Clash of Titans: IDF brass and politicians lock horns over criticism - analysis

In both cases, however, valid criticism was largely drowned out not due to the lack of substance of the critique but rather because of the individual who expressed it.

 IDF 98th Division commander Dan Goldfus (photo credit: SETH J. FRANTZMAN)
IDF 98th Division commander Dan Goldfus
(photo credit: SETH J. FRANTZMAN)

Over the last week, a senior IDF officer, Brig.-Gen Dan Goldfus, criticized politicians, and a senior politician, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, criticized senior IDF officers.

Both men subsequently faced a fierce backlash. Goldfus for taking on politicians while in an army uniform, and Smotrich for taking on officers while sitting in the comfort of his Finance Ministry.

In both cases, however, valid criticism was largely drowned out not due to the lack of substance of the critique but rather because of the individual who expressed it.

What did Goldfus say? Only that he hopes that the politicians, who have reverted to the divisive rhetoric of October 6, will correct course and prove worthy of the sacrifice of those fighting and dying in this war.

 Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich at a press conference, February 14, 2024. (credit: MARC ISRAEL SELLEM)
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich at a press conference, February 14, 2024. (credit: MARC ISRAEL SELLEM)

“You must make sure we do not return to October 6, that all the effort and sacrifice won’t be in vain,” he said to the country’s politicians of all stripes. “This you must keep well in your minds, every day, every hour. With all my heart, I ask of you to be together, united, push away the extreme, and adopt the togetherness. Find what unites. We on the battlefield found it, and we will not give up on it.”

Goldfus's words cause backlash

His words caused an uproar: How dare an officer in uniform speak that way about politicians. Further, this argument ran, if Goldfus is allowed to get away with this, other officers will confuse their roles, which are to implement policy, with those of the politicians, whose job it is to create policy.

Goldfus was called in and received a “severe reprimand” from Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi. Halevi told Goldfus that he crossed the boundaries “between the political and military echelons in a democratic country.”

Ironically, a few days later, Halevi pretty much said the same thing to Smotrich, who was aghast that Halevi – the head of the army at the time of the worst tragedy to befall the Jewish people since the Holocaust – was determined to push forward a new round of top IDF appointments. Halevi insisted the appointments were his to make, and the politicians should not interfere.

Why was Smotrich aghast? Because, he said, it is unreasonable that the person under whose watch the colossal failure of October 7 took place could appoint the next generation of top officers who will shape the IDF for years to come. Smotrich believes this job should be left to the next chief of staff, who will be selected after Halevi resigns. Some believe this may be as early as the summer when an IDF inquiry into the events that led up to October 7 releases its preliminary findings.

Asked about his responsibility as a senior government member for the fiasco, Smotrich said in an Army Radio interview that he accepts responsibility and that the public will ultimately decide his fate and the fate of the other ministers at the polls.

The brouhaha over Smotrich’s words underlines two truths about Israeli society: one is a tendency to dismiss arguments not because they are faulty but because of the person making them. The other is the degree to which the military has an iron grip on the nation’s allegiance, come what may.

Regarding the second point, an Israeli Democracy Institute poll released this week found that despite the failings of October 7, the country’s Jewish population continues to have a great deal of trust in the IDF.

A poll taken in December and released this week shows that the IDF continues to be the most highly trusted institution in the country. In December, 86.5% of Israeli Jews had faith in the IDF, compared to 85.5% in June 2023 and 85% a year earlier (the percentage of Israeli Arab trust in the IDF is considerably lower). In other words, the events of October 7 did not lessen the Jewish public’s confidence in the army but enhanced it.

There are several sociological explanations for this, including that the IDF is a “people’s army” in which many serve or whose sons and daughters are currently serving. As a result, people are familiar with the army and want to believe that they can trust this institution into whose care they are turning over their children for years on end.

Also, the IDF’s quick recovery from the shock and surprise of October 7 and its turnaround in the battle contributed mightily to rebuilding the public’s trust and confidence. Had the fiasco of October 7 been followed by IDF failures on the battlefield, the country would most likely not have regained its trust and faith in the army.

Israel, since its establishment, has always had an oversized respect for the opinions of military men. The feeling is that since they served in the army, risked their lives, and know the enemy from up close, their judgments – at least on national security issues – must be sound.

But, Smotrich is asking, what if it isn’t sound, and hasn’t October 7 shown that this judgment cannot always be trusted?

Israel believed the assessments of the military and the intelligence communities before October 7 that Hamas and the country’s other enemies were deterred. If this was the assessment of the top military brass, then who can question it?

Except that it needed to be questioned. After October 7, the opinions, assessments, and decisions of the country’s military leaders cannot be taken at face value but must be challenged.

This, by the way, is one reason Gideon Sa’ar broke away from the National Unity party and is demanding a seat on the war cabinet as the head of a new independent faction.

The war cabinet is comprised of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Benny Gantz, a former chief of staff. Another ex-chief of staff, Gadi Eizenkot, sits as an observer, as does Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and Shas head Aryeh Deri. Sa’ar argues that three of the main principals setting the war’s policies are military men – Gallant, Gantz, and Eizenkot – who share a common mindset. He said he wanted to be in that forum to give it a different perspective.

There is something to that argument and the need to challenge the mindset of the country’s military leaders. Doing so does not mean undermining the army, the war effort, or security.

Gallant fired back at Smotrich at Sunday’s cabinet meeting for opposing a new round of IDF appointments now, saying that the finance minister was “harming the security of Israel and undermining the security system for political reasons only. This is alarming at any time, but especially during war.”

To which Smotrich responded on X: “What harms Israel’s security is the rejection in advance of any criticism and an unwillingness to have a substantive discussion on issues critical to Israel’s security.” He said that silencing real discussion and “maintaining a chorus of only one voice through shaming and defamation is the most October 6th thing there is.”

One of the characteristics of Israel’s toxic discourse before October 7 was that everyone’s motives were always suspect. One could not be for or against judicial reform for substantive reasons; one was presumed to have an ulterior motive.

In this vein, Smotrich cannot criticize the idea that Halevi will make the next round of high-level appointments in the army because he believes it will perpetuate the groupthink in the IDF that allowed October 7 to happen. He must have an alternative political motive. And, in most cases, the worst possible motivations are attributed to one’s political opponents.

Might Smotrich have a political agenda in opposing appointments now? Might he want to wait until there is another chief of staff who may promote more officers from the national religious camp?

Perhaps, but that does not negate his basic argument – that the army needs an overhaul after October 7, and that transformation won’t come if those appointing those overseeing that change bear a good part of the responsibility for policies that led to October 7.

This is a substantive debate worth having and should not be dismissed merely because of the identity of the person who raised it. The same is true of what Goldfus said. His criticism of the political echelon for sliding back into a discourse that characterized October 6 is valid and needs to be discussed. It should not be drowned out simply because an officer in uniform voiced it.