About a decade ago, during one of the periodic rounds of fighting in Gaza, I attended a briefing with a senior IDF general. It was the kind of update that had become almost routine – maps on the wall, casualty figures being reviewed, assessments about escalation and deterrence.
At one point someone asked how Israel and Hamas manage to signal intentions when they have no direct line of communication. The general answered matter-of-factly: “We talk through artillery.”
He wasn’t being dramatic. He was describing the logic of conflict. If a rocket lands in an open field, the response is calibrated one way. If it hits a home, it is calibrated differently. If there are casualties, the response changes again. Each side communicates through action – through what it chooses to hit, and how hard.
That “artillery language” is now being spoken on a much larger stage.
On one track, President Donald Trump’s Middle East envoys – Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – continue talks with Iranian officials in Oman. On another track, the United States is reinforcing its already substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf. The aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush, wrapping up exercises off the coast of Virginia, could soon make its way eastward to join the USS Lincoln and other destroyers, submarines, and fighter squadrons already in the region.
The message is unmistakable. Diplomacy is the preference – but force is not off the table.
Armada sitting within striking distance of Iran
This is leverage, pure and simple. The armada sitting within striking distance of Iran is a sword held right up across Khameinei’s throat. Trump has made it clear that he prefers a deal to another war. But he is also signaling that if Tehran miscalculates – if it drags out negotiations or rejects the proposed terms outright – there will be consequences.
At the same time, such a military posture is not indefinitely sustainable. Aircraft carriers and strike groups are enormously expensive instruments of power, and there are other areas of operations for the US Navy. The longer the vessels sit idle, the more the leverage erodes. Tehran understands that as well.
Trump is gambling that the Iranians will conclude that they are better off making a deal than testing American resolve, and Israel, naturally, has reason to watch all of this with concern.
This is not because Trump has shown indifference to Israeli security. Quite the opposite. In June, during Operation Midnight Hammer, he joined Israel in delivering a devastating blow to Iran’s key nuclear facilities. That decision shattered the narrative that Washington would never act militarily. It proved that when push comes to shove, the United States can and will stand alongside Israel.
But geography matters.
The US is separated from Iran by an ocean. Israel is separated from Iran by about 2,000 kilometers. Strategic depth changes perception. When you have an ocean and another continent as a buffer, you assess risk differently than when you are within shooting range.
We saw this in June. Even when the vast majority of Iranian missiles were intercepted by Israeli and American defense systems, the approximately 10 percent that penetrated caused immense damage. It does not take many warheads to cause extensive damage to a city the size of Tel Aviv or Haifa. For Israelis, the threat is not theoretical. It is immediate.
That difference in proximity shapes how each country defines “acceptable risk.”
Then there is the question of deception. In high-stakes diplomacy, especially when backed by military force, public messaging rarely tells the full story. The dispatch of an additional carrier strike group is a signal – but so are Trump’s public statements about patience and continued negotiations.
In June, while public messaging suggested that diplomacy was still being given time, behind the scenes, Israel and the US were coordinating the final stages of a strike that would be launched within days. Whether we are witnessing a similar dynamic now is maybe known only to a handful of people – and perhaps not even they have made a final decision.
For Israelis trying to plan their lives, family visits or business trips, this ambiguity is unnerving. Will the airport remain open? Will there be sirens again? Will reserves be called up? The truth is that very little is within anyone’s control.
This recognition – a necessary lesson from the last two years – may be the only way to navigate the uncertainty.
But beyond the substance of a potential deal lies another danger: perception.
Within segments of the Republican Party, particularly among voices aligned with the “America First” movement, there is a deeply rooted suspicion that Israel drags the United States into wars that are not its own. Figures such as Steve Bannon and Tucker Carlson continue to argue that the 12-Day War in June was unnecessary and that Trump only intervened because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pressured him.
That this claim is false is beside the point. It exists. And in American politics, perception can shape policy.
This may explain why Netanyahu’s recent White House visit was so subdued. He entered through a rear entrance. There was no Oval Office photo op and no press conference. Only a single handshake image emerged.
That restraint was likely deliberate.
Israel’s interest right now is not to appear as the impatient party banging the war drum while Washington pursues diplomacy. Even if Jerusalem has concerns about the potential agreement – for example, whether ballistic missile development will be restricted, and whether enrichment will be capped or rolled back – it must balance those concerns against the strategic need to preserve American support.
The worst outcome would not only be a flawed deal. It would be a flawed deal accompanied by a narrative in which Israel is blamed for trying to sabotage diplomacy or push the United States into a war.
If an agreement ultimately emerges, it is unlikely to be a carbon copy of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The regional context has changed, Iran’s nuclear program is at a different stage, and most importantly, Trump is not Barack Obama. Israel’s demonstrated willingness to strike has also changed, and the IDF has proven its prowess. The devil, as always, will be in the details: enrichment levels, breakout timelines, inspections, missile programs, sunset clauses.
And if a deal is signed, Israel’s options will be narrower than they were a decade ago. Acting unilaterally against Iran under the shadow of an American-endorsed agreement would carry far greater diplomatic and strategic costs.
For now, Israel’s wisest course is coordination. Staying aligned as closely as possible with Washington. Preparing quietly for all scenarios. Voicing concerns privately and precisely. Avoiding theatrics and public ultimatums.
In the end, Trump is speaking to Tehran in the language of power backed by negotiation and Iran is calculating its response. Israel’s task is to ensure that, whatever language is ultimately spoken, it does not find itself isolated in translation.
The writer is a co-founder of the MEAD policy forum, a senior fellow at JPPI, and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post. His newest book is While Israel Slept.