The stunning revelation that part of why US President Donald Trump called off, or at least paused, any American attack on the Iranian regime was a request from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu exposes a gaping, relatively new hole in Israel’s otherwise stellar multilayer air defense shield.
The IDF sent more than a dozen messages in a matter of days about how it was ready and how strong its air defense capabilities are, only for Netanyahu to privately tell Trump the opposite.
There were likely a variety of reasons that Trump canceled or postponed attacking the Iranian regime, and there were multiple reasons why Netanyahu also pushed him in that direction.
But with it strongly appearing that a significant reason was not being ready for a potential Iranian ballistic missile strike, the whole idea of what it means for the IDF air defense to be prepared needs to be revisited.
Put bluntly: Israel managed to defend itself against Iran three times in 2024-2025 because its technology is the best it’s been in decades.
Tehran’s ballistic missile capability is now weaker than it’s been in decades. Trump had an opportunity to possibly topple Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But then, Netanyahu was so worried about Israel getting hit that he asked Trump to call off an attack.
This picture does not seem to add up, to put it mildly. The answer lies not in technology but in volume.
In shooting down around 800 Iranian ballistic missiles between 2024 and 2025, along with several hundred Yemeni Houthi and Hezbollah ballistic missiles, the IDF has done a phenomenal job.
Also, the air force succeeded in reducing the Islamic Republic’s pre-war supply of 2,500 ballistic missiles and over 400 launchers by about half.
But if you think about it, when you add all of that up, it means that even if Iran has much fewer missiles with which to strike Israel, Netanyahu must feel that the IDF has not yet sufficiently replenished its supply of Arrow missile interceptors to confront even that lower volume threat.
One of the reasons Israeli officials are so excited about selling the Arrow to Germany is that it allows producing the interceptor at much larger economies of scale, meaning, over time, more Arrow interceptors can be produced at a quicker rate.
However, it still takes time to replenish a supply of interceptors. Pre-war, this came at an estimated cost of around a few million dollars. During the June 2025 Iran war alone, Israel and the US, according to one estimate, spent $1.48-$1.58 billion on missile interceptor defenses, such that the post-Germany deal boost has likely not yet fully kicked in.
Add in that the US probably had not deployed as many defenses to assist Israel with shooting down aerial threats as it had in the prior three rounds, the prime minister suddenly felt militarily vulnerable, no matter what the IDF had been saying about being ready in public.
And this even though there was a decent chance that Iran might not have hit Israel at all, since the sole attacker would have been Washington.
Replenishing Israel's defenses gives Iran an opportunity to rebuild
How long will it take Israel until it gets back to a volume that Netanyahu believes is enough to defend against a fourth massive Iranian missile wave could also impact whether Israel’s threats of enforcing a red line on Iran’s growing ballistic missile supply will be taken seriously by Khamenei.
Israeli officials have not publicly defined the red line, but the numbers point to a likely range.
When Israel attacked the Islamic Republic in June 2025, Tehran possessed roughly 2,500 ballistic missiles and was on track to produce about 300 new missiles per month.
Officials have since warned about Iranian stockpiles reaching between 4,000 and 8,000 missiles. Based on those figures, Israel’s red line is probably somewhere within that range.
If Netanyahu is afraid of Iran’s ballistic missiles when it has not yet returned to its pre-war 2,500 missile levels, how confident will he be when the Islamic Republic has returned to the pre-war levels and possibly surpassed them?
During all of this discussion, most of Israel’s highly praised multilayer air defenses are irrelevant. Generally, the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and the Iron Beam (laser defense) are unable to shoot down ballistic missiles. Rather, they are relegated to shooting down drones, lower-tech rockets, and cruise missiles.
Hopefully, the answer to why Netanyahu might be more confident in the future is that Israel can produce Arrow interceptors faster than Iran can produce ballistic missiles, and that, not too long from now, the Jewish state will have a better relative balance of aerial defenses to aerial threats, plus some additional American air defenses.
Or maybe the prime minister was just worried about the possibility of having to explain to the Israeli public why people died, were wounded, and lost their homes (even in small numbers) in January 2026 when the Iranian nuclear threat has been indefinitely pushed off, and the concrete gain for Israeli interests of an American attack on the Iranian regime at this point were questionable as compared to the clear gains in 2025.
In the meantime, Netanyahu’s request to Trump, and at least one of his reasons, has pierced the armor of Israeli defense officials who, since the June 2025 Iran war, have claimed that the defense establishment remained ready for any scenario.
Jerusalem will also need to take this into account as it seeks to deter Khamenei from rebuilding his ballistic missile program in the future.