One of the most notable phenomena of the war against Iran is the renewed rivalry and struggle between Shi’ites and Sunnis in the Middle East. What is unfolding before our eyes is not only a blow to the Shi’ite regime in Iran, but something much broader, which likely constitutes a turning point regarding the place of Shi’ites in the Arab world, and perhaps in the Muslim world more generally.
The conflict between Shi’ites and Sunnis began in 680 CE following the Battle of Karbala, in which the Umayyad caliph Yazid defeated Husayn ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. With the exception of the Fatimid dynasty’s rule in North Africa during the 10th and 11th centuries, Shi’ites generally occupied an inferior position vis-à-vis the Sunni majority in the Arab world, and in many places they were forced to conceal their religious identity.
Although Shi’ite Islam had ruled Iran since it was adopted by the Safavid dynasty in the early sixteenth century, the rule of the shahs in the twentieth century (both father and son) adopted many features of Western culture, weakened the religious establishment, and maintained alliances with the United States (openly) and Israel (covertly).
All of this changed in 1979 with Khomeini’s revolution, which was not only a Shi’ite one but also a revolution within Shi’ism itself that, for the first time, granted legitimacy to the rule of religious clerics. Khomeini hoped his ideas would influence Sunni Islam as well, but broadly speaking, he failed, since many in the Sunni world perceived this as an attempt to establish Shi’ite-Iranian hegemony. Nevertheless, Khomeini’s revolution served as fertile ground for the revival of Shi’ite communities across the Arab and Muslim worlds.
The first major change was the awakening of the Shi’ite community in Lebanon, which constitutes at least a third of the population. The establishment of Amal in the 1970s, and especially the creation of Hezbollah after the First Lebanon War, expressed this revival socially and politically. Iran largely “rode the wave” of internal developments within Lebanon in order to consolidate its influence there, while Hezbollah effectively took the Lebanese state “hostage” to interests dictated from outside by Iran.
The second change was the alliance between Iran and Syria, beginning with the Iran-Iraq War that erupted in 1980, when Syria became the only Arab state to support Iran. The fact that Syria was ruled by an Alawite minority – whose religious legitimacy was endorsed by the leading Shi’ite cleric in Lebanon, Musa al-Sadr – expanded Iran’s regional influence, particularly after the war ended in 1988.
The third and most significant change came after the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. Saddam Hussein’s Sunni minority regime was overthrown and replaced by a regime representing the Shi’ite majority. This shift opened the door for expanded Iranian influence in Iraq and enabled the creation of what Jordan’s king famously called in 2004 the “Shi’ite Crescent,” stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.
Finally, one of the outcomes of the Arab Spring revolutions was the takeover of parts of Yemen by the Shi’ite Houthis in 2014 with Iranian assistance. Thus, Iran’s network of proxies – known as the “Axis of Resistance” – was completed, with the Sunni Hamas joining it for pragmatic rather than religious reasons. In retrospect, this period appears as the “golden age” of the Shi’ite-led Axis of Resistance.
Regional war after the October 7 massacre
The regional war that erupted after October 7 weakened the Axis of Resistance, though not dramatically. The first major crack appeared when Syria effectively defected from this camp following the overthrow of the Assad regime and the rise of Ahmad al-Shara. Whether he represents jihadist Islam or has moderated his positions, he heads a Sunni-Islamic regime that views Shi’ite Iran as an enemy and hopes for its downfall.
In the present war, Iran has launched hundreds of missiles and drones toward six Gulf states, ruled by Sunni families and populated by Sunni populations (except Bahrain). These states have always feared Iran’s expansionist ambitions and even established the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 as a bulwark against the Islamic Republic. They also supported Iraq, which was perceived as a defensive shield of the Arab world.
Nevertheless, during 2022–2023, Gulf states moved closer to Iran as part of a “double-insurance” policy – maintaining relations with both the West and Tehran. Yet, its surprising and disproportionate attack against them revived not only interstate tensions but also the Sunni-Shi’ite conflict.
Moreover, the heavy blows Hezbollah has suffered in Lebanon are weakening not only the threat against Israel but also altering Lebanon’s internal political balance. The Lebanese government has declared the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps an illegal organization, banned Hezbollah’s military activities, and required Iranian citizens to obtain visas before entering the country. None of these steps would have been possible previously. This means that the Lebanese government will no longer be held hostage by the organization and will be able to pursue policies serving the interests of the state rather than those of Hezbollah.
THE WEAKENING of Iran and Hezbollah will also affect the Shi’ite community in Iraq. For years, a struggle has existed among Iraqi Shi’ites – who are ethnically Arab rather than Persian – between loyalty to Iraq and Iraqi identity on the one hand and loyalty to Shi’ism and Iran on the other. Iran’s weakening will undoubtedly influence this struggle in favor of those loyal to Iraq. The Houthi story remains unresolved, but if they join the war, they may accelerate this process.
If Khomeini’s revolution in 1979, demographic changes in Lebanon, the US invasion of Iraq, and the Arab Spring strengthened the Shi’ites and Shi’ite Islam in the Middle East, the current war may reverse that trend. Sunni governments and organizations may frame the conflict in religious and ideological terms rather than purely geopolitical or economic ones, thereby deepening the Sunni-Shi’ite divide. In that case, the war against Iran may prove to be a turning point, marking the beginning of the decline of Shi’ism after several decades of growth.
Such a development could have several, sometimes contradictory, outcomes. One possibility is strengthened regional stability based on Sunni-majority states. Another is the religious strengthening of moderate Sunni Islamic forces on the one hand, but perhaps also of jihadist elements seeking to fill the ideological vacuum on the other. Finally, it could reinforce the influence of two leading Sunni states: Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Strengthening regional stability based on moderate Sunni-majority states is, of course, in Israel’s interest. Yet the fear of Israeli regional hegemony among some states could create a new and different challenge for Israel in the aftermath of the war.
The writer is a professor who teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a board member of Mitvim, and a member of the Coalition for Regional Security. Dr. Elisheva Machlis of Bar-Ilan University contributed to this article.