The recent killing of Hezbollah’s chief of staff, Haytham Ali Tabatabai – better known as “Abu Ali” – underscores a simple truth: Hezbollah never left the battlefield. It returned, bruised but determined. Tabatabai was the driving force behind the group’s recovery and its renewed alignment with Iran’s economic, ideological, and military machine. From the moment he stepped into the role, he became a legitimate target, effectively a dead man walking.
His assassination, however, reveals something deeper.
While Israel is still entangled in internal disputes over military appointments following the Turgeman Committee’s post-October 7 findings, Tehran wastes no time. Iran is not bogged down by political infighting, nor does it linger on public debates over accountability. Instead, it revives the smoking gun, sets politics aside, and prepares, decisively, for the next round.
In reality, Abu Ali’s elimination presents no serious dilemma for Iran’s leadership. Both Tehran and Hezbollah understand that striking Israel’s home front would invite a heavier Israeli response and give Jerusalem an opening for escalation, one that could disrupt Hezbollah’s rebuilding process. They know it, and they fear it.
A significant elimination
Hezbollah and Iran absorbed heavy blows this past year, but their focus has shifted to something far more strategic: learning, adapting, and building a stronger, deadlier capabilities portfolio for the next decisive confrontation.
Tabatabai was central to that effort. Handpicked and approved by Tehran, he led Hezbollah’s reconstruction, its renewed strategic partnership with Iran, and the restoration of the group’s fighting spirit – severely damaged after the Mossad’s successful beeper operation left senior Hezbollah operatives exposed, humiliated, and visibly shaken. Their appearance alone now serves as a warning sign to anyone considering following their path.
Tabatabai’s elimination is therefore significant and carries a clear message to Lebanon’s government, which is struggling, against all odds, to salvage what remains of its national institutions. Still, the strike does not solve Lebanon’s growing terror problem.
With this operation, Israel continues its policy of controlled, symmetrical escalation. The message is aimed at Hezbollah but even more so at Iran: Jerusalem has no interest in a full-scale war. Instead, it will continue its pattern of precise, surgical, air-based strikes, carefully calibrated to avoid destabilizing Lebanon and certainly Iran, which still grips the Lebanese lever tightly.
Not prepared to 'break the rules'
So while Israel’s command centers display signs reading “Operational Status: War,” Tehran enjoys, at least temporarily, a sense of immunity, maintaining its own status at heightened security.
Israel after October 7 is no longer governed by the old culture of “containment.” However, it is also not prepared to “break the rules” over Hezbollah’s renewed force buildup or its expanding cooperation with Hamas in Lebanon.
Many in Israel still believe that American pressure on Lebanon will generate meaningful change. But Washington is an ally, not an extension of the IDF, and historically, the United States joins successful efforts; it rarely initiates them.
Lebanon’s reality should concern everyone, from Israeli leadership to the families who have just returned to their homes along the northern border. Hezbollah may not be the same organization it was before the war, but it is far more driven to rebuild and reassert itself.
Hezbollah's slow recovery
Every eliminated commander has a successor; every “Abu Ali” (Ali’s father) is replaced by an “Ibn Ali” (Ali’s son).
However, an ideological mission has no substitute; it continues to pulse at the heart of the Iranian regime and fuels Hezbollah’s recovery.
Hezbollah and Iran still possess rockets, missiles, and drones capable of hitting Israeli cities. But their real strength lies elsewhere – in their patience, their rapid learning cycles, their recovery processes, and their ability to rebuild faster than expected.
The very fact that we’re once again debating how Hezbollah might respond is a clear sign that Israel is drifting back toward the same strategic assumptions that failed before October 7, assumptions that are now threatening to reshape its post-war policy as well.
The writer, an IDF reserve lieutenant colonel, is CEO of the Israel Defense & Security Forum (IDSF) and serves as the operations officer of the Gaza Division in the IDF reserves.