When the Arab armies attacked on Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973, Israel was caught off guard – surprised and stunned. Three weeks later, as the UN’s ceasefire came into effect, the IDF had turned the tide, successfully advancing into Egyptian and Syrian territory. But the impressive battlefield counteroffensive could not compensate for the initial debacle, for the some 2,800 IDF combat fatalities, or for the erosion of public confidence in Israel’s leadership. The war heralded a period of national despondency.
Within the first 24 hours of the conflict, Egyptian forces had forged the Suez Canal, swept through the Bar-Lev Line defenses, and had taken up positions on what had previously been Israeli-controlled territory. At war’s end, the IDF had crossed the Canal to the Egyptian side. But although it had surrounded Egypt’s Third Army, the IDF had not managed to expel it from the Sinai Peninsula.
In the North, Syria’s opening gambit allowed its forces to break through on the Golan Heights. Like the Egyptians, the Syrian attackers outnumbered and outgunned the Israeli defenders. But by the time the ceasefire was declared, the Syrians had been driven out of the Golan and the IDF had pushed forward to a mere 40 kilometers from Damascus.
Israel’s initial failures stemmed from hubris. Its dramatic triumph in the June 1967 Six Day War – which saw the IDF take the Old City of Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, Gaza and Sinai from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria – had bred a detrimental cockiness.
Too many in Israel believed that after suffering such a crushing defeat, the Arabs would not dare launch a new war – one that they couldn’t possibly hope to win. However, Israelis were convinced that if their enemies irrationally chose to initiate another round of fighting, Israel’s newfound territorial depth would serve as a defensive buffer until the IDF fully mobilized and expeditiously delivered another 1967-style knockout.
Yom Kippur War: An act caused by Israel's own mistakes
But the 1973 attack wasn’t an act of Arab folly but rather Israel’s blunder – and Jerusalem’s mistakes were both strategic and tactical. The 1967 victory had been achieved thanks to Israel’s preemptive strike, through the supremacy of its air force and the prowess of its armored columns. But in 1973, it was the Arabs who surprised Israel, while Soviet-supplied surface-to-air and anti-tank missiles altered the battlefield in ways that challenged the IDF.
There was also the intelligence fiasco, which, despite all the Egyptian and Syrian preparations for war, caused the IDF to classify an Arab attack as a “low probability” scenario. That erroneous assessment was only revised just before the outbreak of hostilities and, even then, still got wrong the hour of the impending assault. For a nation that prided itself on the excellence of its intelligence gathering, this was a bitter blow.
Jerusalem also failed to plan for the potent efficacy of the Arab oil embargo which leveraged international dependency on Middle Eastern petroleum in a manner that led many purported friends to abandon Israel.
AMERICA’S TRANSATLANTIC NATO allies refused to allow for the refueling on their territory of US planes airlifting vital military supplies to Israel. This took place while the Soviets were expediting the transfer of munitions to their Arab partners.Across Africa, country after country broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, and in Asia, the pro-American Japanese nearly did the same.
All this contributed to an increasing dependence on the US, which remained Israel’s almost singular friend. But with Egypt’s postwar reorientation to the West and the newfound global power of the Arab oil exporters, many in Israel were skeptical about the long-term sustainability of American support.
Altogether, Israel was struck by a series of harsh blows, first and foremost the terrible number of combat casualties. And in contrast to the sense of strength and opportunity that followed the 1967 triumph, the Yom Kippur War ended with Israelis experiencing a combination of military vulnerability, diplomatic isolation, and economic austerity.
Faith in the national leadership dropped. A protest movement engulfed the country calling for the resignation of those in government deemed responsible for the war’s failures. Angry demonstrators shouted “murderer” at defense minister Moshe Dayan.
There was a growing public discussion on emigration, about Israelis departing for greener pastures abroad. A joke was told that the last person to depart should remember to turn off the lights. This sentiment prompted prime minister Yitzhak Rabin’s 1976 description of the emigrants as a “fallout of weaklings.”
Yet, if the Yom Kippur War was a turning point, it wasn’t as bleak as it appeared at the time.
The war ended with direct Egypt-Israel military-to-military talks. These were the harbinger of a dialogue that led to disengagement agreements and ultimately to the 1979 peace treaty – Israel’s first with an Arab country.
In the decades since, Israel has normalized relations with Jordan and Morocco, both of whom sent forces to fight the IDF in 1973 – the former to the Syrian front, the latter in support of Egypt.
And of the Arab petroleum producers who weaponized oil against Israel, the 2020 Abraham Accords saw agreements reached with the UAE and Bahrain. Today, there is even talk of a breakthrough with Saudi Arabia.
If in 1973 Israelis worried that petroleum gave their enemies a colossal advantage, it wasn’t to last. The global energy market has changed in ways that have diminished Arab ascendancy. Simultaneously, Israeli technological innovation has made the Jewish state a sought-after partner. (In the 21st century, is technology not competing with fossil fuels for being the number one driver of economic growth?)
In contrast to the diplomatic isolation of 1973, Israel has returned to Africa, augmented its ties across Asia, and built strong partnerships in Europe – as was seen in the recent $3.5 billion deal for the supply of the Arrow-3 missile defense system to Germany.
Furthermore, those who forecasted an inevitable decline in American support for Israel have, thus far, been wrong in their doomsday predictions. Over the past five decades, the trajectory of Israel-US ties has been indisputably positive, despite all the bumps along the road.
At the end of 1973, Israelis were hurting, apprehensive, and unsure. Although the country had successfully resisted a powerful assault, there was no celebration, but rather a pervasive dispiritedness.
We know today that the postwar gloominess, though certainly understandable, was unjustified in historical terms. Perhaps this fact can give Israelis a measure of succor as we deal with today’s seemingly existential divisions.
The writer, formerly an adviser to the prime minister, is chair of the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy at Reichman University. Connect with him on LinkedIn, @Ambassador Mark Regev.