The Qatari dilemma will haunt Israel after the war with Hamas - opinion

Qatar’s aid to Hamas throughout the years received tacit approval from Israel, which was willing to turn a blind eye to the dangerous calm it bought with Qatari money.

 PHOTO: IRAN’S FOREIGN Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian (left) meets with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar, last month.  (photo credit: Iran’s Foreign Ministry/West Asia News Agency/Reuters)
PHOTO: IRAN’S FOREIGN Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian (left) meets with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar, last month.
(photo credit: Iran’s Foreign Ministry/West Asia News Agency/Reuters)

One of the challenges facing Israel in the past two years, and even more so now, is the policy it should adopt toward Qatar. Qatar supports the “civil” activities of Hamas in Gaza and hosts senior Hamas leaders in its territory. Qatar also provides diplomatic and financial support to the terror organization, and aids its propaganda through the Al Jazeera network that it owns.

Qatar’s actions are detrimental to essential Israeli interests while serving other interests. It is important to remember that Qatar’s aid to Hamas throughout the years received tacit approval from Israel, which was willing to turn a blind eye to the dangerous calm it bought with Qatari money.

Qatar’s connections and influence on Hamas have helped Israel in the past, and they currently have the potential to assist in the issue of the Israeli hostages in Gaza. In fact, the head of the National Security Council, Tzachi Hanegbi, acknowledged that “Qatar is becoming a central player in attempting to solve humanitarian issues, and its efforts in returning the captives are critical at this stage.”

The challenge of taking action against Qatar

In contrast to Hanegbi, many people consider Qatar an enemy, and advocate taking action against it. However, even when emotions run high, Israel will find it challenging to act against Qatar, not only because of the need for its assistance regarding the hostages, but also because Qatar maintains close relations with the United States, which has interests in Qatar, and especially with the current administration, where Qatar assisted in the evacuation from Afghanistan and mediated secret negotiations with Iran. When Hamas began releasing a few captives in Gaza, President Biden was quick to thank Qatar.

Qatar has an interest in contributing to the release of more hostages, gradually, to strengthen its position and delay the more meaningful Israeli ground operation that might endanger its “project” in Gaza. Unlike other Gulf states, which view Hamas and the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat, Qatar has an interest in maintaining Hamas as a key player and as a sovereign power in the Gaza Strip, to preserve its influence there. This influence enables Qatar to bolster its international image and its role in advocating for the Palestinians.

PALESTINIANS TAKE part in a rally in support of Qatar, inside Qatari-funded construction project ‘Hamad City’, in the southern Gaza Strip, in June (credit: REUTERS)
PALESTINIANS TAKE part in a rally in support of Qatar, inside Qatari-funded construction project ‘Hamad City’, in the southern Gaza Strip, in June (credit: REUTERS)

In addition to the difficulty of dealing with Qatar, due to its relations with the United States, there is tension between the Israeli interest in weakening Hamas and the need to use this relationship to advance Israeli objectives during times of conflict.

After the war, and once the hostages are returned, Israel will need to reevaluate its policy toward Qatar and its role in Gaza. Israel may want to establish a new model in the Gaza Strip after the conflict, which could involve other countries.

One such proposal is to try to tie this to a renewed American initiative to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and give Saudi Arabia greater responsibility in the Gaza Strip. However, it is uncertain whether Saudi Arabia, or for that matter, any other Arab country, will have the appetite to get deeply involved in Gaza.

Simultaneously, Israel will need to take direct action, and through the United States, disrupt the relationship between Hamas and Qatar, and the Qatari motivation to fund the organization. Qatar is very sensitive to its international image and status, and it can be targeted by linking it to Hamas and its crimes.

Israel should also work with the United States to ensure that the presence of Hamas leadership in Qatar becomes a liability for the emirate and convey that Qatar is not free from criticism.

However, these and other courses of action depend, firstly, on Israel’s ability to bear the economic, social, and military costs associated with the end of Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip. It’s uncertain whether this can be achieved, so the Qatari dilemma will continue to haunt Israel even after the war ends.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, an independent think tank affiliated with Tel Aviv University, and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute.