UAE security under fire: Lessons from regional crises, Arab divisions - opinion

As the direct threat to Gulf security escalated, old Arab divisions resurfaced, and hostile rhetoric emerged from some platforms.

It was as if the crisis exposed what diplomatic niceties had concealed for years: wars do not so much create facts as expose them. Perhaps the harshest truth in the Arab world is that so‑called Arab solidarity was little more than a thin diplomatic veneer masking deep contradictions and deferred conflicts.

From my perspective as an observer of the strategic scene, the most dangerous aspect of current events is not just political division but the nature of the rhetoric coming from some Arab capitals and currents.

Instead of addressing regional threats that affect the security of the region as a whole, some rhetoric attacks the Gulf states and questions their strategic choices; in some cases, it even justifies or overlooks Iran’s policies.

Consequently, it should come as no surprise that some media platforms and ideological currents amplify Iranian propaganda during crises.

Rather, the region was split into supporters, opponents, and the hesitant. That day, it became clear that what was called “the Arab system” was nothing but a fragile umbrella masking deep contradictions in vision and interests.

This moment was a political shock: it showed that the nationalist slogans that had filled political discourse for decades were insufficient to build a cohesive regional system.

What further clarifies the picture is that the rhetoric is no longer confined to some governments or political forces; it has become prominent in parts of the Arab press and on social media platforms.

With every regional crisis, the same phenomenon recurs: media campaigns accuse the Gulf states of everything from “betrayal” to “subservience.” Meanwhile, the real sources of chaos in the region are overlooked.

One key strategic lesson from recent crises is the need to strengthen the defensive umbrella by expanding foreign bases and increasing the size of hosted forces. This enhances deterrence capability and reduces risk in a turbulent regional environment.

Conversely, experience has shown that excessive reliance on some regional states with their own agendas cannot guarantee stability and may sometimes add to uncertainty.

From this standpoint, decisions related to national security must remain a purely sovereign matter, not subject to interference or political blackmail.

Any objections that may arise in this context should be addressed with the firmness that national interests require. Relations between states are based not on slogans or courtesies but on pragmatism and defined mutual interests; anything else does not meet strategic needs and is not worth building any political calculus upon.

The first principle is to treat Arab relations as matters of managing political neighbors rather than as strategic alliances. This means maintaining channels of communication and cooperation without assuming permanent solidarity by default.

Building political, economic, and security protection systems that reduce dependence on the turbulent regional environment is the second principle. This can be achieved by diversifying international partnerships and strengthening ties with major economic and technological powers.

The third principle is to manage the media and political space with greater firmness, especially when incitement or distortion campaigns appear on some Arab platforms during crises. This helps preserve internal stability and prevents the media environment from becoming a political pressure cooker.

Perhaps the most important, the fourth principle concerns dealing realistically with the region’s demographic and political balances. It involves establishing clear policies to protect societal stability from attempts at political or ideological flooding that could exploit economic or social openness to achieve goals contrary to national security.

The truth is that, specifically in the Middle East, experience has proven that states are respected only to the extent that they can protect themselves and defend their interests. Geography may impose proximity between states, but it does not impose trust between them.

Therefore, national security cannot be managed through political play-acting but rather through precise calculations of power and interests, and with the ability to make sovereign decisions free from pressure and hot air.