For the first time in decades, Iran’s ruling system looks genuinely brittle. Protests are spreading across multiple provinces, the economy is collapsing under inflation and mismanagement, and the regime’s aura of invincibility has been badly damaged by its recent 12-day confrontation with Israel. History does not offer many moments like this. Israel should recognize it for what it is – and prepare to act with discipline, patience, and restraint.
Israel’s interest in political change in Tehran is neither ideological nor abstract. For more than four decades, Iran’s regime has defined hostility toward Israel as a core pillar of its identity. It has armed and funded Hezbollah, Hamas, and other proxies; targeted Israeli and Jewish interests worldwide; pursued long-range missile capabilities; and advanced a nuclear program whose ultimate intent remains deeply troubling. Even after Israel’s recent military success, the Islamic Republic retains the capacity to threaten Israel through missiles, proxies, and escalation across multiple fronts. A weaker, isolated regime is not the same as a benign one.
Yet Israel cannot topple Iran’s rulers: Only Iranians can do that. Nor should Israel try to place itself at the center of Iran’s internal struggle. Overt Israeli involvement would almost certainly backfire, allowing the regime to discredit protesters as foreign agents and fracture fragile domestic coalitions. The first rule for Israel, therefore, is strategic humility: avoid public gestures, avoid high-profile meetings with opposition figures, and avoid anything that places Israel’s fingerprints on a movement that must remain authentically Iranian.
Still, discretion does not mean passivity. Quietly and indirectly, Israel can do a great deal.
Inside Iran, opposition energy is real but fragmented. Protesters chant against the Islamic Republic, and increasingly, some invoke the name of the former shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi, as a symbol of national unity and continuity. Pahlavi has spent years trying to position himself as a unifying figure rather than a claimant to personal power. Among the divided exile landscape, he remains the only figure with a plausible chance of bridging monarchists, republicans, secular activists, reform-minded clerics, and disaffected elites. That does not mean he commands a movement – but it does mean he represents a potential focal point in a fractured opposition ecosystem.
Israel can contribute to the Ayatollah's downfall
Israel should understand that a political transition in Iran will hinge less on street protests alone than on elite recalculation. Regimes fall when insiders defect, stand aside, or refuse to repress. Here, Israel’s intelligence capabilities are a strategic asset. Israel likely has among the best insights into fissures within Iran’s security services, business elite, clerical establishment, and technocratic class.
Sharing carefully vetted intelligence with trusted partners – particularly the United States and select opposition interlocutors – could help map fault lines, identify potential swing actors, and avoid missteps that unify the regime when it is otherwise vulnerable.
Information and communication are another decisive arena. The Iranian state’s first response to unrest is repression and blackout. Helping Iranians stay connected – to each other and to the outside world – strengthens civil society without dictating its actions. Support for resilient communications, independent media, and secure information flows can blunt the regime’s most effective tools: isolation, fear, and disinformation. This is not about propaganda; it is about preserving space for Iranians to see, hear, and coordinate for themselves.
Israel can also contribute in the digital domain in ways that stop short of overt escalation. Cyber capabilities that disrupt censorship, expose corruption, or temporarily degrade the regime’s ability to surveil and intimidate its population weaken repression without dictating outcomes. Used judiciously and quietly, such tools can raise the cost of brutality while lowering the barriers to collective action.
While transferring weapons to opposition forces within the country may be a bridge too far for some, given the regime’s history of repression, it is the only way to help the population defend itself against the inevitable crackdown. Putting up forced resistance can also help change the momentum of events. Parts of the government, such as the military, may be much more reluctant to act in the face of an armed opposition. And the more the regime seems enfeebled, the more likely it will suffer defections.
None of this will matter, however, without American engagement. Israel should press Washington – privately and persistently – to move beyond rhetoric. Statements warning Tehran against violence are welcome, but insufficient.
The United States retains unmatched diplomatic, financial, and informational leverage. Coordinated transatlantic pressure, targeted sanctions against repressors, and visible political support for Iranian civil society – timed carefully and delivered with discipline – could significantly alter elite calculations inside Iran.
The objective should not be chaos or collapse: It should be a choice, where the political environment will emerge in which enough Iranians, including those within the system, conclude that the costs of maintaining the status quo outweigh the risks of change. That requires patience, coordination, and a clear understanding of limits. While Israel cannot manufacture an Iranian revolution, it can help shape the conditions under which one becomes possible.
Moments of regime weakness rarely last. Tehran will adapt, repress, and try to restore fear. Israel should neither exaggerate the moment nor waste it. Acting quietly, in concert with allies, and with a clear-eyed understanding of Iranian society, Israel can advance its core security interests while respecting a fundamental truth: that Iran’s future belongs to Iranians – but others can help determine whether that future ever gets a chance.
The writer is a leading expert on fragile states and political transitions. He is senior adviser to the Institute for Integrated Transitions and a lecturer at Johns Hopkins University.