Israel’s quiet gambit on the Red Sea chessboard - opinion

In chess, the most decisive moments are often misunderstood. They do not always arrive with a dramatic sacrifice or a thunderous check but with a quiet repositioning, an unexpected move that limits the opponent’s options and forces a choice. Israel’s emerging willingness to recognize Somaliland should be understood in exactly these terms: not as a symbolic gesture but as a move designed to place Saudi Arabia in strategic zugzwang.

Somaliland sits near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the southern gateway to the Red Sea, through which a significant share of global trade and energy flows. For Israel – whose access to the Red Sea via Eilat and onward to the Suez Canal is strategically vital – this choke point is not marginal. It is foundational.

Iran has long understood this logic, which is why it invested heavily in asymmetric influence in Yemen through the Houthis, threatening maritime traffic and projecting pressure toward Israel and Saudi Arabia alike. Israel’s challenge has therefore been not only to deter Iran militarily but to shape the broader strategic environment around the Red Sea. Recognition of Somaliland offers a way to do precisely that – quietly, diplomatically, and with lasting effects.

But Tehran is only the first audience. The more consequential target is Riyadh.

This is where recent history matters.

Over the past two years, Israel has demonstrated – through action rather than diplomacy – its capacity to reshape the regional balance in ways that directly affect Saudi interests.

Iranian power projection has been rolled back across multiple fronts. Iran’s nuclear program has been pushed further from operational reality, reducing the strategic pressure on Gulf states.

Hezbollah has been significantly degraded, weakening Iran’s deterrence umbrella and limiting Tehran’s ability to threaten escalation across the Levant. Hamas has been badly weakened, diminishing Iran’s ability to ignite multifront crises that destabilize the broader region.

Most importantly for Riyadh, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has broken a central land bridge of Iranian influence. A Syria no longer firmly anchored to Tehran reduces Iran’s ability to encircle the Arabian Peninsula from the north and lowers long-term strategic pressure on Saudi Arabia’s borders and allies.

At the southern end of the region, Israeli action has also contributed to weakening the Houthis, directly serving Saudi security. Reduced Houthi operational capacity has meant fewer effective missile and drone threats against Saudi cities, energy infrastructure, and Red Sea shipping. These outcomes matter to Riyadh regardless of normalization; they demonstrate Israel’s concrete strategic utility.

These developments should not be understood as “carrots” awaiting delivery. They are proof of capability. They show Saudi Arabia what alignment with Israel and the US security framework already produces and what Riyadh risks forfeiting by remaining noncommittal.

This is where Somaliland becomes pivotal.

For Saudi Arabia, this is uncomfortable. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are partners but also competitors, with diverging interests in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and regional leadership. As the UAE deepens its footprint in Somaliland and southern Yemen, Saudi Arabia risks watching critical maritime and strategic terrain fall under a framework it does not fully control.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Iran – brokered by China – has bought Riyadh short-term deescalation, but at the cost of strategic ambiguity. It has not dismantled Iranian proxy networks, nor has it secured lasting guarantees against future pressure. Israel’s Somaliland move underscores this reality: While Riyadh hedges, others are actively shaping the board.

This is the essence of the gambit.

Recognition of Somaliland does not coerce Saudi Arabia directly. It narrows its options. It signals that a US-Israel-UAE security and maritime architecture is taking shape regardless of Saudi hesitation and that remaining outside it carries tangible strategic costs.

Timing only sharpens the effect. For Israel, Saudi entry into the Abraham Accords would lock in a transformed regional order. For Washington, Saudi-Israeli normalization would be a rare and visible foreign-policy achievement ahead of domestic political milestones. Delay favors no one, but it hurts Saudi Arabia most.

In chess, zugzwang is not about forcing an immediate blunder. It is about reaching a position where every move worsens one’s standing. Recognition of Somaliland may appear peripheral, but it tightens Saudi Arabia’s strategic space. The question is no longer whether Riyadh can avoid choosing sides. It is whether it will shape the emerging order or be shaped by it.