IDF struggles to learn from October 7 as investigations reveal systemic failures - analysis

A total of 25 internal probes of the failures on that day were launched after Hamas’s October 7 massacre. They were initiated when then-chief of staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi was still in charge. Now, after the IDF has reviewed these 25 reports, it has found them lacking.

Ynet noted that the IDF’s latest review “revealed deep, long-standing structural, cultural, and intelligence failures across multiple branches of the military. The committee reviewed 25 core probes and found that two-thirds of them were incomplete or insufficient.”

How could so many of the internal investigations have gone so wrong? The findings were that five of the initial 25 investigations were poorly conducted and unsatisfactory, according to reports.

Which of these reviews was regraded as decent?

According to reports, the internal investigations into the conduct of the “air force, the Technology and Logistics Directorate, intelligence in the IDF Southern Command, the defensive concept along the Gaza border, Home Front Command’s regional defense and the army’s force-building posture against Hamas,” were all found to be acceptable.

The probes found to be lacking pertain to the IDF’s Operations Directorate, what happened on the night leading up to October 7, the navy’s conduct, the IDF’s planning, and the prevailing strategic concepts.

What emerges from this is an image of a hasty attempt at conducting deep, internal investigations. The reports indicate that some of the initial investigations were either too narrow or conducted by those with insufficient experience. Many of the first probes have not reached strong enough conclusions.

In addition, it appears the initial probes were not tough enough on the commanders who failed on October 7. This represents a typical institutional bias – organizations try to avoid ruining careers or being too self-critical.

There is clearly still a lot to learn. The overall picture that emerges once again illustrates a complete breakdown within the IDF on October 7.

“The committee recommended overhauling the regional defense system to align commanders’ authority, responsibility, and resources, and to ensure full cooperation with other security bodies,” Ynet said.

There is no doubt that the latest attempt by the IDF to revisit October 7 has been earnest. It has conducted interviews with dozens of key commanders and other individuals, resulting in a lengthy report.

Yet, the challenge ahead is two-fold. First, it is good to get the internal investigation right. The IDF’s initial attempts to investigate itself appear to have been lacking, in part because those in charge on October 7 were still present, or at least present in the investigators’ minds. This led to some reports being too shallow or not harsh enough.

Second, the larger questions clearly go beyond tactical discussions about how events progressed. Many strategic aspects are being examined regarding the overall lead-up to October 7, and some of this touches on policies that go beyond the IDF.

This has led to a larger tension in Israel in which politicians have sought to prevent a national investigation into the massacre. The lack of willingness to assign any blame to the political sphere has meant that Israel is constantly hampered in its attempt to learn much from October 7.

Given that everything in question about that day is seen as a political football to ensure the current ruling parties stay in power, many lessons will not be learned.

In the end, what emerges is a national decision to believe that no one is at fault for Hamas’s October 7 massacre. No one did anything wrong. Commanders resigned, but no one was held accountable.

Even commanders whose records on October 7 are questionable, such as unit commanders who seem not to have sounded the alarm or who seem to have disappeared for key hours of the morning when bases and communities were overrun, aren’t being prosecuted.

Case in point, how is it possible that the IDF seemed unaware that its Nahal Oz base was being overrun? How is it feasible that the army was in the dark about there being dozens of unarmed, female IDF observers at that base? Why weren’t reinforcements sent? Why weren’t alarm bells blazing at the Kirya military headquarters that a base had been overwhelmed?

How is it possible that the community of Nir Oz was overrun and no forces were sent to protect it until after the Nukhba Forces had left? Fundamental questions have not been answered.

Larger strategic questions have also not been addressed. With the return of the body of IDF soldier Hadar Goldin, we are once again reminded of how he was killed and kidnapped in the first place in 2014.

At the time, the war was winding down, and a ceasefire was supposed to be in place. Yet authorities let Goldin get killed and kidnapped and then proceeded with a ceasefire anyway, essentially throwing up their hands and accepting that Israelis would be held in Gaza. In fact, Goldin, along with the body of Oron Shaul and the two living hostages Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed, were left in Gaza for a decade.

And, throughout that decade, Hamas received cash from Doha. It was empowered. Israel’s policy was basically to let Hamas grow stronger and let hostages be held in Gaza. This policy dates back to 2006, when Gilad Schalit was kidnapped.

Hamas did not even control Gaza back then. Yet the terrorist organization was rewarded and allowed to hold Schalit from 2006 to 2011. Why? Why did Israel decide that a group that kidnaps Israelis should be allowed to take over Gaza? Why, after 2014, were more Israelis kidnapped, and then Hamas got rewarded with a ceasefire and cash?

For two decades, Israel has basically paid tribute to Hamas. It allowed it to grow into a monster. In fact, the group still controls half of Gaza now. The policy of having Hamas govern the enclave in order to separate the Palestinian Authority from Gaza has been a strategic choice.

This choice has led to mass suffering, war, and death. Yet it appears to remain the official policy.

The challenge for Israel is that the problematic strategy of allowing Hamas to run Gaza has also manifested in bad tactics in the IDF in the form of underestimating the terrorist organization. What that meant on October 6 was a collective “this is fine” approach among the political and military leadership.

Some lessons may have been learned. However, even during the war, many of the IDF’s tactics were questionable. For instance, why did the IDF raid areas like Zeitoun seven times, capturing it, then giving it back to Hamas?

Once the October 7 probes are complete, another round of investigations should set out to examine the war effort itself.

There are many stories about how the IDF is trying to learn from October 7 regarding intelligence gathering and planning. Historically, armies tend to reach misguided conclusions from the conduct during their latest wars. The French, for example, built the Maginot Line to prevent another WWI-style battle. But they did not anticipate maneuver warfare.

Is the IDF preparing for another October 7, when such a scenario is unlikely to unfold again? One does need to plan for another Pearl Harbor assault once Pearl Harbor has been attacked.

The military has gained insights from the war, but it is unclear whether it is preparing now for the next battle or for the last one. Before October 7, the IDF was focused on special units and hi-tech, neglecting its vast inventory of tanks and infantry. Now, it may move in the other direction.

The IDF’s willingness to admit error in the initial probes is a good start, but now the lessons need to be learned. One lesson should be at the forefront of everyone’s mind: Preventing kidnapping should be a national priority. Two decades of letting Israelis be carted off to Gaza must end now.