Israel was unprepared for 10,000 Palestinian security prisoners during war, report finds

According to Comptroller Matanyahu Englman, whose term concludes next month, neither the Israel Prisons Service (IPS) nor the IDF was adequately prepared for the implications of needing to arrest and imprison such large volumes of Gazans long-term.

The absence of the IDF and the IPS having prepared even any theoretical plans or estimates for how many Gazans they might need to arrest and imprison in the event of a longer war and how they would they would do so, led to improper "freebie" releases of senior Hamas officials mid-war at times when Israeli hostages were still being held in Gaza, said the report.

On November 23, 2023, the IDF detained the director of Shifa Hospital, Muhammad Abu Salmiya, for significant coordination with the Hamas terrorists who used his facility as a command center.

Englman said, "The fact that prisoners who presented danger to the security of Israel were released without notifying the prime minister in real time should be viewed with severity."

Given the absence of cabinet guidance, sufficient resources, and cell space, the IPS, IDF, and the Shin Bet all were forced to make a large number of ad-hoc decisions to address imminent problems, with many of those decisions being sub-optimal.

At least one IDF prison guard was convicted of abusing a prisoner, five more IDF prison guards were indicted in the large Sde Teiman case, with their indictment only being withdrawn due to how the IDF prosecution violated the prison guards' fair trial rights, but not necessarily because of an absence of evidence, and other possible cases are pending.

The report said it does not address any of these issues as it focused only on IPS facilities, though it is not clear why this distinction was made.

Absent the High Court's intervention in mid-2024, the Sde Teiman problems might have continued indefinitely.

Sources close to the IDF Military Advocate General Yifat Tomer Yerushalmi told the Post at the time that she had tried to close the facility earlier, but had not succeeded.

The report focuses on the errors made by the IPS, IDF, and Shin Bet, which harmed security on the Israeli side in terms of releasing prisoners who it says should have been held for longer.

While the Shin Bet has said it lacked sufficient guidance from the political echelon, a claim which comptroller sources sympathize with, the comptroller sources also say that the agency should have recognized that in the unique situation of the war at the time, a special appeal should have been made to Netanyahu regarding the handling of the Abu Samiya file.

Put differently, in a vacuum, the Shin Bet possibly made the right call to release Abu Samiya as he was not a violent terrorist and did not present a physical danger in that sense.

Having held him for seven months with no clear path to indict him, releasing him to make room for more violent prisoners was not illogical.

However, given that Hamas was holding Israeli hostages and the public relations boon which the terror group received from Abu Samiya's return, without having to give anything in return themselves, comptroller sources said that the Shin Bet should have thought out of the box and held a special meeting with Netanyahu.

Next, the report said that the IDF and IPS's lack of preparation for arresting and imprisoning such a large sudden influx of Gazan prisoners significantly harmed the Shin Bet's ability to carry out future arrests and interrogations.

In other words, if the Shin Bet had nowhere to hold new detainees, how could it arrest and then interrogate them?

The comptroller also said that the overbooking of Gazan prisoners in IPS facilities endangered IPS personnel.

The comptroller does not note that the overcrowding could have also increased the frequency of IPS prisoner abuse.

Regarding numbers, the comptroller said that the pre-war totals of 16,200 total prisoners and 5,200 security prisoners had jumped to 23,400 total prisoners and over 10,000 security prisoners by early 2025.

The true number of Palestinians whom the IDF arrested may be as high as 30,000, but the comptroller did not produce numbers on the thousands of Palestinian security prisoners who were released in the first half of the year of the war due to lack of space or shaky evidence.

In addition, the cabinet released around 3,000 security prisoners as part of three hostage deals which it signed between 2023 and October 2025.

In terms of the numbers and the shortage of space, in October 2023, the maximum number of prisoners who should have been held in the cell space available was around 14,500.

By early 2023, there was insufficient space for 3,502 security prisoners as well as thousands more non-security prisoners.

2,366 Palestinian security prisoners were still being held in IDF cells as of February 2025, an extended improper situation according to the comptroller and various Israeli legal officials.

In addition, fewer Hamas fighters generally surrendered in 2025, and multiple IDF sources indicated that it was more difficult to take prisoners when Hamas fighters would emerge by surprise from underground tunnels near IDF positions, a significant trend in 2025.

Englman also criticized that not a single Hamas terrorist has been brought to trial to date for crimes related to the war.

Until October 2025, the government decided to delay any indictments or trials out of fear that it would need to trade many of the Palestinian security prisoners for the return of Israeli hostages (which it did ultimately need to do.)

This prevented the state prosecutor from moving forward on any indictments or trials.

When the government approved over one billion shekels on June 4 to prosecute terrorists who participated in the October 7 Hamas massacre, this was the first time that there was funding for moving the cases over from the state prosecution to the military prosecution.

The legislation to prosecute terrorists involved in the October 7 massacre was passed in May, granting authority to impose the death penalty and conduct public trials for the perpetrators of the attacks at a new Jerusalem military court, which will need to be built.

The law’s proposal consists of a broad framework for implementing the trials.

The Defense Ministry and the Finance Ministry stated that the framework of over a billion shekels was approved for the years 2026-2029, and that the funds will be allocated to the Defense Ministry and the IDF.

The approved budget is intended for establishing numerous buildings to implement the law, the Defense and Finance Ministries stated.

The infrastructure to be built for the trials includes a court complex, prosecution offices, and an IDF headquarters facility.

Until the buildings are built, new military prosecutors are hired, and new military judges are hired - something which could easily take several months if not years - the cases are likely to be put on hold.

Not addressing these specific issues in detail, the comptroller concluded that against the broader historical backdrop, "Bringing to trial Hamas terrorists who perpetrated terror attacks on October 7 and during the Iron Swords War is a decisively important issue, from a legal, ethical, and public relations perspective. Bringing the terrorists to trial will do justice for the victims of the slaughter."