Iran, Muslim Brotherhood may turn Sudan into an attack platform against Israel - opinion

Africa has become one of these arenas. Iranian strategy today is not confined to direct confrontation; it is built on depth, encirclement, and deniability, achieved through alliances with Islamist movements and armed proxies. In this architecture, the Muslim Brotherhood occupies a critical role as an ideological enabler, political cover, and logistical facilitator.

Sudan’s war must therefore be understood not as a distant African conflict but as part of a long-term strategic environment that directly affects Israel’s security. A Sudan captured by Brotherhood doctrine and Iranian influence represents not only an African crisis but another potential platform in the expanding arc of pressure against Israel.

Africa today stands at a strategic crossroads. It is a continent of immense natural wealth, demographic dynamism, and geopolitical potential – but also one increasingly targeted by external powers and transnational movements that thrive on weak states, ideological radicalism, and prolonged conflict. From the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, militant groups inspired by radical Islamist doctrines are expanding their reach, often nourished by political Islamist networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and enabled by Iranian support.

In this context, Sudan’s war is not an isolated national tragedy. It is a frontline battle for Africa’s future – and a test case for whether Iran and its ideological partners can convert state collapse into durable strategic assets. If Sudan’s crisis is not resolved at its roots, the consequences will not stop at its borders. They will reverberate across Africa and, through migration, security spillovers, and proxy warfare, directly affect Europe and Israel alike.

By any serious measure, the Sudanese military regime led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan does not operate in isolation. At its core lies a deeply entrenched ideological and organizational force: the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood. While international attention has largely framed Sudan’s war as a struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), this binary obscures a more consequential reality.

The conflict is the latest chapter in the Brotherhood’s decades-long project to dominate the Sudanese state – by force when necessary, by infiltration when possible, and by regional alliances when useful. What is unfolding in Sudan today follows a familiar pattern observed elsewhere: state institutions hollowed out from within, sovereignty weaponized, and war prolonged in order to preserve ideological control.

These fighters were reorganized into ideologically driven militias, most prominently the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion, alongside formations such as the Shield of the Homeland and North Shield. According to documented reporting, these units received arms, financing, and logistical support through official military channels, effectively blurring the line between state forces and Islamist militias.

Politically, Brotherhood-aligned parties and media outlets have worked systematically to undermine ceasefire efforts, reject negotiations, and delegitimize civilian alternatives. The war has been framed as an existential struggle against “foreign agents” and “enemies of Islam.” This rhetoric is not incidental; it is designed to justify indefinite conflict while positioning the Brotherhood as an indispensable wartime ally.

The creation of so-called “popular resistance” structures, endorsed by Burhan’s command, has provided the Brotherhood with a new institutional incubator after the formal dissolution of its former ruling party. In effect, war has become the mechanism through which the organization has re-entered the state under the banner of national defense.

While the Brotherhood and al-Qaeda differed ideologically, they converged tactically. Sudan served as a permissive environment where extremist networks could operate with minimal restraint. The lesson is clear and highly relevant to Israel: When political Islam captures the state, it consistently creates space for actors far more violent and uncompromising than itself.

After the fall of Omar al-Bashir in 2019, Sudanese authorities dismantled a network of Hamas-linked companies, seizing real estate, agricultural land, factories, media outlets, and financial firms valued in the tens of millions of dollars. Subsequent sanctions confirmed that Sudanese-based financiers had transferred approximately $20 million to Hamas. Sudan was not merely a financial hub; it was a logistical corridor.

Despite Sunni-Shia differences, the Brotherhood’s relationship with Iran has been driven by strategic pragmatism. Sudan served as a transit point for Iranian weapons destined for Hamas, particularly between 2009 and 2012. Arms originating in Iran and post-Muammar Gaddafi Libya moved through Sudan toward Gaza, contributing to repeated Israeli strikes on Sudanese territory.

For Iran, Sudan offered geographic reach into Africa and proximity to Israel’s southern strategic environment. For the Brotherhood, Iranian support provided leverage, resources, and regional relevance. Ideology proved secondary to shared enemies – chief among them Israel – and mutual utility.

Taken together, these patterns lead to an unavoidable conclusion: The Muslim Brotherhood is not an external influence on Burhan’s regime; it is its ideological and organizational backbone. The Brotherhood supplies fighters, intelligence expertise, political justification for prolonged war, and regional networks capable of mobilizing finance and propaganda. Burhan’s leadership, in turn, provides legitimacy, arms, and access to the state – replicating the same bargain that sustained Islamist rule under Bashir.

For Israel, the implications are strategic and long-term. A Sudan dominated by Brotherhood ideology and Iranian influence risks becoming another platform in Iran’s expanding network of indirect confrontation – one that stretches from Lebanon and Gaza into Africa.

Sudan’s war has many fronts, but its center of gravity remains unchanged. Until the Brotherhood’s grip on the state is broken, peace will remain elusive – and the strategic threat emanating from Sudan will continue to grow.