Three years have passed since the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon pointed out this week that the cease-fire which ended the war on August 14, 2006, remains fragile. The core issues which triggered the fighting remain unresolved. Since the guns fell silent, both sides have been busy seeking to learn the lessons of their successes and failures, on the assumption that another round is at some stage inevitable. For Israel, the war served as a wake-up call that a new chapter in the Arab-Israeli conflict had begun. In the two decades prior to 2006, the main focus of the IDF ground forces had been on counter-insurgency in the West Bank and Gaza. The result was that the IDF's war-fighting capabilities grew rusty. The reports of the committee headed by Judge Eliyahu Winograd were harshly critical of the performance of both the political and military leaderships during the war. Winograd noted a failure to understand and internalize the requirements of war, as opposed to those of low-intensity operations. His reports were critical of the setting of unrealistic goals by the political leadership, the pursuit of goals in an unsuitable way (for example through excessive reliance on air power and illogical and half-hearted use of ground forces), and the lack of readiness of some IDF units. The result, he concluded, was that the war represented a "great and grave missed opportunity" for Israel. The decay in some parts of Israel's defense structures that the 2006 war revealed derived from a misapplication of resources. This, in turn, was the result of a conceptual failure. The faulty pre-war conception held that Israel was unlikely to be called upon to engage in conventional warfare in the foreseeable future. There was an accompanying belief that future wars would involve mainly air power and small groups of highly trained specialists on the ground. The 2006 war, however, ended the notion that the Arab-Israeli conflict was engaged in a long process of gradually winding down. It lifted the veil on a new mutation of the conflict, in which Islamist forces, armed, trained and aided by Iran, are engaged in a long war strategy of seeking to inflict a "death by a thousand cuts" on Israel. But despite the failures of the Israeli military and political systems in the 2006 war, the results were hardly a ringing success for Hizbullah and its Iranian masters. The movement sustained very heavy casualties (over 500 men killed), and the loss of a large amount of sophisticated and costly Iranian equipment - most importantly, the Zelzal and Fajr missile systems destroyed by the IAF at an early stage of the war. The south of Lebanon was decimated, and efforts by Iran and Hizbullah to rebuild the damaged areas have proved sluggish and inefficient. The terms of Security Council Resolution 1701 significantly complicated the movement's deployment south of the Litani River. Hizbullah went on to significantly overplay its political hand as a result of the war. The movement imagined it could translate its self-proclaimed "divine victory" into increased political power, and engaged in a series of adventures which saw it turning its guns on fellow Lebanese, and attempting to bring down the government in Beirut. The results of last month's elections showed the discontent of many Lebanese at Hizbullah's desire to turn the country into a front line in an Islamist war to the death with Israel. Since the Second Lebanon War, both sides have been preparing for the next round. The performance of the IDF in Operation Cast Lead showed that Israel has internalized some of the lessons outlined by Winograd. The Gaza operation saw a better integration of political and military objectives, and a far more logical and effective use of ground forces. Hamas's leaders believed that they would be able to maintain a level of attrition that would force Israel back. They were wrong. Hizbullah, meanwhile, is rearming. The movement is now thought to possess 40,000 missiles north of the Litani. It has tripled the number of C-802 ground-to-sea missiles in its possession, is attempting (reportedly with some difficulty) to recruit and train new fighters, and has created an anti-aircraft unit. The northern border, three years after the war, is pastoral and quiet. The quiet is deceptive. Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah admitted that had he known the Israeli response to the kidnappings that began the war, he would never have carried them out. The result of this miscalculation, we are told, has been stronger Iranian supervision of their Lebanese proxy. Hizbullah's creators and most enthusiastic backers - The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps - is emerging as the victor in the power struggle under way in Iran. Hizbullah is a key asset for Iran in its ongoing bid for regional hegemony. The larger struggle of which the 2006 war was an episode is still under way. The reactivation of the northern front at some time in some future turn of events thus remains likely. The most meaningful form of remembrance of the dead of 2006 is in ensuring that when that time comes, the systems tasked with defending Israel are properly prepared and properly led. Jonathan Spyer is a senior researcher at the Global Research in International Affairs Center, IDC, Herzliya, and is a veteran of the 2006 Lebanon War.