Future historians will surely identify 2023 as a particularly important year in the history of the State of Israel.
It was a year that held up a mirror to Israeli society, revealing in the starkest and most painful fashion just how serious problems have been neglected, covered up, or simply forgotten by Israeli governments over the years – but particularly by the government formed by Benjamin Netanyahu, just three days before the Hebrew new year was rung in.
It began with the judicial revolution, announced with much pomp and little circumstance by Justice Minister Yair Levin on January 4, 2023, only six days after the formation of the most right-wing government in Israeli history. Without any preparation or advance discussion, this revolution threatened to change some fundamental pillars of the state in terms of separation of powers, secular-religious relations, relations between Jews and minority groups (Muslims, Druze, and Christians), and more. After months of mass demonstrations, an acrimonious dialogue began without any clarity as to its ultimate purpose or its chances of success, while the country awaited the Supreme Court ruling on the government’s legislation.
How Hamas exposed the failure of Netanyahu and the dangers of societal divisions
The attack by Hamas on October 7 changed the public agenda at a stroke. This attack – which ironically (or perhaps purposefully) was carried out just one day after the memorial ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the surprise attack of the Yom Kippur War – raised the question of how such a huge intelligence failing could have occurred once again, particularly given the advanced warning technology possessed by the IDF Intelligence Corps. Moreover, the slow and ineffectual military response (if judged by the appalling outcome of some 1,200 killed and more than 200 taken hostage) raised concerns about the decision-making by Israel’s military and political leadership.
The attack highlighted a double failure of the policy led by Netanyahu in recent years regarding the Palestinian issue in general and Hamas in particular: First, the premise that it was possible to deter Hamas militarily and reach understandings with it, while simultaneously weakening the Palestinian Authority (PA). And second, that it was possible to impose a blockade on Gaza by air, land, and sea that would prevent it from building up its military capabilities.
The war also demonstrated the great danger inherent in societal division, which provided a catalyst for the murderous attack.
The attempt to advance a sectorial agenda – especially at a time of military threats from around the region, and when the heads of the defense establishment were warning against possible escalation in the near future, with no response from the political leadership – failed dismally, and should serve as a lesson for future governments.
The fact that Israeli society in its entirety, devoted itself to the war effort should not mislead anyone about the willingness of those groups who were being marginalized or harmed by the judicial revolution to continue the internal struggle after the war, if necessary. Moreover, the war should be an invitation to redress various wrongs that have been done to Israel’s minorities, and particularly the legislation of the Nation-State Law.
Furthermore, the Hamas attack has made clear that the threat posed by Hezbollah in the North can no longer be overlooked. Though most Lebanese have no interest in war, a solution must be found to this threat in order to ensure the safety of Israeli residents along the border – whether a political or military solution. Behind Hezbollah stands Iran, which also has other proxies active on its behalf in the region. But dealing with Iran will require broad, collaborative action, together with the United States and other countries that share similar interests with Israel.
The war is also a test of all of Israel’s accomplishments in the Middle East since signing the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979. That agreement opened the door for Israel to gain recognition and find a place for itself in the Middle East. It was followed by the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians (1993), the peace treaty with Jordan (1994), and diplomatic relations with Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania.
The Second Intifada, which broke out in 2000, may have presented a setback, as several countries broke off relations with Israel and some withdrew their embassies, but the treaties with Egypt and with Jordan held firm. Furthermore, normalization agreements were then signed with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco in 2020 – with the Palestinian issue being sidelined from the regional agenda. Netanyahu governments led the approach that it was possible to make progress with Arab countries without dealing with the Palestinian issue and while continuing to strengthen the settlement project in Judea and Samaria.
In fact, 2023 was supposed to be the peak year in this process – the year in which Netanyahu’s ultimate dream would be realized in the form of a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia. Press reports hinted at advanced negotiations behind the scenes between the US and the Saudis, with Israeli knowledge.
However, the Hamas attack has put an end to that idea for now, as Saudi Arabia decided to suspend all talks. It should be noted that even before the war, there had been a cooling of cooperation with the Arab states due to the current government’s extremist policy and statements.
The so-called “moderate” Arab states have not yet broken things off with Israel entirely. Excepting Jordan, which recalled its ambassador, all the “peace and normalization” countries have taken no punitive measures and have even declared their intention to maintain relations with Israel. However, public opinion in the Arab world is fervently in favor of the Palestinians – and in some cases, even Hamas – and thus places restrictions on Arab rulers’ room to maneuver.
Still, the search for a solution to the Palestinian problem should not be driven only by a desire to mollify Palestinian and Arab public opinion, but to resolve one of Israel’s most fundamental and urgent problems – ruling over a foreign people.
The traumatic events of 2023 have held up an ugly mirror to Israel’s leadership and society, posing difficult questions about both domestic and foreign issues. These questions will have to be answered in the coming years – but not by the current government.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.