In October 1967, a young Benjamin Netanyahu, in the middle of his infantry training, received a letter with advice from his older brother, Yoni, then a rising officer in the Israel Defense Forces’ Matkal commando unit. Among expressions of brotherly love, Yoni tried to convey critical insights on topography and hints for successful orienteering.
He pointed out that quick assumptions when navigating in a wadi can be treacherous. What looks like a straight line on a map may, in the field, have a hidden, misleading curve. “Walk inside a wadi about 100-150 yards and see if the direction is correct.” Only after knowing one is fully on the right path should one continue towards one’s objective.
Heeding his brother’s advice today, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should greet Israel’s military victories in Iran with caution and prepare the public for the longer struggle that remains along a still challenging path. Despite its dangers, it is a path that promises opportunities to advance Israel’s security well beyond the Iranian arena.
Sadly, providing a lesson in the unhelpful, President Trump continues to describe the US attack on Iran as a one-off, knock-out blow to Iran’s nuclear program. According to President Trump’s various statements, the final US attacks were so successful in harming the Iranian nuclear program and cowing the Iranians that there is not even a great need for a formal nuclear agreement with Iran.
Nevertheless, US and Iranian officials are to meet next week in order to begin working on one. All should hope they succeed.
Avoiding the illusion of the quick win
As tempting as it is to thrill with the notion that “Boom! We’re done!” – it is prudent to take Yoni Netanyahu’s advice to his brother in order to ensure the full continuation to Israel’s objective – an Iran prevented or deterred from developing nuclear weapons and lacking the capacity to deliver nuclear or conventional warheads to Israel on missiles.
A key hurdle to achieving the objective of a nuclear-free Iran – and one without missile systems with which to threaten its neighbors – is linked to the question marks hovering over Trump’s stamina for facing the longer-term challenges that the regime’s nuclear and missile programs present even today. These challenges cannot be met with kinetic operations alone.
Trump and quick wins
Trump seems to have hoped to leverage his claims of successful US intervention in Iran at this week’s NATO summit in the Netherlands, and it is worth asking: “Why?”
A focus on the US action in Iran at the NATO summit should raise an eyebrow. This is not only because claims of having dealt successfully with Iran’s nuclear issue are premature, but more specifically because the Russia-Ukraine War poses arguably the most significant security threat to Europe since World War II.
Shouldn’t that be a greater focus in a NATO summit?
When asked at a press conference at the conclusion of the NATO summit, why he has not been able to end the war after promising to have it ended quickly after taking office, Trump responded and then digressed, “Because it is more difficult than people would have any idea.
“Vladimir Putin has been more difficult. Frankly, I had some problems with Zelensky […] It’s been more difficult than other wars. I mean, look, we just ended a war [between Israel and Iran] in 12 days that was simmering for 30 years.”
The rest of his response related to a string of other successful peacemaking efforts that he claims. But it shed little light on Russia and Ukraine.
Just as Trump avoided the heavy lifting involved in pressing Putin to end the war in Ukraine, the US president can easily do the same with respect to Iran and nuclear weapons.
What is Israel to do?
What, then, is Israel to do in order to prevent Iran from reconstituting its nuclear program, from achieving a nuclear breakout – should it indeed have succeeded in spiriting away some of its enriched uranium – or rebuilding its supply of missiles to use against Israel?
A longer-term strategy must look beyond the quick and potentially deceptive victories of the past 12 days.
It would be good for Netanyahu to avoid trying to oversell the legitimately extraordinary victory that has already been achieved by Israel in Iran. Failing this, it is up to the Israeli public not to accept the myth of the quick win.
Israel should share with the Trump administration its priorities for the coercive diplomacy that it hopes the US will engage in with Iran. This includes lobbying the Trump administration to focus not only on Iran’s nuclear program but also on its missile one
Alongside this, Israel needs to clarify the parameters of the existing ceasefire with the Trump administration, along with the types of violations that would trigger a response by the US or would, in the eyes of the US, justify an Israeli response.
What could entice the Trump administration?
It is likely that the Trump administration could be further enticed toward engagement if it believed that there was broader opportunity, not just for a robust agreement with Iran, but a grand deal of sorts that would involve the expansion of the Abraham Accords – including the prize of Saudi Arabia.
That, in turn, would require a horizon for a political process between Israel and the Palestinians, the ending of the war in Gaza, the return of Israeli hostages, and cooperation with regional actors able to help stabilize Gaza. It is as readily possible to identify opportunities that exist and to map out possible routes towards their fulfillment as it is to identify internal Israeli political hurdles that will prevent them.
This is exactly where Trump’s desire to get deals done – and more than a small bit of good fortune – can be helpful.
The writer is a strategic consultant and lecturer. He served as a General Staff officer in the Israel Defense Forces’ Strategic Planning Division, where he worked on Israel’s defense-oriented international relations.