A fateful and climactic internal debate took place on Saturday night – and still is taking place – in the war cabinet and within the IDF about how and when to respond to Iran’s attack.
This could be seen as of similar importance – perhaps even more – than the debates surrounding the future of the Gaza war.
At the end of the day, Iran is Israel’s ultimate adversary, not just for the next five days or five months, but potentially for decades.
And despite Hamas’s one-time success on October 7, Iran, with its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), web of proxies, over 80 million people, huge land mass, and nuclear weapons program, is far more formidable.
There is no such thing as permanent and perfect deterrence.
But, if Israel does not restore that balance, there is no reason why Tehran shouldn’t attack directly again, to more devastating results.
The question which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, war minister Benny Gantz, and IDF Chief-of-Staff Maj.-Gen. Herzl Halevi’s struggle is with how to best restore that deterrence, without instigating a regional war.
This is not so different from key moments on October 11 when Gallant, Halevi, and IDF Northern Commander Maj.-Gen. Uri Gordin pushed for a surprise attack on Hezbollah – only at very symbolic levels.
Gantz, Gadi Eisenkot, some senior IDF officers, and eventually Netanyahu, the government, and the military decided on a “Gaza First” policy, making the reaction to Hezbollah more passive.
It seems that, so far, the decision whether to attack Iran holds some similar dynamics, though Gallant may have shifted from a more aggressive Hezbollah approach to waiting and trying to milk the moment with Iran for additional military or diplomatic commitments from allies that would prefer Israel stand down.
There is also some confusion regarding Gantz and Eisenkot’s position, with some reports claiming they wanted to counterattack immediately.
The Jerusalem Post understands that its approach was extremely limited, which is why it was not viewed by other decision-makers as a strong enough counterattack that would restore deterrence.
As well, the IDF, at its top levels, has been more reserved about a rushed counterattack, even as it wishes for deterrence.
Meaning, that there is no single person in power in the war cabinet or the military publicly pushing for an immediate response, as of the time of printing.
This was reflected in the stunningly-fast decision by the IDF Home Front Command to restore normal educational and public gathering conditions, just 24 hours after announcing those emergency measures.
Those pushing for intense response are outside war cabinet
Those who are publicly pushing for an immediate and harsh response are outside of the war cabinet – Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.
Even Gideon Sa’ar, who has outflanked much of the government on the Right in terms of aggressive approaches, would prefer to wait on Iran.
No one in the opposition has been vocal about attacking Iran sooner or more harshly, with opposition head Yair Lapid criticizing the government, but being silent on the public dialogue of what to do about Iran.
No one in the opposition has been loud about attacking Iran sooner or more harshly, with Lapid making some loud political statements against the government, but disappearing from the public debate of ideas of what to do about Iran.
There was also some speculation that Israel is playing a double game, and a meeting between Netanyahu and Lapid could mean an attack on Iran sooner, despite all of the counter-signals.
But unless Israel is pulling off one of the best deception acts in war history to surprise Iran, its attack will likely be deferred until at least after Passover, possibly even until a much later date, and very much depending on Rafah.
There were hints from several top Israeli and US officials that Jerusalem might get more latitude against Hamas in Rafah, as part of holding off against Tehran.
Will Israel still be able to attack Iran as its coalition shakes, with possible elections later this year, and the US presidential election around the corner?
What would a potential Israeli attack look like?
Regardless, whether now or later, if the government and military do decide to attack, how will they do it? Will they go big as Gallant and Halevi suggested against Hezbollah on October 11? This could involve dozens and dozens of Israeli aircraft targeting the ayatollahs’ nuclear program, which would also require disabling Iran’s extensive advanced antiaircraft network. It could even branch out far more to attack its military power centers.
It would require significant risk to the pilots and incur a significant danger of a substantial counterattack by Iran and Hezbollah – though at this point we have seen quite a lot of those attacks already.
Top Israeli officials confirmed to the Post that Iran does not have more powerful weapons than it attacked with on Saturday night, such that the main additional risk would be whether Hezbollah might go all in, and it might not – after being punished by Israel for six months.
A lesser attack might involve targeted strikes on IRGC bases with ballistic missiles and drones, especially those from where the most recent attack was launched. However, this too would involve high risk, both at the attack phase and at a later stage of retaliation.
Israel would need to hope that Tehran realized this past weekend it had watered down its response by not going after nuclear sites.
A variation could be a limited strike using only drones and ballistic missiles just like Iran did.
Alternatively, Israel could use Mossad to covertly hit some of the nuclear or weapons facilities to kill select officials, choosing not to “out” itself in a public direct attack the way that Iran did.
Alternatively, Israel could use Mossad to covertly hit some of the nuclear or weapons facilities to kill select officials, choosing not to “out” itself in a public direct attack the way that Iran did.
Gallant will probably push for a more aggressive approach at some point, while Halevi is a bit of a wild card. He is not as ideologically committed to aggression in general but has taken more aggressive views following the shock and trauma of October 7.
Whatever these officials end up deciding will set the new paradigms for Israeli-Iranian military relations, after Tehran demolished the old ones.