Around two years ago, a serious security breach was uncovered at the residence of former defense minister Benny Gantz. A cleaning worker, who had supposedly undergone a "background check," was revealed to be a convicted felon with a history of bank robberies and connections to terrorist elements.
This employee had been working at the minister's house and had managed to pass all the necessary approvals and screenings, showing an unnerving enthusiasm for thorough cleaning.
The people responsible for hiring and employing this worker failed to recognize the potential threat from the beginning. They did not properly assess the human factor or establish updated protocols for hiring and placing individuals in sensitive facilities like the defense minister's house in Israel.
In February of this year, there were suspicions of biased tendering processes related to the construction and maintenance of IDF bases and facilities.
According to reports, a sophisticated criminal cartel supposedly operated behind the scenes, submitting separate tenders without the knowledge of the security system. Each winning contract was allegedly associated with this organized crime group, leading to continuous problems and compromises.
It is not difficult to assume that criminal elements often collaborate with "business partners" associated with terrorist organizations, engaging in activities such as drug and human trafficking.
These companies and suppliers tend to hire workers similar to the aforementioned cleaning worker at the defense minister's house, who are deemed a "risk group" due to their involvement in military and security projects.
In such projects, it is not always possible to strictly adhere to cost-based tenders, as the cheapest option might turn out to be the most compromised. Security and military tenders should consider factors such as threat assessment, compartmentalization, classification, information security, and privacy preservation.
Information security goes beyond restricting access for employees and suppliers; it requires diligent and careful selection processes.
In today's digital era, information collection and privacy breaches occur routinely for various reasons. The motivations behind collecting information in secret spaces are vast and pursued with determination.
Gathering information jeopardizes personal privacy, compromises security, and endangers missions. The rapidly evolving digital age, with the proliferation of the "Internet of Things" and artificial intelligence, increases sharing and exposure without bounds.
The economy is transitioning from smaller entities to larger corporations and "campuses," resulting in an intergenerational crisis in the maintenance and service workforce. Large entities are accumulating vast amounts of information without the ability to securely store it.
The widening gap between companies, service providers, and customers diminishes commitment, loyalty, and professional values, which encompass execution, control, safety, and privacy maintenance. Technological integration in the supply chain often overlooks the role of the human factor in ensuring security, safety, and asset maintenance.
Civilian and operational secret collection became evident shortly after the outbreak of the recent war, with the discovery that the terrorists and Hamas organization had meticulously prepared and possessed detailed knowledge of settlements, residents, and strategic military facilities in the area.
Maps and satellite photographs were found on the bodies of the terrorists, providing precise information about these locations. However, decoding, cross-checking, and verifying such information require accurate and continuous intelligence.
Videos of terrorists infiltrating the IDF Gaza Division revealed their familiarity with the division commander's office, the layout of rooms, and the actual location of the commander. It is clear that this meticulous gathering of information cannot be solely attributed to maps and visible data.
Additionally, residents themselves disclosed that for many years, workers from the Gaza Strip were employed full-time within settlements, engaging in operations, maintenance, services, and agriculture.
It can be assumed that a significant portion of this workforce willingly or out of fear served as informants, collecting accurate and high-quality intelligence for terrorist organizations over the years.
In this case, unlike the defense minister's house, where it was possible to scrutinize and vet employees and contractors, the sheer number of workers residing in the Gaza Strip made comprehensive checks impossible. The state should have anticipated the threat and understood that labor, suppliers, logistics, agriculture, and maintenance are integral parts of overall safety and security.
The state, along with the security system, failed to recognize the routine information gathering occurring in the civilian and operational spaces, which formed the foundation for a real future threat. This lapse allowed terrorist organizations, led by Hamas, to infiltrate the core of Israel with consistent and determined information gathering efforts.
Procurement and tendering personnel often lack awareness of the security and intelligence threat landscape, while security personnel alone cannot provide comprehensive and secure service and logistics solutions without a thorough understanding of procurement, tendering, security, privacy, and information security.
In the case of southern settlements, where a large number of workers from the Gaza Strip were employed, comprehensive background checks were challenging. However, it is crucial to anticipate the potential risks and seek alternative solutions.
Balancing security concerns with economic needs is a delicate task, but the state must prioritize safety without compromising its citizens' privacy and security.
Intelligence is not just limited to James Bond movies with happy endings. It involves continuous and meticulous collection, even within civilian and operational spaces.
Many details are acquired over a long period, as terrorist organizations have done through their workforce employed within the core of Israel.
The author is a consultant and lecturer specializing in intelligence gathering, covert security, and the human factor in secret dimensions, with a focus on maintaining privacy for individuals and assets.