Make no mistake, as complicated as the coverage of the future International Security Force is, and with as many dizzying issues as people raise, only one issue really matters: Will the ISF be allowed and ready to shoot at Hamas terrorists?
There have been endless discussions about whose soldiers will compose the force, which is supposed to secure Gaza.
Palestinian Authority involvement
First, it was going to be Egypt, the UAE, and the Palestinian Authority.
Then it was going to be Indonesia, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan.
Then the parties started talking about Egypt and the PA again, along with some of the new countries.
Here and there, Turkey’s name has been bandied around – but quickly and repeatedly rejected by Israel.
And yet, it does not matter which of these countries are involved. The only thing that matters is that their troops will be allowed and ready to fire at Hamas operatives if the Gazan terrorist group tries to act like Hezbollah in Lebanon as the force pulling all the strings behind the curtain.
Likewise, there are huge political discussions surrounding whether PA forces will be involved, how involved they would be, or how directly or indirectly connected they would be to the PA.
This may be an important issue diplomatically for Israel in the ongoing debate about whether, down the road, the concept of a Palestinian state will ever make a comeback. But it is not a crucial security issue in the near or medium term.
If the PA forces are well-trained and ready to fight back, they can be useful in maintaining security in Gaza and in the IDF not having to handle every Gazan security issue, such as in the West Bank, where a mix of Israel and the PA acts.
If the PA forces are afraid to fight Hamas, or are not sufficiently equipped, then they will be either useless or a negative force on the ground, as Hamas may try to use them as a new form of human shield.
Hamas disarmament
Another issue being discussed is whether the ISF will be involved in disarming Hamas. To some extent, this issue is also a misnomer.
Hamas is not going to disarm overnight, nor over a few months. If it disarms at all in the near future, it will be partial and limited to certain areas, or its operatives may carry their weapons less in public or in broad daylight.
The best hope that Israel has for a better security reality and a better future for Gaza is that the ISF prevents Hamas from rebuilding its military might, especially in ways that can endanger the Jewish state.
If Hamas continues to use low-grade violence against its own population, it would be tragic. But if it does not build or acquire new rockets, drones, anti-tank missiles, and rocket-propelled grenades, it would not be able to endanger Israel again anywhere near the same level that it did during the October 7 massacre.
If Hamas maintains its forces in the shadows as small guerrilla cells but cannot openly meet, train, and organize larger forces, it will remain a threat but a weak echo of the one it once represented.
So, what is crucial is that the ISF, whoever composes it, be allowed and ready to fire on Hamas’s operatives if it tries to rebuild rocket, drone, or anti-tank weapons laboratories. What is crucial is that the ISF prevents weapons-smuggling attempts from Egypt into Gaza.
This raises the other debate about whether the ISF should be more focused on border security or internal security.
Ultimately, while it would be nice for Israel if the ISF competently handles both issues, it does not matter if it focuses on one more than the other – as long as the IDF can intervene anywhere the ISF is not, should the need arise.
And this is the other most important point about the ISF: It should not be seen as the be-all and end-all of Israeli security issues relating to Gaza.
After the October 7 massacre, in any scenario, the IDF will need to intervene sometimes in Gaza to keep Hamas down.
The ISF should only be seen as a complementary security force, which will hopefully absolve the IDF of as much responsibility as possible, saving Israeli lives, time, and money.
The IDF, however, will always need to be ready to intervene to keep Israel safe as a last resort.