As the US once again enters negotiations with Iran, Americans must confront how profoundly we have misread the Middle East and the motivations of both our adversaries and our partners.
These misperceptions shape US policy, diplomacy, and security outcomes, not only for America but for its most reliable regional ally, Israel.
There should be a call for humility and realism when dealing with all Middle Eastern actors, friend and foe alike.
To understand the region, we must accept a basic truth: the Middle East does not operate according to Western assumptions about alliances, institutions, or time. From 6,000 miles away, many relationships appear incoherent or even contradictory. In reality, they follow a different logic, one shaped by history, religion, tribal identity, and rivalries that long predate modern nation-states.
Washington consistently overestimates the power of formal agreements and underestimates the weight of identity, grievance, and long memory. Americans prize written deals and immediate outcomes; Middle Eastern actors think in terms of generations. We measure success by signatures; they measure it by survival.
Consider today’s emerging Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani security alignment. At first glance, it appears to signal a dramatic shift in Saudi policy. But the more important question is whether this represents a genuine strategic realignment or simply tactical maneuvering among rivals with overlapping interests at a particular moment.
For Israel, the distinction is critical.
Alliances in the Middle East are built on temporary objectives
In this region, alliances are rarely built on trust or shared values. They are built on shared threats and shared objectives, often temporary ones. Israel understands this reality intuitively; Washington too often does not.
Looking “back to the future” helps explain how this works. Hamas is Sunni Arab and jihadist; Iran is Persian and Shi’ite. Theologically and historically, they should be bitter enemies. Yet they cooperate closely because they share a higher priority: the destruction of Israel. When interests converge, identity conflicts can be set aside.
Egypt and Turkey offer another example of apparent contradiction. Both are Sunni powers that once competed for leadership of the Sunni world. Erdoğan’s Turkey is deeply rooted in Muslim Brotherhood ideology, while Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi views the Brotherhood as a mortal threat.
Cairo and Ankara have moved toward rapprochement as Egypt allowed weapons to pass to Hamas through Rafah, even though Hamas is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.
To Western policymakers, this appears incoherent. In the Middle East, it is business as usual, and Israel pays the price when Washington misreads what's going on. Having rejected President Obama’s Iran nuclear deal, the current administration nonetheless risks repeating its core flaw: placing faith in the Supreme Leader’s promises rather than in Iran’s long record of deception.
These patterns repeatedly confound American officials, think tanks, and members of Congress, producing strategic miscalculations. Gulf Arab policy illustrates this clearly. Gulf leaders prioritize regime stability above all else, and their partnerships shift accordingly. Three years ago, Iran was their primary concern, making alignment with Israel logical. Today, some Saudi leaders are reassessing whether Israel has become a destabilizing force, particularly after Israeli operations against Hamas leadership based in Qatar.
At the same time, Riyadh is weighing whether Iran’s current vulnerability presents an opportunity worth exploiting. These calculations are fluid, pragmatic, and intensely self-interested, not always ideological.
For American policymakers, the lesson is simple but difficult: do not take statements in this region at face value. Flattery, symbolism, and public gestures often conceal very different private calculations. Interests may align temporarily; values rarely do.
Washington must learn to think on a Middle Eastern clock, not an American one. Strategic patience matters more than speed. Deterrence and perception matter more than signatures on paper.
This is especially true with Iran. The Islamic Republic negotiates from a tradition shaped by centuries of Persian statecraft, where deception and delay are tools of power, not breaches of trust. When a senior US official recently suggested that “we all want the same things,” the reaction in Gaza and Tehran was likely relief. To jihadists, Sunni or Shi’ite, such statements signal weakness.
The same caution applies to Gulf negotiations. Washington often views arms sales, defense pacts, and nuclear cooperation as stabilizing, only to discover it has surrendered leverage for vague promises. Offering Saudi Arabia a defense treaty, a civilian nuclear program, and F-35s without first insisting on normalization with Israel is strategic generosity without reciprocity.
As the Arab Spring gave way to a cold winter in 2013, former ambassador Aaron David Miller warned in Foreign Affairs that Gulf states are “tribes with flags,” exposing the myth of Arab statehood. We would be wise to acknowledge this reality rather than project comforting illusions. The US may share an interest in regional stability, but these regimes do not necessarily share America’s interests in its values.
If America remains strong and clear-eyed, it will retain influence and reinforce Israel’s deterrence. If it appears desperate for deals and photo opportunities, that is all it will get.
The Middle East does not reward wishful thinking. It rewards power, clarity, and patience. Washington must learn to play by those rules or continue paying the price, along with Israel, for misunderstanding the region.
The writer is the director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network, and the senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report. He regularly briefs members of Congress, their foreign policy aides, think tanks, and the State Department.