Iran ‘conceals illegal activities’ for WMD tech - German intel

The report said Iran’s regime can use “Detour deliveries over ‘third states’ in order not to identify the final buyer” and “the use and misuse of inexperienced freight deliverers and transporters."

Employees of the Research Institute for Protective Technologies, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection (WIS) inspect a dummy sample which is contaminated with a substance similar to the chemical weapon Sarin. (photo credit: REUTERS)
Employees of the Research Institute for Protective Technologies, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection (WIS) inspect a dummy sample which is contaminated with a substance similar to the chemical weapon Sarin.
(photo credit: REUTERS)
A new intelligence report from Germany’s northernmost state, Schleswig-Holstein, has disclosed detailed information about the secretive methods which Iran uses to cover up its attempts to secure illicit technology for the world’s most deadly weapons.
“Proliferation-relevant countries such as Iran, North Korea and Syria, but also Pakistan, try to circumvent safety precautions and legal export regulations and to disguise illegal procurement activities. To do this, they turn to mostly conspiratorial means and methods,” wrote the intelligence agency.
The intelligence document noted that “proliferation is still one of the central tasks of counter-espionage in Schleswig-Holstein.”
The report defines proliferation as the “spread of weapons of mass destruction (ABC weapons) and the necessary know-how, as well as the products used for their manufacture and associated carrier technologies.”
“ABC” is a commonly used abbreviation for atomic, biological and chemical weapons.
The Iranian regime’s methods to obtain illicit technology for weapons of mass destruction, according to the report, include “the creation of a neutral firm to deceive the buyer about the true nature of the sale through a state-controlled company; the establishment of illegal procurement networks which belong to the front companies and middlemen.”
The intelligence agency said Iran’s regime can also use “detour deliveries over ‘third states’ in order not to identify the final buyer” and “the use and misuse of inexperienced freight deliverers and transporters.”
According to the intelligence, the Islamic Republic can also “distribute the illegal procurement activities in many individual non-suspicious deliveries to avoid exposing the entire business.”
Tehran can “conceal the end user” and the “individual, company or institution with which the goods ultimately remain,” the intelligence agency wrote.
Schleswig-Holstein, which borders Denmark, is a center of “many companies, but also universities, colleges and universities of applied sciences that have sensitive technical knowledge and know-how,” the report said.
The agency said it had 12 conversations with companies and academic institutions in 2020 to “sensitize” them about “counter-proliferation” attempts.

IRAN’S REGIME is cited 19 times in the 218-page intelligence report, which covers security threats to the state’s democracy.
Within the context of illegal proliferation procurement, the report stated that: “Products that can be used both civilly and militarily are of particular importance (so-called dual-use goods) as they are supposedly easier to obtain. States like Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria and Russia continue to strive to acquire such corresponding products, technologies and scientific know-how.”
The document stressed that: “Proliferation is a serious threat to security in many regions of the world, including the Federal Republic of Germany and thus for the state of Schleswig-Holstein. The Federal Republic of Germany is one of the most important export nations in the world. The export of military as well as civilian goods (the export of so-called dual-use goods) is subject therefore to special control.” The report stated that merchandise such as software can also be used for military purposes.
In 2013, a Hamburg court convicted three German-Iranians with dual citizenship and a German for violations of Germany’s export law. The men used a negotiator for the Islamic Republic to deliver equipment to a nuclear plant in Iran.
“In 2010 and 2011 the suspects are believed to have helped in the delivery of special valves for the construction of a heavy water reactor in Iran and therefore to have broken the Iran embargo,” prosecutors said in 2012. “The deliveries were part of an order worth several million euros, which Iran was trying to use to secure the necessary valve technology to make a heavy water reactor.”
The Jerusalem Post reported this past week that a damning new report authored by the Netherlands’ General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) asserts that the Islamic Republic of Iran attempted to obtain technology in 2020 for weapons of mass destruction.
The Post reported last month that the Bavarian state intelligence agency in Germany said: “Proliferation-relevant states like Iran, North Korea, Syria and Pakistan are making efforts to expand their conventional arsenal of weapons through the production or constant modernization of weapons of mass destruction.”
Also in April, the Post reported that Sweden’s Security Service disclosed in its 2020 intelligence report that Iran sought Swedish technology for its nuclear weapons program.