The Israel-Hamas War appears to be approaching its endgame. After nearly two years of grueling combat, political hesitation, and diplomatic friction, the two sides that matter most - Jerusalem and Washington - are signaling readiness to move toward closure.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated that he is prepared for the war to be declared over, provided that a comprehensive deal can be reached to secure the release of the remaining hostages and dismantle Hamas’s hold over Gaza.
Equally critical is the shift taking place in Washington. On Wednesday, President Donald Trump convened a high-level meeting at the White House to discuss “day after” scenarios for Gaza.
The timing was deliberate: Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer were in town, underscoring the convergence of Israeli and American decision-making.
Trump has reportedly grown increasingly impatient, telling advisers that he “can no longer watch what is happening in Gaza.” His special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, has said bluntly that the president wants the war over, “one way or another,” by 2026.
This alignment is pivotal. For Netanyahu, the question is no longer just about Israeli domestic politics and the makeup of the coalition. If the White House’s patience has run out, then the message is unmistakable: It is time to end the war, bring back the hostages, and begin the transition to a new governing framework in Gaza.
INSIDE ISRAEL’S security establishment, the pressure to move toward a deal is just as strong. IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir has emerged as one of the strongest advocates for taking the current deal, even if it is phased.
He supports the framework Hamas has reportedly already agreed to – a phased arrangement in which some hostages are released upfront, a ceasefire follows, humanitarian aid increases, and further hostage releases occur in stages.
Zamir’s view rests on a belief that additional ground operations, including an assault on Gaza City, will not fundamentally change the outcome of this war. Hamas has already been degraded militarily to the level necessary to conclude the campaign.
This position has created a deep rift between the prime minister and the military chief. Netanyahu continues to insist on “total victory,” a phrase he repeats at every opportunity, yet within IDF headquarters the definition of victory is more restrained.
The isolation factor is decisive. Israel has been able to sustain its war effort largely because of a supportive White House. Without Trump’s backing, the calculus in Jerusalem changes. Proceeding into Gaza City without Washington’s consent would be nearly impossible, and Netanyahu knows this.
Even with all his talent to maneuver and delay, he recognizes the dangers of a rupture with Trump. All he has to do is call Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, once the darling of Washington, to understand what can happen.
The Israeli government now faces a dilemma of historic proportions. On the one hand, it cannot credibly end the war without securing the return of all the hostages. On the other hand, it cannot declare victory while Hamas remains in power in Gaza. Achieving both objectives simultaneously has been the great paradox of this war since the beginning.
Why was a ceasefire with Hezbollah possible?
Comparisons are often made to Israel’s confrontation with Hezbollah in Lebanon, but they miss crucial distinctions.
A ceasefire with Hezbollah was possible for three reasons. First, Lebanon, though dominated by the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, remained a recognized state with which the international community could engage. Israel never contemplated conquering all of Lebanon.
Second, it was not Hezbollah that stormed across the border on October 7, massacring 1,200 Israelis in the deadliest day for Jews since the Holocaust. That atrocity was Hamas’s doing, and it cemented the organization as Israel’s unforgivable enemy.
While Hezbollah joined the war on October 8, it did so with extreme limitations, fighting more symbolically than out of a real desire to take on Israel. But even that was too much as Hassan Nasrallah certainly realized in his last moments as oxygen was running out in the Beirut bunker where he was killed by an Israeli airstrike.
Third, Hezbollah never took hostages. It did not abduct 251 people from homes, bases, and a music festival. Hamas did.
That act – kidnapping civilians and soldiers en masse – pierced the Israeli heart in a way rockets and missiles never could. It ensured that no outcome would ever be judged a true victory unless the hostages returned home.
This is why the war cannot simply “end.”
OCTOBER 7 altered Israel’s strategic equation in ways nothing had before. Dismissed for years as Israel’s weakest enemy, Hamas inflicted the most grievous wound in Israel’s history. It shattered the illusion of security, exposed complacency at the highest levels, and forced Israelis to grapple with a question that has haunted every subsequent debate: What constitutes victory?
If the hostages are returned, but Hamas remains in power, some will see it as a triumph, while others will call it a defeat. If Hamas is toppled, but hostages remain in captivity, the judgment will be equally divided. Trying to find the balance of these two outcomes has been the greatest obstacle in Israeli decision-making for nearly two years.
In our new book, While Israel Slept, which arrives in bookstores on Tuesday – Amir Bohbot and I trace the failures that set the stage for October 7. We examine not only the intelligence lapses and operational mistakes between October 6 and October 7 but also the deeper strategic illusions that allowed Israel to drift into complacency.
How could a country so attuned to its threats convince itself that Hamas, a genocidal movement sworn to Israel’s destruction, could be bought off with suitcases of Qatari cash? How did successive governments ignore the tunnels, weapons stockpiles, and open training exercises for raids on Israeli bases, preferring instead to believe that Hamas could be deterred?
The answer lies not only in intelligence assessments but in a belief system that transcended political divides. From Netanyahu to Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, prime ministers from all parties shared the conviction that Hamas could be contained, managed, and ultimately neutralized as a governing body. October 7 shattered that illusion with devastating clarity.
This is why a State Commission of Inquiry is essential. The fact that one has not yet been established is in itself dangerous. Without an authoritative process to dissect how Israel failed so profoundly, the same assumptions risk taking root again. The war may be winding down, but unless lessons are learned, the next crisis will arrive sooner than anyone expects.
Looking ahead, Israel faces three urgent tasks. First, to secure the release of the hostages through a phased or comprehensive agreement, even if it means painful compromises. Second, to bring the war to a close in coordination with Washington, preserving its irreplaceable alliance with the United States. Third, to help facilitate a new governing entity in Gaza, capable of preventing Hamas from reconstituting itself.
Even then, the journey will be far from complete.
Victory, if it can be defined at all, will be measured not just in battlefield triumphs but in the resilience of Israel’s society, the deterrence that has been created, and the ability to ensure that October 7 never happens again. That will require more than military force; it will demand political courage, institutional reform, and an honest reckoning with the illusions of the past.
Israel slept once – and paid the highest price. It cannot afford to sleep again.
The writer is a co-founder of the MEAD policy forum, co-author of While Israel Slept, about the October 7 attack, a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute, and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post.