Report reveals Iranian soft-power infrastructure in the United Kingdom through charity sector

The Iranian regime has made a systematic effort to build a soft-power infrastructure within the UK via the charitable sector, Lord Walney revealed in his new report, released on Wednesday.

John Woodcock, Baron Walney, is a crossbench peer who served as the British government’s independent adviser on political violence and disruption between 2020 and 2025.

His 109-page report “Under influence: the Iranian Regime’s abuse of the UK charity system and the limitations of oversight” explores a number of charities operating in the UK and their connection to the Iranian regime.

Walney found that, functioning in parallel to Iran’s hard-power tactics – such as the 1989 Rushdie fatwa and recent MI5-thwarted assassination plots – Iran’s network of around 30 UK-based charities is used to spread Khomeinist ideology, foster antisemitism, and conduct transnational repression.

The report focuses on 10 UK charities, specifically: Abrar Islamic Foundation (AIF), Al-Tawheed Charitable Trust (TUCF), Dar Alhekma Trust (DAT), Idara-e-Jaaferiya (IEJ), Irshad Trust (trading as The Islamic College), Islamic Centre of England (ICEL), Islamic Human Rights Commission Trust (IHRC Trust), Labaik Ya Zahra (LYZ), Ahlulbayt Foundation (Ahlulbayt TV), and the Muhammadi Trust of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (noted mainly because Ahlulbayt Islamic Mission (AIM) uses its premises).

It is worth noting that eight of the 10 examined are subject to ongoing regulatory engagement or investigation by the Charity Commission.

Walney also determined that the UK provides a perfect ecosystem for this kind of soft-power activity. The openness of its civil society creates vulnerabilities.

Charitable status confers tax advantages, credibility, and a seal of approval that can reduce due diligence by officials eager to engage communities and combat discrimination.

In turn, by exploiting the UK’s charity ecosystem, the Islamic regime can transmit revolutionary ideology.

The report uncovered three overarching features of this soft-power ecosystem: Evidence of governance and personnel overlap, both with regime institutions and among the charities themselves; evidence of ideological alignment with Khomeinist doctrine; and evidence that these UK charities operate within a wider security context involving Iranian state threat activity.

Walney also found that senior figures in UK charities have also held senior positions within the Iranian regime or Iran-linked institutions. This includes Iranian bodies such as the Qom Seminary, which oversees state-sanctioned religious doctrine, and Al Mustafa International University, which the United States has designated for its role in recruiting for the IRGC Quds force.

Other examples include the fact that the founder of Labaik Ya Zahra (LYZ) charity was hosted by a senior IRGC commander in Tehran and that its representatives signed a memorandum promising to spread the ideals of the Islamic revolution internationally.

The leadership of Islamic College (Irshad Trust) has featured figures such as Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, a member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts. The college has also had historical affiliations with Al-Mustafa International University. And Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) Director Massoud Shadjareh has spoken at events organized by the Basij (a paramilitary arm of the IRGC) and given interviews to the Masaf Institute, an EU-sanctioned Iranian propaganda outlet known for doxing dissidents.

At least half of the charities examined had publicly marked or eulogized Soleimani following his death in 2020. Furthermore, some institutions, senior figures within the charities, or invited speakers have expressed support for Iranian proxy groups such as Hamas or Hezbollah, or promoted narratives aligned with the regime’s revolutionary worldview.

Walney also noted the way in which Al Quds Day rallies and related events hosted by UK charities have “featured rhetoric widely criticized as antisemitic or hostile to Israel.”

Other charities, such as the Dar Alhekma Trust (DAT) and Abrar Islamic Foundation (AIF), have hosted speakers praising the “Axis of Resistance” and pushed newsletters containing Holocaust distortion and antisemitic tropes.

While UK authorities have assessed Iran as posing an active state threat, including via espionage and transnational repression, Walney said that neither the government nor the Charity Commission have so far taken sufficient action against Iran’s soft power infrastructure.

The report focused particularly on elements within the identified charities that are hostile toward Iranian dissidents.

Experts consulted for the report said that some members of the Iranian diaspora were apprehensive about travelling to parts of Brent, where several prominent Iranian-linked charities are based.

According to Walney, this soft-power infrastructure, while not directly tied to terrorism or espionage, represents a growing challenge to Britain’s national security, as charities are increasingly leveraged for strategic political and ideological purposes beyond British borders.

Not only does it have direct links to the supreme leader, but it is also allegedly involved in subversion and espionage.

The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) warned that state-linked institutions such as ICEL are likely being utilized by Iranian Intelligence Services to identify and recruit targets. ICEL also allegedly distributes funds to sub-branches across the UK under the oversight of Iranian ministries.

As mentioned, until March 2023, ICEL’s constitution legally required that one trustee be a direct appointee of the Iranian supreme leader. Until late 2022, this member was Seyed Hashem Moosavi, who acted effectively as a senior regime official in the UK.

While Moosavi stepped down and the constitution was amended following a Charity Commission inquiry, the report highlights that Moosavi remains the “incumbent imam” and new trustees with deep Iranian establishment ties (such as Jafar Ali Najm and Mir Abbas Hussain) have simply rotated into power.

ICEL has also been involved in youth indoctrination, according to Walney. It was used as a filming location for the English version of the song “Hello Commander,” where children were filmed saluting and pledging to join the “313” (fighters for the Mahdi) and follow the path of Soleimani.

Despite eight of the 10 charities examined being under Charity Commission investigation, they continue to operate, and in some cases, still receive government funding.

Four of the charities (ICEL, IEJ, Ahlulbayt Foundation, and IHRC Trust) are recognized for HMRC Gift Aid, meaning that the British government supplements their donations by 25%.

Walney also highlighted a key procedural flaw: By treating hostile state influence as mere “trustee misconduct,” the Charity Commission allows these charities to simply swap personnel and draft new policies without disrupting the underlying ideological and operational links to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

This is all exacerbated by the Charity Commission’s relative opacity and weak public signalling, he said. While statutory inquiries and official warnings may be flagged publicly, regulatory compliance cases are often invisible on the public register, leaving donors and public bodies uninformed.

In order to dismantle this soft-power infrastructure, Walney’s report outlines the seven statutory and operational reforms needed:

First, he calls for the Charities Act 2011 to be amended to explicitly empower the Charity Commission to deregister or dissolve charities based on systemic extremism or hostile state influence.

Second, he urges an expansion in disqualification powers, allowing for individuals subject to immigration orders or identified as hostile state agents to be banned from serving as trustees.

Third, he asks for investigations into charities to be expedited, noting that endless re-litigation and ringfence funding are often barriers for investigative success.

Fourth, he calls for mandatory intelligence sharing, specifically forcing the Home Office, the police, and the Charity Commission to securely share intelligence regarding terror financing and national security.

Fifth, he demands that all ongoing extremism be flagged and hostile-state investigations be undertaken on the online Charitable Register.

Sixth, he wants to reform Gift Aid and require mandatory extremism and foreign-influence due diligence checks before granting Gift Aid.

Seventh, Walney calls for the introduction of strict ID verification.

The longer-term risks extend further to the blurring of lines between legitimate religious expression and state-aligned ideological activism, as well as the gradual entrenchment of the same polarising Khomeinist worldview within elements of British society over time, placing pressure on democratic norms and social cohesion.

The evidence presented suggests that elements of this infrastructure have been deliberately cultivated rather than organically developed.

As one former government adviser told Walney: “This is not a grassroots Shia manifestation. It’s basically been imported in. And it’s been imported because the Iranian government has picked a few people to come and run British religious institutions.”

The picture that emerges from Walney’s investigation is not one of isolated governance failures but of a coordinated soft-power strategy operating largely in plain view.

By leveraging the legitimacy and tax advantages associated with charitable status, Iran likely has been able to project influence, cultivate ideological networks, and intimidate critics while remaining formally within the bounds of British law.

Walney’s report, therefore, suggests that the UK’s regulatory framework may not yet be equipped to confront state-backed influence campaigns that operate through civil society rather than through traditional intelligence or military channels.

The challenge for British authorities will not only be addressing individual cases of misconduct but also confronting the structural vulnerabilities that allow hostile state actors to embed themselves within civil society institutions over time.