2024 will be bad for Israelis, even worse for Gazans

“We have set the order of operations: First, a decisive victory in the South. But it is clear that after we complete the destruction of Hamas, we will not be able to leave the northern border the way it is,” said Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. ”We cannot end the war this way. We told the Americans this must be solved diplomatically or militarily, and we will solve it.”

The astronomical economic cost of the Gaza war will also kick in. A significant drop in living standards across the board is inevitable, along with higher unemployment. For some sectors, such as tourism, 2024 will be catastrophic. The drafting of so many reservists for months on end is already damaging the economy, including hi-tech, the main driver of growth. The drop in investment and loss of confidence will undermine Israel’s economic outlook and negatively impact the country’s credit rating.

All current reserve battalions will be called up for one month in 2024. The IDF believes that what they achieve in the Gaza Strip will impact Hezbollah and other regional players for years to come.

With the Gaza war now in its third month, Israel’s military advance has been demonstrably aggressive. Hamas has been soundly defeated in every encounter with the advancing troops, and Israel estimates that close to 8,000 terrorists have already been killed, with many more wounded. However, despite the numerous tactical victories, there is still no strategic victory for Israel. Hamas has not surrendered, and the group’s senior leaders have still not been killed or captured. Despite an unprecedented intelligence effort, only one hostage still alive has so far been rescued by troops.

Hamas’s hopes that their attack on October 7 would spark a wider regional conflagration were dashed, with the exception of the Houthis in Yemen, who succeeded in disrupting Red Sea maritime trade.

The Iranian-backed rebels fired a few long-range rockets from Yemen towards Eilat, but they were intercepted.

More worrying were the attacks on vessels that were heading toward Eilat at the southern entrance to the Red Sea or vessels that were Israeli-owned.

The largest shipping companies in the world announced in mid-December that they were pausing all container shipments via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, meaning the ships now have to navigate all the way around Africa, adding a couple of weeks and a significant cost to the journey.

A multinational naval coalition was formed to protect shipping and shoot down incoming missiles and drones. Israel also sent Navy patrol vessels to the area but stressed that the Houthi attacks were an international problem that required an international response.

Although there are daily clashes with Hezbollah along Israel’s northern border, the powerful Iranian-backed Shi’ite group has been careful not to provoke Israel into launching an all-out war, as that could spark a much more dangerous regional conflagration.

Hamas stands alone, despite the undoubted solidarity on the Arab street. Hamas called for a popular uprising among West Bank and east Jerusalem Palestinians but it didn’t happen, despite polls showing a surge in popularity for Hamas in the West Bank since the start of the war. And Israeli Arabs, who make up 20 percent of the population, have kept quiet.

Arab countries have condemned Israel’s attack on Gaza but have, by and large, failed to take practical steps, although Jordan and Bahrain did withdraw their ambassadors, without cutting ties.

The scale of the atrocities committed on October 7, combined with the fear that a Hamas success would boost radical elements across the Middle East, endangering many existing regimes, may partly explain the reluctance of the wider Arab world to join the fray.

If 2024 promises to be a difficult year for Israelis, it will be much worse for the residents of Gaza.

How Gaza will feel the New Year

An Israeli task force, comprised of senior political and military officials, has held a number of meetings to discuss “the day after” – the post-war arrangements concerning Gaza – but has still not presented its recommendations to the war cabinet for approval. Netanyahu has only indicated in broad strokes what Israel wants to happen as part of a post-war arrangement after Israeli troops withdraw. Mostly, he has stressed what he doesn’t want to happen.

He has made it clear that Israel has no desire to re-occupy Gaza, and he has rejected the possibility, supported by some of his far-right coalition partners, of re-establishing Jewish settlements in the coastal enclave.

At the same time, Israel insists that Gaza be demilitarized, with IDF forces maintaining the right to carry out cross-border military interventions, similar to the situation today in the northern West Bank, particularly in Jenin and Tulkarm, where IDF troops frequently enter areas ostensibly under Palestinian Authority (PA) control to engage terrorists.

Israel also wants to establish a security strip a few kilometers wide along the entire length of the Gaza Strip, on the Palestinian side of the border, to prevent hostile elements from approaching the border fence.

In addition, Israel will no longer allow Gazan residents to enter Israel to work or allow humanitarian trucks to cross into Gaza via Israel.

The Hamas invasion of southern Israel was the most traumatic moment in Israel’s history. Netanyahu, in contrast to most of the military and intelligence top brass, has refused to admit responsibility, and there is no indication that he intends to resign after the war.

National Unity party leader Benny Gantz will quit the unity government when the war ends, and tens of thousands of demobilized reservists are expected to join a revitalized protest movement, demanding Netanyahu’s resignation and new elections, adding political turmoil to the expected security and economic woes in 2024.

The events of October 7 caused the prime minister’s popularity to plunge to unprecedented levels. Since then, despite stressing that he is concentrating solely on defeating Hamas, he has been looking for an issue to restore his popularity.

“The day after,” and specifically his objection to any role for the PA, is that issue – and the campaign is already underway. Netanyahu wants the next election to center around the claim that only he can prevent the PA from taking over Gaza, in contrast to his rivals who will cave in to American and international pressure and bring the PA into Gaza.

His position is in contrast to that of the administration of US President Joe Biden, which is pinning its hopes on Mahmoud Abbas’s Palestinian Authority, which controls the West Bank, to play the leading role in a post-war Gaza arrangement.

Speaking during a visit to Israel in mid-December, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reiterated Washington’s position that the PA should be responsible for governing Gaza at the end of the fighting but acknowledged that it would need to undergo significant changes to be fit to do so.

Abbas said that Gaza was “an integral part of the Palestinian state” and that “any political solution” must include that enclave, as well as the West Bank and east Jerusalem.

Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh says Ramallah is working with the US on a plan based on PA control with Hamas participation.

He told Bloomberg that Israel’s aim of dismantling Hamas is unrealistic, saying he believes that Hamas should take part after the war in building a new independent Palestinian state.

“Hamas before October 7 is one thing, and after it is another thing,” Shtayyeh said. “If they are ready to come to an agreement and accept the political platform of the PLO, then there will be room for talk. Palestinians should not be divided.”

Netanyahu ruled out any role for either Hamas or Fatah, the dominant force in the PA.

“I want to clarify my position: I won’t let Israel repeat the mistake of Oslo,” he said. “I won’t allow us, after the massive sacrifice of our citizens and soldiers, to bring into Gaza someone who teaches terrorism, supports terrorism, and funds terrorism. Gaza won’t be Hamastan or Fatahstan.” ■