The benefits of the 'Arab Spring'

Israel’s strategic standpoints are changing, and although there are some serious challenges ahead, there are also some silver linings.

arab spring_521 (do not publish again) (photo credit: AVI KATZ)
arab spring_521 (do not publish again)
(photo credit: AVI KATZ)
There are two types of strategic perspectives in Israel today. They aren’t contradictory, but they have different priorities. These can be called the “northern” and the “southern” views.
The “northern” approach is the more traditional one, focusing on the situation in that direction. The key longer-term concern is over Iran and its drive for nuclear weapons. More closely, there are both concerns and hopes regarding Lebanon and Syria.
Regarding Iran, the new feature is the assumption that Israel will not attack Iran to prevent it from getting nuclear weapons. This means Israel will be constructing a multi-level defensive system that includes long-range attack planes, the ability to subvert Iran’s nuclear force through covert operations, possibly submarine platforms, and several types of anti-missile missiles and defenses.
The goal here is fourfold: • To delay as long as possible Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and to minimize the size and effectiveness of its arsenal through sanctions, international pressure, sabotage and other means.
• To have the maximum ability to deter Iran from launching a nuclear attack and demonstrating the ability to stop its missiles. The aim is to discourage Iran from launching such an attack, given a nearcertainty that it can be stopped and, as a result, it would suffer very heavy damage.
• Of course, ordinary deterrence is not a sufficient safeguard against Iran, given the Islamic regime’s ideological extremism and passionate hatred of Israel, the recklessness of some key elements there, and the rulers’ shortcomings in assessing reality.
Consequently Israel must put a high priority on stopping any Iranian attack from happening or succeeding.
• To be able, if Israel determines there is a real danger of an Iranian attack, to launch a first strike to inflict maximum damage on Iran’s nuclear strike force. In other words, an Israeli attack would be premised not on Iran getting nuclear weapons, but on Iran being likely to use them.
US deterrence, early-warning, and anti-missile efforts would supplement this system, but this strategy is not premised on any dependence on the US government.
BUT ISRAEL also knows that an equal or even greater danger is the spread of Iranian influence, taking over Arab countries or turning them into proxies. Here, the northern focus is on Syria and Lebanon.
On the surface, the news from these two countries is potentially bad. Lebanon is now controlled by Hezbollah and other Syrian or Syrian-Iranian clients. Hezbollah can thus use Lebanon as a virtual fiefdom for building its military power and attacking Israel. This is much worse than the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war, when Lebanon as a government and army had a separate identity.
Syria itself is faced with a serious internal upheaval that seems likely to bring down President Bashar Assad. Here the “glass halfempty” analysis is that Assad might be replaced by a regime even more hostile to Israel.
There is also a “glass half-full” analysis. As long as Syria is in such turmoil, it cannot so effectively threaten Israel. And if Assad is overthrown, a government that is more preoccupied by internal affairs, and less eager to start a conflict, might take power.
Iraq offers a good model here.
Between the interests of the Kurds, the internal conflict, a greater focus on domestic development and other factors, Iraq has dropped out of the conflict with Israel.
Hezbollah also suffers from this turmoil. Since it has sided with the Assad regime, it has gone from being wildly popular to widely hated by the Syrian people. Hamas, which has sided against the Syrian regime and in favor of its Muslim Brotherhood comrades, has thus lost Syrian patronage. Finally, Syria’s aggressive behavior has opened a rift between that country and Turkey’s government, which has been increasingly acting like an ally of the Iranian and Syrian regimes.
CONSEQUENTLY, WHILE this is no ideal situation, Israel can be considered to have benefitted from this aspect of the “Arab spring.” From Israel’s standpoint, the relative stability in Jordan and Saudi Arabia is a plus, since these countries are unlikely to be transformed into radical Islamist states under a government linked to al-Qaida, Iran or the Muslim Brotherhood. The turmoil in Bahrain, Yemen and Tunisia is of relatively little strategic significance to Israel.
Generally there can be a hope that democracy and domestic development will become a higher priority than fighting Israel, thus easing the pressure on Israel, or at least preoccupying Arabs and Muslims for a while. Clearly, merely calling dissidents Zionist agents and hoping to unite the people around an anti-Israel platform no longer works for incumbent governments.
In time, this strategy might work for replacing Islamist governments, but that hasn’t happened yet.
Moreover, American weakness and the Obama administration’s cooler view toward Israel is worrisome. So is the possibility that things might be moving in a way to strengthen Iran.
IF ONE looks at the southern front, though, it is harder to find a silver lining. Egypt is likely to elect a radical government more hostile than anything Israel has faced there since about 1974. The future of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty is gloomy.
Peace between Israel and the Arab world’s most populous country cannot be taken for granted.
There is also the problem of the Egypt-Hamas relationship. Egypt is likely to see itself as Hamas’s ally and patron. In a future Hamas-led conflict with Israel, Egypt could take the side of the Palestinian Islamists, and will certainly help them. The long-quiet southern front now has to be treated as a very possible war zone.
This is the basic way things look for Israeli strategists.
One can stress better- or worse-case scenarios and different parts of the challenge, but there is a general consensus on the fundamental challenges – and on whether they will be met successfully.

The writer is director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center ( at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya and editor of Middle East Review of International Affairs. He blogs at