Modi’s Israel visit isn’t about optics, it’s about capability - opinion

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel tomorrow will inevitably trigger the usual wave of speculation: Is the visit a referendum on bilateral ties, a regional signal, or a bromance sequel?

Those frames are noisy – and strategically shallow.

In nominal terms, International Monetary Fund (IMF)-based estimates widely place India as the world’s fourth-largest economy in 2026, an indicator of scale that shapes how partners approach New Delhi.

This is not the India of 2017, when Modi made history as the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel. India today is increasingly shaping agendas, setting terms, and selecting partners that accelerate its strategic trajectory.

That is exactly why this visit is neither a relationship test nor a story about personal chemistry between leaders.

The real question is whether India and Israel are ready to move from procurement-based defense ties to a capability partnership based on co-development, co-production, shared IP arrangements, resilient supply chains, readiness, and strategic resilience.

Why now? Because three turning points converge:

First, leader-to-leader warmth is not an indicator of alliance. Modi consistently uses informal personal diplomacy with leaders he deems strategically valuable. It’s a method projecting trust and momentum, not codifying commitments.  Second, India is not joining an alliance. New Delhi’s strategic DNA is multi-alignment and issue-based coalitions, not bloc politics. Even when India deepens defense cooperation, it avoids the language and the obligations of formal alliance behavior.

Third, this is not about choosing sides in the Middle East. India manages overlapping relationships with Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and others through interest ranking and risk management, not ideological alignment.

If you read the visit as “India picking Israel over the Gulf,” you’ll misread India’s approach and overpromise what Israel can extract from the relationship.

That means Israel’s value proposition is strongest when it accelerates Indian capability-building rather than merely filling near-term gaps.

The following are the capability areas where India’s demand signal is most strategic and where Israel can align without clashing with India’s self-reliance trajectory.

India’s challenge for air and missile defense integration and upgrades are not just acquisition; it is about integration, sensor fusion, C2, layered architecture, and operational doctrine that can absorb new systems without creating stovepipes. Israel’s comparative advantage lies in architecture thinking, battle management, and iterative upgrades – especially when paired with Indian production, MRO, and software sustainment.

This is a natural co-development and co-production space – especially if Israel positions itself as a partner in systems integration with rapid iteration, not as a one-off vendor.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), sensors, electro-optical (EO) payloads, and autonomy are crucial for India’s modern deterrence and warfighting. Because warfare depends increasingly on persistent ISR, precision targeting, and decision advantage. Israel’s strong point is not just sensor technology but operational integration: How ISR plugs into targeting cycles, how autonomy reduces manpower burdens, how systems survive contested environments.

Cyber and critical infrastructure protection can allow this partnership can become structural. India’s digital expansion and its exposure to critical infrastructure are accelerating simultaneously. Israel has deep expertise in protecting high-value nodes – ports, energy, communications – and in translating threat intelligence into resilient architecture. This connects directly to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and to India’s broader resilience agenda.

Defense industrialization includes the transfer of technology (ToT), co-production, MRO, and training ecosystems. Israel’s strategic opportunity is to lead with a proposal that respects India’s core demand to build capacity inside India.

This means clear co-production pathways, modular IP structures, MRO and sustainment nodes, and training ecosystems that embed tacit knowledge into Indian organizations. If Israel frames the relationship as “more exports,” it will hit a ceiling. If it frames it as “capability transfer plus industrial partnership,” it becomes harder to reverse politically – and easier to expand.

If Israel wants to be a serious node in an India-linked corridor architecture, it must speak in India’s operating language: bankability, risk, insurance, and continuity under stress. India’s calculus is straightforward: Is the corridor operationally reliable under regional volatility? Can it be insured at scale? Are cyber and physical protections credible? Do regulatory and logistics regimes reduce friction or create bottlenecks? Can the system deliver in crisis conditions?

Israel’s problem is not a lack of intent; it is insufficient packaging.

To be “serious,” Israel needs to present an IMEC security and delivery package with baseline standards, cyber protections for communications/energy layers, port security architecture, and mechanisms that reduce risk premiums.

This is precisely where Israel can offer unique value: critical infrastructure defense expertise, cyber depth, and operational planning culture.

A mature India-Israel defense discussion requires clarity on boundaries. No alliance commitments. India will not trade strategic autonomy for symbolism. It will expect deep cooperation, not treaty-like obligations, along with caution with the Gulf.

India will keep balancing its relationships with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, not least because energy security, diaspora realities, and economic strategy are intertwined.

India may prioritize certain projects over others, but it will avoid being seen as coercing Gulf partners in a way that reduces room for maneuver.

Identity debates, communal sensitivities, and the government’s preference for maintaining decision latitude – all these constrain how publicly India will frame certain partnerships. Israel’s mistake would be to push for maximal public theater over quietly expanding institutional depth.

Establish an India-Israel defense industrial working group. Mandate it for co-production, maintenance, repair, and operations (MRO), and supply-chain resilience, with clear timelines and industry participation.  Israel should also launch a focused joint research and development (R&D) track. It should also prioritize Counter-UAS, layered air defense interoperability, sensor fusion, and cyber for critical infrastructure.

The proposal of an IMEC security package standards together with cyber and port security, along with a risk/insurance framework, designed to reduce corridor friction and lower risk premiums.

Build a “port-to-protection” plan around Haifa as a node scenario, with exercises, disruption drills, and cyber-physical protection architecture that demonstrate seriousness. Jerusalem should also create talent and training pipelines; joint programs connecting academia, industry, and defense institutions for ecosystem lock-in.

But all of this should be kept discreet and disciplined. A public-diplomatic coordination mechanism that respects India’s sensitivities and avoids unnecessary political noise. Modi’s visit should be read through capability, not optics.

Can Israel help India build resilient defense capacity in ways that the latter can absorb, scale, and sustain?

The opportunity is real, but only if Israel moves from messaging to mechanisms, from transactions to systems, and from headline diplomacy to industrial and operational depth.