How the Iran war impacted Israel's haredi conscription debate - opinion

One of the most immediate and impactful consequences of the 12-day war is Israel’s expanded freedom of action and use of force across the Middle East. Prior to the conflict, Israeli military operations, especially against Iranian proxies or infrastructure in nations such as Syria and Lebanon, were conducted with a careful eye on avoiding broader escalation and international condemnation.

The direct, large-scale confrontation with Iran, however, appears to have recalibrated these strategic boundaries. With the support of the West, Israel could now pursue a more assertive and less constrained military posture throughout the region.

The post-Iran-war period has seen Israel adopting a strategic doctrine akin to “ongoing security” or “mowing the lawn” across all its active fronts. This means executing lower-intensity operations aimed at preserving military achievements and preventing enemies from rebuilding or rearming. This approach, prior to October 7, was employed with some success in Syria to prevent Iranian military entrenchment, and has now been formalized and expanded.

In Lebanon, the agreement with Hezbollah is strictly enforced, with immediate and forceful retaliatory strikes for any violations. Similarly, repeated attacks on the Houthis have severely degraded their ability to project power. Most notably, this doctrine could probably extend to Iran itself. Should Tehran attempt to revive its nuclear program, it is now highly likely to trigger preemptive and repeated attacks.

This conflict signifies a fundamental shift in Israel’s security perception. For decades, the Iranian nuclear program and its regional proxy network represented an existential threat – a “day of judgment” scenario whose scale and consequences were difficult to quantify. The resources required to address such a threat were always unknown, and the potential damage from a full-scale confrontation was often considered incalculable.

The war served to effectively transform Iran from an “existential threat” to another “arena” in which the IDF could actively maintain its “military achievement.” This is a monumental shift. It implies that while Iran remains an adversary, it is now perceived as a manageable challenge within Israel’s existing strategic framework.

The immediate, overwhelming dread associated with an unchecked Iranian nuclear program and an unbridled proxy axis has been replaced by a more pragmatic, ongoing commitment to maintaining military superiority.

This redefinition of the Iranian threat, and the fact that there is no threat on Israel’s security horizon of a similar magnitude to the one that has been removed, allows for more structured resource allocation and a more predictable security environment, reducing the sense of an impending, uncontrollable catastrophe.

This is because the IDF, with its current human resources and capabilities, was able to face and overcome the most difficult part of the task. This successful outcome, even if not complete, will probably alleviate the intense pressure that existed pre-Iran-war to dramatically increase the size of the standing army or significantly expand the pool of conscripts.

While the various active arenas require constant vigilance and operational readiness, the strategic picture no longer demands a massive influx of new personnel beyond what is currently sustainable. The existing forces have proven their capacity to handle the new “mowing the lawn across the Middle East” paradigm.

The decreased immediate need for a substantial expansion of the army’s ranks also lessens the acute pressure to accelerate the conscription of haredim into the IDF, with all the political and social implications that entails.

However, with the strategic shift and the successful management of the Iranian threat, and the reduced expectation of a full-blown existential war, the urgency surrounding increased manpower from the haredi sector would diminish.

Their conscription is still essential for a variety of reasons, including social cohesion, equality of burden, integration into the labor market, and a clear contribution to security by reducing the burden on regular and reserve personnel – but not with the same urgency as before.

The paradoxical outcome of Israel opening many fronts of war is that it will likely lead to granting some kind of exemption from conscription to the ultra-Orthodox.

Historically, the IDF has been largely resistant to widespread exemptions, citing the principle of shared burden and the operational needs of the military.

Nevertheless, with the removal of the existential threat posed by Iran and the demonstrated ability of the existing forces to manage the “ongoing security” landscape, the military’s opposition to such exemptions is expected to soften. The immediate, urgent need for every available soldier has diminished.

This shift in military perception, coupled with the ongoing societal pressures and political realities surrounding haredi integration, could create an environment where a limited, carefully structured exemption for yeshiva students could become more politically and militarily palatable.

The war with Iran has thus not only redefined Israel’s standing in the Middle East but has also created unexpected ripples within its domestic social and political fabric, particularly regarding the longstanding debate over military service for its ultra-Orthodox citizens.