamas  is not connected to reality."

He said that it might or might not be true that villages in the West Bank help with Israeli security needs.

Generally, Amidror's approach has been a hard-nosed readiness to pursue Israel's specific interests, even when they run counter to world opinion, while not getting caught up in political ideology when deciding what Israel's security interests are.

Although he did not specifically address annexation, he would likely evaluate it based on anticipated costs and benefits for national security, rather than viewing it as inherently positive, as Bithonistim does.