What might Israel want if the United States rejoins the Iran deal?

Israel is vehemently opposed to the deal, but with the Biden administration likely rejoining, Jerusalem is making demands

former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani reviews Iran's new nuclear achievements during Iran's National Nuclear Energy Day in Tehran, Iran April 10, 2021. (photo credit: IRANIAN PRESIDENCY OFFICE/WANA (WEST ASIA NEWS AGENCY)/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS)
former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani reviews Iran's new nuclear achievements during Iran's National Nuclear Energy Day in Tehran, Iran April 10, 2021.
(photo credit: IRANIAN PRESIDENCY OFFICE/WANA (WEST ASIA NEWS AGENCY)/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS)
It might not be right away, but the US is heading back into a nuclear deal with Iran; it’s just a matter of time. So what should Israel demand in return?
The Biden administration has said a new deal  would be broadened to put greater limits on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs as well as constrain its malign activities in the Middle East, where Tehran has been expanding.
But Israel is strongly opposed to any deal with Iran – both under the previous government led by Benjamin Netanyahu as well as the current coalition led by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett.
Israeli officials, including President Reuven Rivlin, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and top military officers, have and will continue to meet with American officials in an attempt to convince the Biden administration to refrain from reentering into a deal with the Islamic Republic.
IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Aviv Kohavi recently returned from Washington and Tampa, where he met with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, head of US Central Command Gen. Kenneth McKenzie and head of US Special Operations Command Gen. Richard Clark.
During the meetings, he warned that the current deal had failures, including a lack of supervision in terms of nuclear proliferation that would allow Tehran to make “significant” progress related to its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs.
Kohavi “explained the threat created by returning to the original nuclear agreement and emphasized that all measures should be taken to prevent Iran from achieving military nuclear capabilities,” the IDF said.
Kohavi has made it clear that he views the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal with world powers, as dangerous. In January, Kohavi said he had directed the IDF to prepare fresh operational plans to strike Iran to stop its nuclear program if necessary.
Following the meetings, the US released statements that “affirmed the President’s commitment to ensuring that Iran never gets a nuclear weapon” and that the two allies would continue to “expand bilateral consultations on the array of strategic challenges facing the region.”
Kohavi’s weeklong meetings were intensive and likely also included quid pro quo demands from the US.
What might those demands be?
One could be to significantly increase military coordination and cooperation between the two allies.
In January the US moved Israel from EUCOM (European Command, which currently focuses on Russia and its threats against Europe and NATO) to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility in January.
The move to CENTCOM is believed to not only simplify the cooperation with American troops in the region; it can also create potential for a regional coalition with Arab countries that have normalized ties with Israel against shared threats posed by Iran.
Both Kohavi and Defense Minister Benny Gantz believe moderate Sunni states such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and others who have not yet signed agreements with Israel can deepen their ties, especially in terms of regional security arrangements.
The move would “put an operational perspective” on the Abraham Accords and will set up “further corridors and opportunities to open up between Israel and Arab countries in the region” on a military-to-military level, McKenzie told Defense News.
The increased cooperation with CENTCOM and even the Gulf States will give Israel a leg up in terms of dealing with the threat posed by Tehran. But it’s not enough.
Increased intelligence sharing will likely be a main demand, and additional monetary support for missile-defense batteries could be another.
The current 10-year $38 billion Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two was signed in 2016 and was an increase from the $30b. MOU signed in 2007. The discussions surrounding the new one, which is set to be signed in 2028, are already in the works.
The new MOU could allow Israel to have a framework and the freedom to decide and finance future procurement plans. As part of the demands for rejoining a nuclear deal, Israel could demand that the new MOU allow Jerusalem to obtain deferred payments and low interest rates on future major platform purchases.
A new MOU might also secure the ability to front-load platforms, giving the IAF the fighter jets, helicopters and transport planes now with the ability to pay later.
The replenishing and upgrading of the prepositioned precision-guided munitions stockpiles that the US keeps in Israel would also save time for Jerusalem by having immediate access to them in the case of a full-scale conflict in the North or with Iran.
Either of those would bolster Israel’s strategic and defensive situation.
But Israel has always stressed that it would defend itself, by itself, at any given time.
And last week, during Kohavi’s visit to the US, a manufacturing center for the production of centrifuges near the Iranian city of Karaj was attacked by a drone strike. According to a report in The New York Times, the site, known as the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company, was on a list of targets presented to the Trump administration last year as being a possible Israeli target.
No matter if Jerusalem gets what it might demand from Washington, the Jewish State has said loud and clear that it will continue with its “war between wars” against Tehran.