The war is postponed until spring
Al Joumhouria, Lebanon, December 18
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What is most striking is that the very parties that dragged Lebanon into repeated defeats at the hands of Israel are now the loudest in their demands, declaring, “We reject any peace agreement with Israel unless it is forced to accept our terms.”
In principle, they are not wrong, but reality is far more complex. Do these self-styled champions, who led Lebanon into these losses, possess any real means of compelling Israel to comply? More importantly, do they understand that Israel has no genuine interest in signing a peace agreement with Lebanon in the foreseeable future, and that its overriding obsession today is to alter facts on the ground so thoroughly that any future peace would amount to little more than surrender?
Do they grasp that a peace agreement with Israel today, were it somehow to materialize, would spare Lebanon far more crises and catastrophes than an agreement reached a year or two from now, after Israel has already imposed new realities on the terrain?
The Americans are acutely aware of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s thinking concerning Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, the West Bank, and Iran. While they do not oppose Israel on many strategic objectives, they see clear benefit in calming conflicts, opening channels of negotiation, and constructing a future rooted in shared economic interests. They seek to entice Israel by granting it a leading role in the Middle Eastern-European market. This is precisely why US President Donald Trump invited Israel’s prime minister to Washington.
Netanyahu, however, is not currently prepared for de-escalation or for the conclusion of peace agreements. He seeks subjugation first; the forces opposed to Israel, particularly Hezbollah and Hamas, must be militarily defeated, or at the very least effectively stripped of their capabilities.
Netanyahu believes previous agreements failed because they were not grounded in a decisive balance of power, and that concluding new peace deals now would be a grave mistake unless they are preceded by the imposition of absolute military and security dominance. This logic explains the ongoing escalation in Lebanon, as well as in Syria and Gaza. Netanyahu benefits from Hezbollah’s insistence on refusing to surrender its weapons and from the repeated statements of its officials, most recently by its representative in Tehran, claiming that the party has managed to restore its capabilities, even if only partially.
The American perspective diverges on the tactical level. Trump views stability in the Middle East as essential to safeguarding the flow of oil, maintaining markets, and securing diplomatic achievements that can be sold to the American electorate. He is therefore working to avoid a regional war that would derail his agenda and impose enormous military costs on the United States, as he seeks to reduce direct American military involvement and minimize expenditures.
Trump believes that political arrangements between Lebanon and Israel would be advantageous, even if they are tilted in Israel’s favor. He fears that Netanyahu’s unchecked escalation could trigger a broad Iranian response, dragging Washington into an unwanted military confrontation. In short, Trump favors de-escalation to secure a swift and inexpensive peace that serves American interests, whereas Netanyahu rejects any de-escalation unless it follows costly military campaigns that advance Israel’s long-term security objectives.
The question, then, is whether Netanyahu can refuse Washington’s request. Most likely, at their meeting on the December 29, Netanyahu will maneuver tactically, agreeing to a superficial and temporary freeze in hostilities while offering vague assurances of restraint. At the same time, he will leave the door open to “limited” operations, biding his time for the right moment to strike Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran. This approach serves the broader ambitions of Israel’s nationalist and religious Right, whose vision ultimately revolves around the idea of “Greater Israel” as an inalienable goal.
Netanyahu will attempt to persuade Trump that every previous peace process involving territorial withdrawal, from Sinai to Gaza, has merely laid the ground for new security threats. Accordingly, he will promote the notion that peace is impossible without the complete and irreversible elimination of the opposing side’s military capabilities.
The true objective extends beyond border security to the redefinition of the borders themselves. Israel is therefore determined to entrench a presence and expand its influence into Lebanese territory, seize strategic high ground such as Mount Hermon, and establish security buffer zones extending into neighboring countries. This expansion is not purely geographic; it is also demographic, and the prospect of displacement is very real.
Meanwhile, attention is being deliberately diverted from a dangerous acceleration in settlement construction in the West Bank, a pace that will render the idea of a viable Palestinian state virtually unattainable. Through negotiations, Netanyahu is simply buying time. It would thus be extraordinarily naive for the Lebanese to fall into the trap of stagnating at any particular stage of the talks.
Worse still is for Lebanon to become mired in arguments over what it should accept or reject, while Israel has no genuine desire for negotiations or an agreement in the first place, and while its machinery relentlessly advances its bets outside the negotiating halls, beginning with the Naqoura–Shebaa Farms line. Recent leaks suggest the possibility of several additional weeks of truce, perhaps eight, allowing the Lebanese army to announce the completion of the first phase of its plan south of the Litani River. Such a development would expose to all that the Lebanese state is wholly unprepared for the perilous gamble of disarmament north of the Litani.
At that point, Netanyahu will declare that the justification for a major war is now unmistakable and that the United States must stand firmly by its Middle Eastern ally in trying times. Consequently, while a large-scale Israeli war may not erupt in the immediate weeks ahead, it is far more likely to break out in the spring, unless Israel achieves its objectives through negotiations. Since Lebanon is unlikely to concede something so momentous, war in the spring appears all but inevitable, and spring has long been a season that evokes, for the Lebanese, memories of wars, invasions, and hardship.– Toni Issa
An open war between the Syrian state and IS
Okaz, Saudi Arabia, December 18
It is clear that the war between the Syrian state and the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organization has entered a new, more complex, and more dangerous phase, one in which theaters have multiplied, and fronts have become intertwined following the attack launched by the organization against a joint Syrian-American patrol in the city of Palmyra.
This attack cannot be interpreted as an isolated security incident, but rather as an explicit declaration of the nature of the conflict ahead – a conflict that bears little resemblance to conventional wars and is not governed by their familiar rules, instead fitting the pattern of shadow wars, guerrilla warfare, and lightning strikes, where geography itself becomes a trap, security gaps prove more perilous than open battlefields, and terrorism wagers on exhaustion and attrition rather than outright victory.
This war, though its timing may have seemed predictable, carries far deeper implications. The approach of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, founded on restoring the state and its institutions, clearly engaging with the framework of international law, and explicitly breaking with the logic of extremist groups, is inherently unacceptable to terrorist organizations. It inevitably places them in direct confrontation with a state seeking to rebuild itself and with an authority determined to monopolize decision-making, arms, and legitimacy, rendering the clash only a matter of time.
Yet the true challenge lies not in the eruption of the confrontation itself, but in its intricate nature. This is not a war of armies or a battle fought along defined front lines; it is a war of information and intelligence. Such a war demands superior surveillance capabilities, deep penetration, and cross-border cooperation in intelligence and analysis, making international partnerships a vital and indispensable component, particularly given Syria’s renewed role as an active participant in the international coalition against IS, not merely as a battlefield but as an engaged and proactive actor.
Domestically, the urgency for the Syrian government to accelerate restructuring efforts and to build its security institutions on clear, professional foundations has never been greater. This necessity applies foremost to the intelligence services and the General Security Directorate, with the aim of eliminating the current fragmentation, multiplicity, and overlapping jurisdictions. The fight against terrorism cannot tolerate duplicated decision-making or competing centers of power; it requires a single security apparatus, a unified armed force, and a centralized command that monopolizes the use of force and manages the battle with strategic foresight and patience.
In this context, seeking expertise from allied and friendly nations is not a secondary choice but a strategic imperative, whether from the United States, which possesses extensive experience in counterterrorism, or from Saudi Arabia, which has accumulated deep security and intelligence expertise in this domain in addition to its influential regional role.
Washington also bears a dual responsibility at this stage, as many of the complexities of the Syrian landscape, particularly in the north and east, cannot be resolved without direct political and security engagement that leads to the unification of arms, the end of fragmentation, and the alleviation of the burden on the Syrian state so it is not drained by peripheral issues while confronting an existential threat that is expanding across the desert and other fragile areas.
Yes, a war has begun, but it is a harsh and bitter war, one that demands immense patience and profound sacrifices. Syria paid the price from the very first moment with the blood of its soldiers, as did its allies with the blood of American soldiers who fell while confronting an enemy that recognizes no values and assigns no worth to human life. This reality lends the battle a humanitarian and moral dimension that transcends cold political calculations.
This is not Syria’s war alone, nor is it merely a confrontation between a government and an organization; it is a war for the entire region, waged by the international coalition against terrorism. Syria – its state, its people, and its government – stands on the front lines, at the very edge of vacuum and chaos, and at the points of vulnerability through which terrorism infiltrates, strikes, and then vanishes.
Initial reactions, ranging from explicit condemnation and declared support by Arab states and the international community to the advanced American stance, represent a step in the right direction, but they remain insufficient unless accompanied by the development of a comprehensive strategy – security, intelligence, and logistical – built in partnership with Damascus rather than on its behalf, and reinforced by a political umbrella that enables the Syrian government to reclaim its capacity to act and to address the thorny issues obstructing state consolidation.
Supporting the Syrian administration in its war against IS is no longer a debatable political option, but a regional and international security necessity, because the alternative to a strong state is a deadly vacuum, and because terrorism is not defeated by statements, but by the state itself – by institutions, by will, and by a sincere alliance that understands that the fall of a Syrian martyr or an American soldier is a warning to all, not merely a fleeting headline in the evening news.– Rami Al-Khalifa Al-Ali
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.