Massad Boulos Must Ensure that Peace in Sudan and Libya Does Not Come at Israel’s Expense

The strategic environment surrounding Israel is no longer defined exclusively by its immediate neighbors. Developments across the Red Sea, North Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean increasingly shape the broader balance of power in which Israel operates. Sudan and Libya occupy particularly sensitive positions within this evolving landscape. Although their internal conflicts are fundamentally different, both demonstrate how weakened state institutions can become vulnerable to ideological movements, armed organizations, and competing external powers.

The challenge facing American diplomacy is therefore greater than ending hostilities or assembling new governing coalitions. It is to ensure that political settlements do not legitimize the very forces that have contributed to prolonged instability.

Beyond the immense humanitarian catastrophe, the conflict has created opportunities for Islamist networks,  associated with the former regime of Omar al-Bashir (who for many years had been Iran's ally, until he turned around) to recover influence within Sudan’s military and political structures. The implications became clearer when the United States designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2026.

The designation encompasses the al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade, an Islamist armed formation fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces of Gen. Al Buhran. American authorities have also identified the brigade’s connections to Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These developments should command serious attention in Jerusalem and Washington.

The Houthi attacks on maritime traffic have already illustrated the consequences of allowing heavily armed ideological movements to establish autonomous military capabilities near vital shipping routes. Israel and its partners cannot afford to ignore the possibility of similar vulnerabilities developing elsewhere in the Red Sea basin.

A credible peace agreement must include civilian accountability, security-sector reform, and enforceable restrictions on designated terrorist organizations. Most importantly, it must prevent Sudan from becoming a platform for renewed Iranian military influence. For Massad Boulos, this should be a central consideration in any American-backed political settlement.

Libya presents a different strategic challenge, but one with equally important implications for Israel and its regional partners - and specifically, Greece and Cyprus. Since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, the country has experienced prolonged institutional fragmentation, competing governments, armed factionalism, and extensive foreign involvement.

Muslim Brotherhood-linked political movements have been among the actors competing for influence within Libya’s fractured political system. Meanwhile, Erdogan's Turkey has steadily expanded its military and diplomatic role, initially through its support for authorities in western Libya.

Recent developments suggest a significant evolution in Ankara’s position. On October 20, Libya’s eastern-based parliament approved the controversial maritime agreement originally concluded between Turkey and the Tripoli government in 2019. The decision, strongly opposed by Greece and Egypt, underscores the extent to which Turkey is developing relationships across Libya’s previously divided political landscape.

For Israel, the implications extend well beyond Libya itself. The Eastern Mediterranean has become an increasingly important arena of strategic cooperation linking Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus. Maritime stability, energy development, freedom of navigation, and respect for international law are fundamental interests shared by these countries. Thus, arrangements that intensify disputes over maritime boundaries or undermine established regional partnerships risk destabilizing this increasingly important strategic environment.

Turkey is not Iran, and the challenges presented by Ankara’s regional policies are not identical to those posed by Iranian-backed armed organizations. Nevertheless, Israel must remain attentive to developments that could alter the Mediterranean balance of power or weaken the security interests of its partners. Nor should every Islamist political organization in Libya be automatically equated with an armed terrorist group.

The greater concern is the persistence of a political order in which ideological networks, armed factions, and foreign patrons can exercise influence beyond the control of accountable national institutions. A sustainable settlement must restore unified state authority, establish responsible security structures, and prevent foreign powers from using Libya’s internal divisions to advance destabilizing strategic objectives.

Israel has learned, at considerable cost, that ideological hostility combined with autonomous military capabilities cannot be dismissed as a manageable threat indefinitely. The events of October 7 reinforced the dangers of underestimating organizations that combine political ambitions with the ability to conduct sustained armed violence.

That experience should inform Israeli assessments of developments across the wider Middle East and North Africa. It does not require Israel to intervene in Sudan’s civil war or determine Libya’s political future. But it does require something more disciplined: sustained strategic vigilance, close coordination with Washington, and active cooperation with regional partners.

In Sudan, this means supporting American and international efforts to disrupt Iranian military assistance, restrict the financing of designated terrorist Islamist networks, and ensure that armed Islamist organizations cannot preserve independent coercive power under the cover of a political settlement.

In Libya, it means defending the principles of maritime sovereignty, supporting stable national institutions, and reinforcing cooperation with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and other partners committed to Mediterranean security.

Across both countries, Washington should make clear that international recognition, reconstruction assistance, and diplomatic legitimacy cannot become unconditional rewards for actors who retain private armies or obstruct civilian governance. These priorities are entirely compatible with the pursuit of peace. Indeed, they are essential to making peace sustainable.

It must be whether those agreements reduce violence, strengthen legitimate institutions, prevent extremist organizations from consolidating power, and protect the security interests of America’s regional partners.

Israel has a particular stake in that outcome. The Abraham Accords demonstrated that long-standing divisions in the Middle East need not be permanent. They also illustrated the strategic value of cooperation between countries seeking stability, economic development, and a more secure regional order, and the need to fend off the influence of those who seek to undermine it.

Sudan’s movement toward normalization was part of that promise. Allowing Iranian-linked networks to regain institutional influence would endanger the possibility of reviving that historic opening.

Similarly, permitting renewed instability in the Eastern Mediterranean would threaten partnerships that have become increasingly important to Israel’s diplomatic and economic future.

Israel is not asking Washington to subordinate the sovereignty of Sudan or Libya to Israeli preferences. Nor should legitimate aspirations for peace and civilian government be sacrificed to geopolitical competition. It is asking that the security consequences of diplomatic settlements be taken seriously before agreements are concluded.

A settlement that empowers designated terrorist organizations, preserves unaccountable armed structures, or facilitates destabilizing foreign military influence cannot be considered a durable success.

Massad Boulos should therefore approach Sudan and Libya with a clear understanding that the interests of Israel, the United States, and their regional partners are closely connected to the emergence of stable, sovereign, and responsible states.

The objective must be more ambitious than ending today’s fighting. It must be to prevent tomorrow’s threats.

Dr. Eran Lerman is a former senior intelligence officer. He served as Israel’s deputy national security adviser (2009–2015), and prior to that as director, AJC Israel and ME office (2001–2009). He is currently the vice president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and a lecturer at Shalem College.