Iran: Staying in power trumps nuclear ambitions

The international community must capitalize on Iran’s regional isolation and vulnerability.

By ALON BEN-MEIR
Ahmadinejad behind massive Iranian flag 370 (photo credit: REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi)
Ahmadinejad behind massive Iranian flag 370
(photo credit: REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi)
The P5+1 has demanded that Iran put an end to its nuclear enrichment program and allow the International Atomic and Energy Agency (IAEA) unfettered access to inspect its nuclear facilities.
However, the clerical regime will comply with these demands only if the mullahs conclude that a failure to cooperate could cost them their grip on power. In the wake of the upheaval in Syria and crippling sanctions that Tehran may no longer be able to withstand, the United States and the European community must capitalize on Iran’s growing regional isolation.
Iran’s defiance of numerous UN Security Council resolutions continues to cast a dark shadow over the country’s regional and international reputation.
After months of failed negotiations and stern, continuous warnings from Israel and the US that “all options are on the table,” the possibility of an Israeli and/or American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities is approaching a dangerous precipice.
Iran has consistently played for time in order to advance its nuclear program and is currently working hard to shield its nuclear facilities from a potential attack. The international community should have no illusions regarding the upcoming technical talks in Istanbul.  Unless Iran halts enrichment and permits IAEA inspections, the talks will meet the same fate as all previous negotiation attempts. Do not expect any breakthroughs.  
Now, the Obama administration has said that the new crippling sanctions should be given more time to work and may eventually force Tehran to concede to international demands.
Nonetheless, the question still remains: how much longer will Iran continue to resist while racing to insure that its main nuclear facilities are immune to air attacks? There is no doubt that they have and continue to play for time. Iran’s behavior only confirms its sinister intentions: Tehran refuses to end the enrichment of uranium to 20 percent, is unwilling to ship its current stock of enriched uranium to another country, and averts pertinent questions by the IAEA while denying IAEA inspectors free access to investigate its Fordo and Parchin plants – among others.
Iran’s nuclear ambitions, however, must now be dealt with in the context of the Arab Spring – particularly the crisis in Syria – in order to force the mullahs to reconsider their nuclear posturing.
With the imminent collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, Iran’s ambitions to become the regional hegemony could soon further unravel; shattering Iranian influence over a predominantly Shi’ite crescent extending from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean.
Tehran and Damascus have been strategic allies since the Iran-Iraq war – in which Syria backed Iran against its fellow Arab state, Iraq. Iran’s interests in Syria are especially critical. Syria has continuously provided support for Iran’s Shi’ite connection in Iraq and Lebanon, solidifying the alliance. Iran has a Shi’ite majority while the ruling minority in Syria is Alawite, a sect of Shi’ite Islam. Iran’s continued support of Assad’s killing machine has made Iran not only complicit in the daily Syrian massacres, but has turned Iran into the number one enemy of Sunni Muslims. From the Arab youth’s perspective, Iran’s support of the Assad regime stands in total contrast to their aspirations for political freedom and human rights.
The linkage between Iran’s nuclear program and the mayhem in Syria cannot be overstated.
With the support of the Arab League, the US and the EU must be persistent in their efforts to remove President Bashar Assad and his cohorts. With the removal of the Assad regime, Iran’s Shi’ite crescent will be dismantled. Add to this the fact that extracting Syria from Iran’s belly will inflict irreparable setbacks to Iran’s regional ambitions, weaken its resolve, and force the regime to focus on its own survival as sanctions tighten.
Hamas and Iran have historically enjoyed strong bilateral relations. The two have worked in tandem to frustrate Israel’s occupation and undermine its power.
However, as a consequence of Syria’s upheaval, Hamas has refused to support the Assad regime’s crackdown on its population and has abandoned its political headquarters in Damascus, relocating to Doha, Qatar. Thus, Syrian turmoil has severely disrupted the nexus between Iran and Hamas and as a result, much of Tehran’s influence on the Palestinians.
Moreover, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – of which Hamas is an offshoot – and their full cooperation in Mideast peace talks removes Tehran’s ability to further meddle in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In addition to losing Hamas, Iran’s alliance with Hezbollah is seriously frayed due to Tehran’s inability to continue its past levels of financial and military support. Syria has functioned as the conduit between Iran and Hezbollah but the preoccupation of the Assad regime with internal strife has broken the chain between the three actors. Though Hezbollah initially offered unqualified support for Assad, the spillover of violence into northern Lebanon has forced Hezbollah to take a more practical approach to the conflict, placing itself in an awkward position between its popular base and Iran’s diminishing regional influence. 
Although on the surface, due to Turkish need of Iranian oil, Turkey and Iran have maintained cordial and mutually beneficial relations, the outbreak in Syria poses a serious challenge to Turkey’s bilateral relations with Iran.
As Syria gradually becomes the battleground between the Sunnis and Shi’ites, Ankara and Tehran will inevitably try to shape the new emerging political order in Damascus – a move that is bound to escalate the tension between the two competing powers.
Considering Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its support of the Arab states, Ankara will have the upper hand in any potential conflict with Iran. Turkey will emerge as the bulwark of the Sunni bloc of states while striking a blow against the dwindling Iranian (and Shi’ite) regional influence.
Finally, the recent Syrian attack on an unarmed Turkish reconnaissance plane has pushed Turkey toward confronting the Assad regime. Under such circumstances, Iran will be powerless to stop the superior Turkish military. Iran will be forced to watch their diminishing influence in Syria from the sidelines.
Fundamentally, Iran has two choices.
One: the clerics may decide to support the Assad regime to the bitter end, flex their muscles through insurgent proxies in Iraq, push Hezbollah to move against Israel, and hasten the protection of its nuclear program from external attack. This choice could help maintain the Syrian regime and allow Iran to retain its grip on power. Yet, realistically, waging such a campaign will prove extremely perilous and could lead to the total collapse of the Iranian regime.
Two (the more likely option): the clergy sticks to their desire to preserve the regime. Under such a scenario, Iran may adopt a path of “strategic retreat” and decide to make significant concessions on the nuclear front while still claiming victory. Furthermore, Iran would lower its regional profile and await another day to reassert its power. Or, Iran may attempt to peacefully establish a legitimate regional role by virtue of its history, size, location, and resources.
This outcome will ultimately depend on the US’ and EU’s resolve to capitalize on Iran’s growing regional isolation and vulnerability.
The international community must stay the course on the nuclear issue, continue to impose crippling sanctions, and remain absolutely steadfast in its determination to oust Assad and his culprits from power.
The writer is a professor of International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University and is also a Senior Fellow and the Middle East Project Director at the World Policy Institute.