While military efforts on both fronts are far from being resolved, Israeli leadership must develop a clear and decisive plan for the inevitable status quo shifts that will become apparent in the post-war reality.
Fifty years ago, the Yom Kippur War was sparked by Operation Badr, an offensive meant to breach the border on the Suez Canal, orchestrated by Egyptian chief of staff Saad El-Shazly under the direct orders of president Anwar Sadat. This strategic move was Egypt’s response to its prior military failures against Israel in the Six-Day War and the War of Attrition (1967-1970). Recognizing that a complete military defeat of Israel was unfeasible, Egypt’s tactical objective shifted.
They instead aimed to penetrate a 10-km. zone, hoping to undermine the IDF’s sense of invincibility gained from the Six Day War, thereby paving the way to conduct diplomatic negotiations from a stronger position. This strategy was a calculated attempt to change the dynamic of their ongoing conflict with Israel through the use of military leverage.
In assessing the motives behind Hamas’s October 7 attacks, we must revisit these very same fundamental military and political principles. Hamas’s objective wasn’t merely the destruction of Israel, but rather, just like Sadat and El-Shazly, to embarrass it and gain strategic leverage.
Hamas sought to emerge from the conflict as Israel’s primary adversary, surpassing even Hezbollah, aiming for significant post-conflict gains like lifting the blockade, establishing maritime ports and airports, and possibly even securing UN recognition. Instead, this strategy backfired. The unexpected scale of their success and Israel’s unprecedented military and intelligence failures compelled the state to radically shift its strategy. Rather than trying to merely maintain the attritional status quo, Israel set its sights on the complete dismantlement of Hamas’s long-standing reign of terror.
Military triumph does not always equate to political success
Unfortunately, a lack of creativity seems to plague the Israeli and American political arenas, where the only proposed alternative for Gaza’s governance is the Palestinian Authority. However, discerning observers recognize that the PA is regarded as both too weak a governing body by the Palestinians and as overly hostile by the Israelis. Therefore, imposing its rule over Gaza is unlikely to alter the existing dynamics significantly, and would most likely result in a disastrous conclusion to the ongoing military efforts.
History is ripe with cases in which military triumphs did not equate to political success. Take, for instance, the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War. American forces, initially caught off-guard, ultimately dealt a significant blow to Soviet-backed North Vietnam. However, this military triumph didn’t translate into a diplomatic victory. As historian Victor Davis Hanson points out, the military accomplishment was undercut by negative domestic public opinion and governmental indecision in the US, leading to years of diplomatic impasse. During this period, American troops continued to fall in tactical battles, fighting without a coherent overarching strategy in service to a decisive victory. This example serves well to remind us that with an absence of clear and decisive diplomatic goals, military success is an ultimately fruitless endeavor.
The overarching consensus that is emerging across the political spectrum is that the key to decisively impacting our Palestinian adversaries lies in inflicting a strong blow to their inherent sense of honor. Military victories must be converted into palpable psychological setbacks. The manifestation of such a defeat could range from a “humbling” surrender akin to the Treaty of Versailles to the reestablishment of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip. The specific strategy may still be up for debate, but the core principle remains; without Palestinian acceptance of its unequivocal defeat, a sustainable political resolution that meets Israel’s security requirements is unattainable.
The question arises of whether Israeli leaders fully grasp the critical nature of the current circumstances. Engaging in negotiations with Hamas amidst ongoing conflict might be inevitable, but Israel needs to approach these talks with utmost caution. The primary diplomatic objective should be clear: decisively dismantling Hamas in a manner that imprints a sense of overwhelming defeat in the Palestinian psyche. Such a strategy is pivotal to achieving the long-sought political milestone of reestablishing a sense of security for the citizens of Israel, while hopefully cautioning against future attacks.
When the moment of action arrived, preparations fell short
THE IDF has long discussed being prepared for conflicts fought on dual fronts. However, when the moment of action arrived on October 7, preparations fell short.
In the past two decades, the IDF’s guiding principle has been the belief that definitive victory in asymmetric warfare is unattainable. This conception has shaped their cautionary approach to conflicts with terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, leading to short, targeted engagements aimed primarily at situational improvement, rather than outright extermination. This strategy influenced the IDF’s tactical evolution, especially following the Second Lebanon War, most notably in its reduction of traditional armored brigades in favor of enhanced precision counter-fire systems and bolstering of elite, specialized units such as the Commando Brigade and the Multi-Dimensional Unit. Dr. Omer Dostri discussed these developments in detail in his article “Victory is Achieved Through Ground Maneuver,” published in Hashiloach Journal two years ago.
One critical takeaway from recent events is the need for a significant expansion of the maneuvering forces, as well as a complete restock, and perhaps even an overall increase in munitions and missile stockpiles. Following the war’s conclusion, Israel’s national priorities need to make a substantial shift.
Currently, Israel dedicates about 4.5% of its GDP to defense, equivalent to around NIS 80 billion. This figure is significantly higher than the US, which spends 3.5%, and China, at 1.5%. Post-war, the Israeli military budget may need to rise to between 5.5-6% of the GDP, or roughly NIS 120 billion, nearly a quarter of the national budget. However, the solution goes beyond just increased spending. The military will also have to streamline its operations and optimize its critical capabilities in order to more effectively meet future challenges.
A change of this scale in national defense spending will undoubtedly have broad economic implications, particularly on government expenditures. It will necessitate the public’s acceptance of significant reductions in other areas, and will doubtless require steadfast and reliable leadership capable of managing the anticipated backlash.
There are three key truths we must remember in pursuit of a long-term resolution to the military crisis on Israel’s northern front. The first is that the northern population of Israel, Jews and Arabs alike, will be able to return to their homes with no imminent threat from missile fire or ground invasion.
The second is that under UN Resolution 1701 Hezbollah will have to retreat north of the Litani River and surrender its weapons. Third, if these two conditions are not met in the immediate future, Israel will be forced into a major military offensive that will only culminate in the relocation of the border to the Litani, the inevitable move of the hostile Lebanese population north of the new border.
As it becomes increasingly unlikely that the UN will act on Resolution 1701, Israel’s leadership is gradually coming to the conclusion that the question is no longer if, but when.
The writer is director-general of Tikvah Israel and publisher of the Hebrew-language journal, Hashiloach.