Israel-Hamas War: How the Navy's failures made October 7 worse

Unveiling the grave errors of the IDF Navy on October 7, the untold details of Hamas's naval raid.

 The Navy has completed the commissioning of the four state-of-the-art warships of the Sa'ar 6 model (photo credit: IDF, IDF SPOKESMAN’S UNIT)
The Navy has completed the commissioning of the four state-of-the-art warships of the Sa'ar 6 model
(photo credit: IDF, IDF SPOKESMAN’S UNIT)

On the morning of October 7, 2023, Hamas naval commandos launched an attack from Gaza into Israel. Within 48 hours, the last remaining infiltrators were captured, but the Israeli Navy admitted they weren't prepared for anything like this.

Normally anticipating attacks from a single boat, the Navy was caught off guard as terrorists arrived on multiple boats.

What followed was a chaotic scene of gunfire, civilian casualties, and a desperate chase to apprehend the attackers.

 An unmanned submersible that was spotted infiltrating Israel on October 7 (credit: IDF SPOKESMAN’S UNIT)
An unmanned submersible that was spotted infiltrating Israel on October 7 (credit: IDF SPOKESMAN’S UNIT)

As the terrorists opened fire on IDF personnel, the Navy fought back, managing to hit and sink five of the boats. However, some terrorists managed to escape and headed towards Kibbutz Zikim, leaving a trail of death and destruction in their wake. Eventually, the remaining terrorists were eliminated after a 48-hour pursuit.

 Navy forces along the Gaza Strip (credit: Amir Buhbut, walla! studio)
Navy forces along the Gaza Strip (credit: Amir Buhbut, walla! studio)

Why was Israel's Navy not prepared for Hamas's October 7 massacre?

A follow-up investigation revealed several failures on the part of the Israeli Navy. They had not prepared for this type of scenario and lacked intelligence on Hamas's naval capabilities and their tunnels.

Additionally, crucial information was not properly communicated, leaving key commanders unaware of the imminent threat.

Ultimately, the Navy's inadequate preparation and intelligence gathering played a significant role in the failure to prevent the October 7 massacre.

The article also highlights that the IDF had received warnings about a possible training session by Hamas but failed to pass this information to the Navy leadership. Lack of coordination and sharing of intelligence further contributed to the surprise attack.