To find a solution for Gaza, Israel needs long-term, strategic thinking - opinion

The absence of serious strategic, long-term thinking permeates significant areas of Israel’s political culture, such as the inability to write a constitution.

 PRIME MINISTER Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant confer in the Knesset plenum last month. Many Israelis are thirsty for a decisive Israeli victory and a long-term strategy in order to finally live in peace and without existential threat, the writer asserts.  (photo credit: YONATAN SINDEL/FLASH90)
PRIME MINISTER Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant confer in the Knesset plenum last month. Many Israelis are thirsty for a decisive Israeli victory and a long-term strategy in order to finally live in peace and without existential threat, the writer asserts.
(photo credit: YONATAN SINDEL/FLASH90)

As the war drags on and increasing impatience surrounding the “day after” Hamas in Gaza reverberates throughout the world, it appears that all of the relevant stakeholders are offering long-term strategic plans except for one – the Israeli government.

The United States and its Arab partners, among them Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia, have proposed a few ideas. Some have spoken about a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority (PA) and others about an Arab peacekeeping force as it is part of a track towards a long-term, comprehensive deal.

Yet the Israeli government is still lagging behind, having remained mostly quiet on the matter, to the detriment of its allies, with the exception of a brief document released by the Prime Minister’s Office laying out general principles for deradicalization and civil governance by undefined “local actors.”

This is due to a lack of strategic vision and the avoidance of discussing options for a long-term political settlement. As a result, we see the Israeli tendency to provide tactical answers – mostly military-based – for strategic questions. The absence of serious strategic, long-term thinking permeates significant areas of Israel’s political culture, such as the inability to write a constitution or to reform the status quo on issues of religion and state.

The reason for this has to do with a broad feeling of existential fear in Israeli society. The feeling is that Israel has yet to secure its existence in the region and that we have yet to get past the threshold of a permanent Jewish state surviving in the Arab-dominant Middle East.

 IDF soldiers operating in Khan Yunis, in the Gaza Strip, April , 2024. (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)
IDF soldiers operating in Khan Yunis, in the Gaza Strip, April , 2024. (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)

Such fear serves as a barrier to being able to take calculated risks for solving long-term problems to national security. We’ve succumbed to the almost obsessive desire for “quiet,” to neutralize the immediate security threat, and then move on, until the next time.

Instead of acting to address the core problems and to ensure that these threats don’t return in the future, our policies are reactive and consider only the symptoms. This subsequently creates a cycle that produces, and then constantly reproduces, tactical thinking and the postponement of serious discussions in government on strategic, long-term planning for security issues.

Israel does not excel in long-term strategy 

Israel is superb in providing tactical, military answers to security challenges. Throughout its history it has invented world-renowned tactics for urban warfare and hi-tech military technology that is used by many foreign armies around the globe. The country excels less in long-term strategy.

This kind of thinking became embedded in Israeli culture during the initial years of statehood. Israel entered international society as a small country, desperate for financial resources to develop the nascent state. Upon declaring independence, Israel was invaded by several surrounding Arab armies. For the first three decades, total war never ceased looming, and four interstate wars were fought during this period, in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. Existential threats continued to surround Israel and the Jewish state as a permanent phenomenon in the region was not perceived as hoped.

THE OCTOBER 7 massacre perpetrated by Hamas terrorists magnified this existential fear. Unlike during any other war that Israel had been involved in since 1948, thousands of Hamas operatives were able to take effective control of Israeli towns.

This existential fear goes beyond the relatively brief history of the State of Israel. For many, it’s ingrained in the Jewish psyche. Attempts to annihilate the Jewish people are unfortunately prevalent in the historical Jewish experience. Existential fear is central to Jewish history, from mass expulsions and pogroms to the Holocaust. It’s a central theme in Jewish holidays such as Passover, Hanukkah, and Purim.

Many Israelis are thirsty for decisive Israeli victory and a long-term strategy in order to finally live in peace and without an existential threat. However, Israel does not have the leadership capable of quenching that thirst.

The IDF is the most powerful army in the region and has killed thousands of Hamas operatives throughout the majority of the geographic area of Gaza, with the exception of Rafah. The military alone cannot destroy Hamas. Its power vacuum must also be replaced with an alternative. The military is a tactical tool that is able to create more favorable conditions for the initiation of a long-term political strategy. In order to escape the barrier of existential fear, the Israeli government needs a long-term strategy, but it is this existential fear that prevents it from being able to make such risk-averse decisions. It’s a catch-22.

Thus, serious discussion about long-term solutions remains absent. What is the result? The recycling of old ideas that address symptoms and not core problems.

For instance, it was reported that Defense Minister Yoav Gallant suggested the idea of arming and training (via the US military) Fatah affiliates in Gaza to take over governance duties. A similar plan was implemented in 2006 in order to overcome the Hamas victory in the parliamentary elections. In the end, the weapons reached the hands of Hamas as they forcefully took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007.

Whether Israel’s security establishment tries arming alternative factions like Fatah or working with local Gazan clans, it’s merely a bandaid, a tactical answer to a strategic problem. And like in the past, it’s bound to be short-lived.

The Israeli government needs to tap into some of Zionism’s root characteristics: A clear vision for creating a different reality than the one that exists today; the ability to have an open discussion on creative ideas for what that reality might look like; decisiveness regarding decision-making even amid disagreement; taking Jewish destiny into our own hands to bring about that envisioned reality.

Otherwise, we’ll remain stuck in the same loop and, God forbid, another October 7 will befall us in the future.

The writer is a PhD candidate in international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a social activist, and a combat reservist. He lives in Jaffa with his wife and daughter.