France, the UK, and other leading states recently recognized a Palestinian state, bringing the total number to do so to 157. Most explicitly support a two-state solution, although it is questionable how many truly understand what issues must be resolved in practice and what the prospects are.
After decades of failed attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the October 7 massacre, and war in Gaza, these acts of political theater will not advance the peace process one iota. Instead, it is time to acknowledge a sobering truth: The classic two-state solution to the conflict is no longer viable and new approaches are required.
The following tripartite paradigm is based on long-established proposals. Their combination together in a coherent whole, with some necessary modifications, is what may make this the most effective path forward.
Key points of the paradigm
A Jordanian-Palestinian confederation is the heart of the proposed paradigm: two sovereign states that share foreign and defense policy, while maintaining their own national identities and separate civil governance. The Palestinian state would include both the West Bank (excluding a few percent of the territory to incorporate the major settlement blocs in Israel) and Gaza.
For Jordan’s Hashemite monarchy, the confederation model offers a chance to address a major, even existential, demographic and political challenge: The kingdom already has a Palestinian majority, the king’s heir is half Palestinian, and absent a solution, the Hashemite minority’s future is increasingly doubtful. Nevertheless, Jordan is deeply wary of the confederation proposal, fearful that it could destabilize the kingdom, or become a Trojan horse for a Palestinian takeover.
Rather than undermining the Hashemite monarchy, however, the confederation would be explicitly designed to secure its future. Constitutional guarantees would ensure that Jordan remains the Hashemite Kingdom in perpetuity. They would also provide Jordan’s king with emergency authorities and veto power. Strong security partnerships with Israel and the US would provide further assurances.
The Palestinians would gain an essentially independent state, tightly linked to a functioning extant one, with a viable economy and effective military, and far larger than the tiny and landlocked West Bank. Palestinian refugees would gain an unlimited right of return to the Palestinian state, but not Israel, with compensation for those who do not choose to exercise this option. The confederation would constitute the “end of claims” and formal conclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The confederation model would provide Israel with a more trustworthy security partner than a nascent and likely hostile Palestinian state. During a transitional period, Jordan would retain overall control over the confederation’s military and intelligence apparatus and ensure that the Palestinian state remain demilitarized, although Israel would retain the right to conduct counterterror operations, as necessary, in coordination with it.
Jerusalem would remain Israel’s capital, with a Palestinian capital in its outskirts, e.g. in Abu Dis or Ramallah. Jerusalem’s Old City, including the sensitive holy sites, would be administered jointly by Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the US, pending final resolution of its status.
Details of the confederation proposal
The confederation proposal has been openly supported by Jordanian and Palestinian leaders ever since the 1970s, including King Hussein, Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, Israeli leaders, and American leaders from Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan to President Donald Trump. It has never had its moment, however, perhaps until now, when the old paradigms are crumbling and new thinking is desperately needed.
Multilateral land swaps: No solution is viable without addressing the unique challenges posed by Gaza. With one of the world’s highest population growth rates, doubling approximately every 20 years, Gaza is unsustainable socioeconomically. Multilateral land swaps could provide the solution.
Egypt would give the Palestinians land adjacent to Gaza, doubling or even tripling its size. Israel would compensate Egypt with equal-sized land along their common border. The Palestinians, in turn, would provide Israel with equal land in the West Bank (6%-12%, depending on whether the land transferred to Gaza was doubled or tripled).
What makes this swap so effective is that no party gains or loses net territory, but the Palestinians and Israel gain territory where they need it the most: An expanded Gaza becomes viable for the long term; Israel retains key settlements and defensible territory in the West Bank. Egypt, for its part, would gain economic incentives and support from the international community, along with infrastructure links through Israel to Jordan.
Egypt has long opposed any changes to its territory and refused to assume responsibility for Gaza. Egypt, however, like Jordan, must be reminded that it, too, bears historical responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian issue and thus for its resolution. It is not just Israel’s problem.
Civil separation in the West Bank: Given the current security climate, particularly after the October 7 atrocities, few in Israel, including the Left, are prepared to completely withdraw from Palestinian territory, even in exchange for peace and security guarantees. This is particularly true of the West Bank, which abuts all of Israel’s major population centers. Conversely, the status quo is untenable for the long term.
As a first step, which might be a prelude to the above measures, Israel would conduct a civil, but not military, withdrawal from the West Bank. This would involve transferring civil control to the Palestinians in approximately 90% of the West Bank (subject to the land swap above), while maintaining full military deployment and security prerogatives, as necessary, pending a final status agreement. Incentives would be provided to settlers to voluntarily relocate.
This proposal would reduce day-to-day friction between the sides and greatly expand Palestinian self-governance, without compromising core Israeli security needs. It could also help pave the way for the establishment of the confederation. In Gaza, Israel would withdraw to the security perimeter currently envisaged or, preferably, transfer it to Egyptian trusteeship, as per the preceding section.
None of the above can happen in the current political context. A new government would have to be elected in Israel, as appears likely next year; the Palestinians would have to undergo more fundamental political reform, which will take time; Jordan and Egypt would have to demonstrate new policy flexibility.
The Gulf states and international community would have to provide political and economic backing. The United States would have to take the lead and leverage its influence to bring the parties on board.
Critically, however, this paradigm shift aligns with Trump’s preference for dramatic out-of-the-box solutions, unconstrained by conventional wisdom and bearing his personal imprint. It may not be ideal and is certainly not a panacea; it does not fulfill the sides’ every aspiration. But in a region where the perfect has always been the enemy of the good, it may be the most effective formula for addressing the core security, demographic, and political concerns of both the Israeli and Palestinian publics.
The writer, a former deputy national security adviser in Israel, is an adjunct professor at Columbia and Tel Aviv University and the author of several books on Israeli national security.