IDF reservists discuss the Israeli art of war

MILITARY AFFAIRS: Gaza could have been a much better place.

A terrorist from the al-Quds Brigades, the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, is seen inside a military tunnel in Beit Hanun, in the Gaza Strip. (photo credit: ATTIA MUHAMMED/FLASH90)
A terrorist from the al-Quds Brigades, the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, is seen inside a military tunnel in Beit Hanun, in the Gaza Strip.
(photo credit: ATTIA MUHAMMED/FLASH90)

Often, the greatest “glory” in the current invasion of Gaza goes to the air force and the commando units that fill up the breaking news and headlines.

But The Jerusalem Post recently visited multiple units on the southern front where it got to speak to senior engineering and tank officials responsible for destroying tunnels and making the landscape more “sterile” for those same commando units before the elite fighters enter the fray.

IDF Maj. R. normally works for the ANU - Museum of the Jewish People in “a completely different kind of role,” but in the IDF is a reservist commander of a unit of engineers. He told the Post that already on October 8, he and other “engineering professionals had multiple goals and worked with their brigade commander to figure out how to get past booby-traps and barriers to invasion.”

“You need to study the ground, anything connected to it,” and the different small changes in elevation of the land, explained R.

Further, he said, “We look at not only how we get over obstacles, but also how we build obstacles to confront the enemy.”

 A terrorist from the al-Quds Brigades, the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, is seen inside a military tunnel in Beit Hanun, in the Gaza Strip. (credit: ATTIA MUHAMMED/FLASH90)
A terrorist from the al-Quds Brigades, the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, is seen inside a military tunnel in Beit Hanun, in the Gaza Strip. (credit: ATTIA MUHAMMED/FLASH90)

Specifically, he stated, “The D9 [bulldozer] has been very effective against improvised explosives on the road and in the walls of houses. We want to give maximum protection for dealing with Hamas positions, shafts, and full-fledged tunnels.” They also used tractor-excavator machines which are smaller than D9s.

Next, he noted, “We develop tactics for how to look for them and how to destroy” the tunnels and ambush points.

“They trained for this, for tunnels and urban issues, and that training is proving itself now.... We are not surprised by Hamas’s special tactics. This is not theoretical. We are super ready,” according to R.

In addition, regarding tunnels he said, “We watch what is happening around us. If we make a decision to destroy a tunnel shaft, we only implement the decision after we check” all of the details and effects of destroying the tunnel in question.

A number of different aspects of IDF military forces can handle different kinds of tunnels, he said.

R. said that when planning to carry out a demolition of an area or a tunnel, it is important to have already carefully mapped out everything connected with the tunnel.

Further, he said that each shaft and tunnel that his unit takes away from Hamas undermines the terrorist group’s broader ability to mount a unified defense and to maintain contact between disparate units and defense positions.

Also, he noted that many engineering projects, including demolitions, occur in war zones where Hamas terrorists could still be a threat to those working on the engineering or demolition issue.

Because the situation in the field is so dynamic, his unit is regularly updating its situation reports to headquarters.

“What equipment do we need, including explosives, to go and blow up and destroy certain Hamas structures” is information which he constantly and rapidly must get to the right officials.

He said that during the May 2021 Gaza conflict, significant aspects of the engineering unit were called up to prepare for ground attacks into Gaza.

Both the 2014 and 2021 conflicts significantly enhanced the IDF Engineering Corps’ cumulative knowledge of how to address tunnels during the current war, he said. He added that the special anti-tunnel Yahalom Unit is always updating us; there are always technical changes. Hamas invested billions and tons of energy in its tunnel projects, and when [they] is taken away from Hamas, that hurts them deeply.”

Jumping out of concealed spots in tunnels

IDF Col. A., a reservist and the CEO of a company in the real estate sector, commands a reservist tank unit fighting in Gaza.

Discussing the phenomenon of Hamas terrorists suddenly jumping out from concealed spots in tunnels to try to ambush IDF ground troops, he said that his unit and aerial forces were able to kill such terrorists.

Also, without actually giving away secrets to the enemy, he said that, during the war, his unit had diagnosed certain successful enemy ambush strategies and figured out better ways to tease out, avoid, and spring Hamas ambushes in the IDF’s favor.

“We have a common goal. Everyone wanted to get into this war fast. We have been training for the purpose of fighting a war. We have thought through many war scenarios. When a tank arrives at a location, it has a dramatic impact,” said A.

He added, “Hamas’s terrorists felt they were being confronted in a robust manner, and they stopped trying to penetrate forward”; large numbers of them fled when they saw IDF tanks advancing.

A. said that his tank unit has “very deadly” capabilities, which are even more powerful when combined with the IDF joint operations with drones and aircraft.

He cited one incident where his unit killed 10 Hamas terrorists before ground troops proceeded so they would “encounter a sterile environment.”

In addition, he said their role is to “integrate the different capabilities of the infantry, air, and tank forces, creating an elevated mix of power which none of the different commands can achieve alone.”

He said that his unit had lost a soldier, but that Hamas would pay the price for this, and that losses “would not stop us, but would increase our motivation” and cause his unit to innovate different ways of fighting and strategizing the war.

Further, he said that his unit’s capabilities could be surgical and exact, like using a sharpshooter versus using 100 soldiers for a “statistical attack” of opening fire all over an enemy front.

According to A., “We can reduce the danger to our ground forces if we can kill Hamas terrorists without getting to the point of close or hand-to-hand combat.”

Also, A. said that the classified intelligence and other information coming to tanks is a huge advantage in having a broader understanding of the status of the battle on the front and where to focus the tank unit’s firepower.

“We have a lot of initiative, which has led to significant accomplishments. We use a lot of tricks,” explaining that reservists are often more sophisticated in knowing how to manipulate the perceptions of the enemy than younger, mandatory service soldiers.

A. said his tank unit “learns from every battle incident, with technology to show the soldiers videos of how they maneuvered” correctly or less well, so that they better absorb lessons to improve. This is also explained verbally and sometimes in writing, but with the focus of passing on the lesson in the most effective medium possible.

Speaking prior to the IDF invasion of southern Gaza, he said, “We will keep going until we topple Hamas. We are revved up to go south.”

The special character of the reservists 

THE TWO officers also addressed the special character of the reservists in their units.

R. said that reservists “have extra cool-headedness under pressure, plus some have vast experience now also doing creative multidisciplinary civilian engineering that they can bring to bear.”

He said his reservists do not automatically just follow whatever the military guidebook may say, as many mandatory service soldiers do.

This allows them to think more outside the box about what each “mechanical instrument can really do and about what is a smarter way to address different engineering challenges.

“The number of reservists serving is more than has occurred in decades, and they are very updated” in terms of challenges from Hamas,” R. said.

Addressing the tumultuous period for reservists, with the judicial overhaul debate prior to the war, R. said that “no one is talking about politics” anymore. He acknowledged that prior to the war, reservists were talking about the judicial overhaul frequently, but that “Hamas’s barbaric actions on October 7” had unified everyone and overcome the gaps between different political groups.

While wartime reserve duty takes a toll on every soldier and officer, A. jokes that it is still “lower pressure than at home.”

“We trained a ton. We built operational capacities for many years, and there is more participation now than at any other time. This is a big advantage. We can build the Tank Command decades forward into the future,” said A.

Also, he noted his unit was given an award from President Isaac Herzog for its excellence.

He said they have a very strong system of coordination for who is going in and out of battle and in and out of duty, to keep everyone fresh.

Regarding the threat of war crimes allegations from the International Criminal Court, A. said, “We have rules about what is prohibited and what is allowed.”

“This unit knows how to deal with the issue, and sometimes we pass on striking military targets because we avoid hitting innocent civilians. We are very disciplined,” he stated.

Moreover, A. noted, “The International Criminal Court is not relevant. We do the right thing because we believe in it.

Likewise, R. said: “We want to save lives, but these places are combat areas, and it is hard with civilians,” and with Hamas using human shields.

The events of October 7

REWINDING TO October 7, A. said that when he first started to see updates about a Hamas invasion, “I called a friend at 6:54 a.m. They said they had been shot in the hand, but were on their way to Soroka Medical Center and had escaped.”

Next, “I arrived here [at a tank base near the Gaza border] in the afternoon.”

He said he had trained for decades for this war, and that there were high motivation and capabilities, especially from the reservists, “who think more broadly and maturely.”

They left for the base at 2 p.m., and by 7 p.m. all of the required equipment and logistics items had arrived on the Gaza border, and they went into action.

After the initial stage of playing defense, the tank unit moved to offense in support of the IDF ground troops.

A. concluded, “October 7 was a hideous event which will stand out for generations. It was not a normal incident, and it does not matter what we knew. What they [Hamas] did wasn’t normal.”

R., who is 43 and lives in Tel Aviv, is married and has three children, said he had barely been back home at all, and only for short 24-hour stints.

He acknowledged that the military world he was now living in “is a very different setting. It’s very hard on the family, but this is what is happening now.”

If the October 7 massacre had not happened, R. would have been involved in his work in a celebration related to Codex Sassoon 1053, one of the two oldest extant Hebrew Bible manuscripts, dating back around 1,000 years.

In a very human moment, R. noted sadly: “All this [Hamas] money is going to war and not peace. If they had only invested all this energy” into building their communities, Gaza could have been a much better place, and the world would not be stuck having to cyclically rebuild it after another conflict.