The Palestinian issue is expected to command a more central role in the talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel on normalization, compared to earlier assessments or expectations by the Israeli government. The normalization should be seen as an opportunity to save Israel from the steep slope down which it is sliding toward a one-state reality (a situation opposed by a majority of the Israeli public), by means of political, geographic, and demographic separation from the Palestinians, to ensure Israel’s character as a secure Jewish and democratic state.
Saudi Arabia is committed to the Palestinian cause for three main reasons: the importance of the issue for Saudi Arabia as the leader of the Arab-Muslim world; the demands that the Biden administration is expected to present to Israel to preserve the two-§state option; and the understanding by Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas that he will gain more than he loses if he joins the move, contrary to his policy regarding the Abraham Accords. However, it is difficult to expect the current Israeli government to realize the opportunity presented by normalization with Saudi Arabia in order to save itself from a political impasse. The Netanyahu government will be hard pressed to stop the moves toward annexation that are creating a reality of one state, and instead enjoy significant benefits from the Saudis and other Arab states for promoting moves toward separation from the Palestinians, leading to two distinct entities.
The United States administration is working to implement a regional initiative that includes Israeli-Saudi normalization, or “integration,” as the Saudis call it. Saudi demands from the United States in return for its consent to normalization with Israel include an additional “Palestinian package” that would breach the political impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and revive of the two-state solution.
Until now the contents of the “Palestinian package” were not clear. Prime Minister Netanyahu played down the importance of the Palestinian issue for the Saudis, as have other senior Israeli officials. However, it appears that unlike with the Abraham Accords, the issue will assume center stage in the formulation of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
For many years Saudi Arabia has shown limited interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, along with a palpable aversion to engagement with the issue and to the conduct of the Palestinian leadership – both the PA and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. However, Riyadh is more committed to the Palestinian issue than Abu Dhabi, if only because of its status and role as the leader of the Arab and (Sunni) Muslim world. The Royal House and King Salman himself listened carefully to the voices who objected to the Abraham Accords (about 80 percent of Saudis), the religious establishment, and the wider Arab public.
Thus, Saudi Arabia presents progress toward a political solution to the conflict as a condition for normalization and is formally committed to its implementation according to the parameters of the Arab Peace Initiative. Senior Saudi officials have said that they see the initiative as the basis for negotiations and it is therefore estimated that in return, Riyadh expects some Israeli gestures toward the Palestinians that it can highlight as genuine progress toward achieving the two-state solution.
True, senior Saudi officials speak in two voices. The differences in nuance between the Crown Prince, the King, Saudi Foreign Minister, or between their statements at different times and to different audiences, reflect the lack of agreement among the Kingdom’s elite, and perhaps also the desire to maintain some opacity and room for political maneuvering. Enabling the Saudis to take measured steps toward integration with Israel under cover of the demand for a Palestinian state, while maintaining flexibility so that the Palestinian issue will not become an obstacle to an arrangement with Israel and acquisition of rewards from the US.
Since the current Israeli government was formed, and against a background of a security escalation in the Palestinian arena, there has been a significant rise in the extent and severity of Saudi condemnation of Israeli government policy. This development is evidence of the Kingdom’s wish to strengthen its involvement in the matter, while signaling to Jerusalem that its freedom of action in the Palestinian arena is limited. The recent appointment of a non-resident Saudi ambassador to the PA who will also act as consul for East Jerusalem, along with the renewal of funding hospitals in East Jerusalem, are further indications to Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians that Saudi Arabia intends to increase its involvement in the Palestinian issue.
It appears that the Palestinian leadership has learned the lessons of their rigid opposition to the Abraham Accords, and is now ready to take an active part in the moves to promote Saudi-Israeli normalization. The PA achieved nothing by its refusal to participate in regional initiatives based on the Abraham Accords. Another reason why the Palestinian leadership is not ruling out normalization is the senior status of Saudi Arabia in the regional and Muslim world: normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel without a significant Palestinian component would weaken the Palestinian position further and push the Palestinian issue to the sidelines of regional arrangements. In the eyes of the Palestinian leadership, being part of the discussions on Israeli-Saudi normalization is also a way of restraining Israeli actions that are perceived to aim at destroying the two-state option. Furthermore, participation in a broad regional process would likewise demonstrate the relevance of the PA, which is losing its own legitimacy and that of its political approach, compared to the growing legitimacy among the Palestinians of the resistance concept heralded by PA rivals, mainly Hamas.
The PA’s willingness to play on the normalization court is evidence of its attempts to realize the opportunity to redesign the Palestinian position, and even its willingness to frame the process in a transitional/interim agreement with Israel, as the way to a future settlement based on the two-state solution. Participation in the normalization process, if it gathers momentum, will enable the PA to influence the process, improve its status at home and abroad, and strengthen its ability to achieve rewards and commitments from both Israel and Saudi Arabia.
The PA leadership for its part will be required to renew its control over the northern West Bank and withdraw its claims against Israel in the international courts in The Hague (ICC and ICJ). The Biden administration will be required to fulfill its previous commitments to the Palestinians – reopening PLO offices in Washington and restoring the US consulate for Palestinian affairs in East Jerusalem. It appears that the Saudi share of the “package” will be considerable economic aid, to rescue the PA from bankruptcy and promote projects to improve the economy, vital infrastructure, and the fabric of Palestinian life.
For Israel, normalization with Saudi Arabia would improve its strategic regional and international standing considerably, with the potential for multi-dimensional gains. However, to advance normalization, the Israeli government will be required to commit to the two-state solution and the principles of the Arab Peace Initiative, pledge not to undertake unilateral annexation, and help preserve a functioning PA. This in addition to committing to concrete steps, such as promoting a transitional arrangement with the PA centered around a more than a symbolic transfer of land of Area C to PA control, freezing the expansion of settlements and evacuating illegal outposts and pastures in the West Bank; avoiding or at least limiting the presence of IDF troops in Area A, which is under PA control; strengthening the PA and extending its area of operation; maintaining the status quo on the Temple Mount, with the emphasis on banning Jews from praying at the site.
The sum total of the demands made on Israel contradicts the government’s position, whereby there is no need to implement a settlement in the Israeli-Palestinian arena in order to establish formal relations with most of the Arab world, and that Israel can in effect continue the steps toward annexation of the West Bank, with little to stop it. However, it appears that rhetoric alone will not satisfy the Saudi Royal House or the Biden administration. Consequently, to achieve normalization, Israel will have to address the “Palestinian package,” which will be hard for the Israeli government to respond favorably to, even though it will increase what Israel can obtain from Saudi Arabia and open the door to its integration in the region. This will only be possible subject to a change in the composition of the government in Israel.
Dr. Yoel Guzansky and Brigadier General (ret.) Udi Dekel are Senior Researchers at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).