Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent visit to the United States initially appeared to be yet another routine stop in a long series of trips aimed at tightening coordination over Middle East developments and reinforcing the personal bond between the two leaders who make no secret of their mutual affection.
Yet in an interview with The Economist at Mar-a-Lago, Netanyahu dropped what can only be described as a strategic bombshell: after more than 70 years in which Israel has received American financial support, the State of Israel will not seek to renew the annual $3.8 billion military aid package that is set to expire in 2028.
“I want to reduce military aid over the next ten years,” Netanyahu said, answering in the affirmative when asked whether that meant reaching zero dependence on the United States.
The prime minister explained that Israel has “come of age” and has developed impressive economic capabilities, with its economy projected to reach the trillion-dollar mark in the coming decade. “We want to be as independent as possible,” he stressed, while adding that he would continue to “fight for the loyalty and support of the American people.”
Since the early 1950s, Israel has received American assistance that was critical to its survival and to the building of its military and economic strength, at a time when enemy states were engaged in an advanced arms race aimed at its destruction. In real terms, total US aid to Israel exceeds $300 billion – more than to any other country in the world. How, then, can Netanyahu agree to give up such a significant sum from a country that has consistently been one of Israel’s most loyal and supportive allies?
The answer is not primarily economic. It is a profound geo-strategic move, born of dramatic changes within the United States, the lessons of the Israel-Hamas War, and the maturation of Israel’s economy and national power.
Netanyahu recognizes sentiment from American society
Netanyahu, known for his deep understanding of American society and its internal political processes, clearly recognizes that broad segments of the American public – including within the conservative camp – are no longer willing to finance the security of other countries. Both the Republican movement and progressive currents within the Democratic Party increasingly share the same view: America should invest in America.
In this political reality, US aid to Israel is no longer merely a budgetary burden; it has become a source of domestic political criticism that erodes public support for the Jewish state. As long as Israel is seen as a state funded by American taxpayers, it becomes a target for ideological opposition on the Left and fiscal skepticism on the Right.
Precisely for this reason, Israel’s willingness to wean itself from American aid may be received positively, recasting Jerusalem not as a dependent recipient but as a strong, independent partner that does not drag Washington into external obligations. More than that, Israel can become the prototype of what the Trump administration demands from its allies – from NATO to Taiwan to South Korea: if you want the American umbrella, you must be strong enough to hold the handle yourself.
The decision also carries weight on the liberal-progressive side of American politics. For years, voices on the US Left have argued that because Washington funds Israel on such a large scale, it has the right to intervene in Israeli policy – a claim vividly experienced during the recent war. Ending the aid will not end criticism of Israel, but it will significantly reduce the legitimacy of direct intervention and diminish the available levers of pressure.
During the war itself, the dangers of dependence were starkly exposed. As a senior operations officer in the Gaza Division, I experienced firsthand how limited ammunition supplies and references in the IDF’s situation assessments to US political constraints became operational variables. Dependence on American munitions turned into a tool of leverage for the Biden administration, which sought to impose political and military redlines on Jerusalem.
At the height of the fighting, Israel found itself facing critical shortages due to political considerations and progressive worldviews in Washington. Israelis came to understand that even the closest alliance is, in the end, a contract – one that includes footnotes, clauses, and exit options that certain administrations can invoke to impose their policies on Israel.
Critics of Netanyahu’s decision point to the economic value of US aid and its importance to a small country like Israel. Yet from an economic perspective, a gradual end to the aid would force massive investment in Israel’s domestic defense industries, restoring what was eroded during decades of dependence: manufacturing capacity, independent supply chains, jobs, exports, and technological development. Every dollar that does not come from Washington would be created in Israel – in wages, R&D, and industry – strengthening the Israeli economy and its long-term resilience.
The United States will remain a major and loyal partner. Indeed, it derives enormous benefits from security cooperation with Israel – from its stable strategic foothold in the Middle East and invaluable intelligence to advanced technological know-how that enhances American military capabilities.
Yet the political climate in Washington is turning aid into a liability. This requires not only technological upgrades in weapons systems but a strategic upgrade in the relationship itself: from a model of dependency to one of true strategic partnership between two strong allies.
Reducing American aid to zero over the coming decade is not a risk – it is a necessity. Israel in the third decade of the 21st century does not need charity. It needs freedom of action, industrial sovereignty, and alliances built on strength.
The writer, an IDF reserve lieutenant colonel, is CEO of the Israel Defense & Security Forum (IDSF).