The fight between Defense Minister Israel Katz and IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir over appointing brigadier-generals and colonels has nothing to do with appointments or the relationship between the two men.
The two men got along great for a whole year in two separate capacities until Zamir crossed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over his Gaza war policy last week.
Following Zamir’s “sin” of speaking his mind about a new policy – which most defense officials believe will either lead to the deaths of the remaining hostages, many more soldiers, and Palestinian civilians, as well as harm Israel’s legitimacy without really weakening Hamas, or all of the above – he appears to have become the prime minister’s new main target for blame.
This is basically pulling out the same playbook that Netanyahu and Katz used to pummel Zamir’s predecessor, Herzi Halevi.
Only this time, it is happening faster than it did with Halevi before Zamir has actually made any mistakes that anyone could attribute to him, and shortly after, he spearheaded a historic win against Iran and conquered 75% of Gaza.
A repeat over the Herzi Halevi pummeling
It is also happening despite the fact that Zamir was Netanyahu’s top pick (among multiple reasons why Netanyahu never liked Halevi was the fact that Benny Gantz had picked him).
The appointments at stake are not positions where the defense minister typically weighs in. Usually, the defense minister does weigh in more on high command appointments, but these ones are beneath that level, and usually, whoever is in Katz’s position just signs them off.
This makes sense because usually these officers are too far down the military food chain for a defense minister to know them or their competitors in any real way.
In contrast, the IDF chief makes it his job to get to know colonels, lieutenants, and those in higher positions.
So what exactly would Katz have to say about these officers he does not know or their competitors? Not much.
When Katz blocked Halevi’s appointments, it was to force Halevi to publish the October 7 IDF failures report and to resign. But the report has been out since February.
Katz did not ask for any new major resignations after it came out aside from Halevi, Halevi’s spokesman, Daniel Hagari, and the IDF southern command chief at the time, Yaron Finkelman – all of whom left voluntarily.
All of the officers who Zamir wants to promote were key to Israeli victories against Hamas and other terror groups since October 7. They are exactly the kind of battle-hardened officers one would want in key positions.
This isn’t unprecedented. When Ehud Barak was fighting with Gabi Ashkenazi as defense minister versus IDF chief over public credit for being Israel’s “Mr. Security,” he blocked some appointments.
Once again, Katz used this process to oust Halevi, although Halevi already had the October 7 failure hanging over him. There is really no basis besides politics to explain the way that Zamir and his picks are being treated.
Even the excuse – that Zamir failed to consult Katz on the appointments – appears to be a half-truth, given that it appears he did try to meet with Katz about the issue and was stonewalled.
The message to Zamir from Netanyahu seems to be clear: Get in line with supporting the new Gaza war policy in a full-throated way, or get ready to be turned into a scapegoat and possibly fired.
Maybe this whole situation is complex three-dimensional chess in which Netanyahu will eventually drop the issue and is just keeping the new Gaza 100% takeover policy hot to force Hamas to cut another partial hostage deal.
But if not, then in the new reality we live in, where Netanyahu has already fired or tried to fire the last IDF chief, the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) chief, and the attorney-general, there is no reason to think he might not fire yet another IDF chief, regardless of (or because of) his popularity.
The question is: What will the cost be to the country if this happens?