Last month, a significant attack on Iran’s major gas pipelines disrupted vital services, affecting industry and the millions of people relying on gas for heating and cooking across several provinces.
Despite the clear impact, Iranian officials hesitated to point fingers, even as Western sources attributed the blasts to Israel. This incident, followed by subsequent disruptions at the Bandar Abbas Aftab oil refinery and other key sites, reveals a strategic vulnerability.
For Israel, this marks a critical moment to assess the broader consequences of these actions and the apparent reluctance of the Iranian regime to escalate tensions by assigning blame.
To understand why Tehran dispensed with its usual fire and brimstone threats against the “Zionist enemy,” a summary of the decades-long shadow war between the two countries is in order.
From its revolutionary start in 1979, the regime has viewed the eradication of Israel, also known as “Little Satan,” and the creation of a Palestinian state from the “river to the sea” to be a religious and political imperative. With few military resources to take on a regular army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) has encouraged several – mostly Shia – militias known as the “axis of resistance.”
Iran’s proxies, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Houthis, and the Iran-aligned forces in Syria, were to serve as the “ring of fire” around Israel. In other words, they could be unleashed in a coordinated move, according to the regime’s needs.
In response, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) developed the containment doctrine known as MABAM, a Hebrew acronym for “war between wars.” According to the former chief of staff, Gen. Aviv Kochavi, the Israeli military sought to prevent a larger conflagration by localized retaliation against the offending proxy or proxies.
Although the IDF targeted Iranian nuclear scientists and IRGC forces attached to militias in Syria and elsewhere, a direct strike on Iranian infrastructure and facilities was ruled out. For instance, between 2010-2012, when the Netanyahu government discussed bombing Iran’s nuclear sites in Natanz and Fordo, the idea was overruled by the military.
Naftali Bennett, who became prime minister in 2020, challenged the notion that it was too risky to take on Iran directly. In a well-publicized round of interviews, he called for implementing the Octopus Doctrine: Rather than going after the Octopus’s militia tentacles, Israel should cut off the head, Iran.
Bennett argued that the previous doctrine was not likely to deter the regime which, despite its lavish praises for the “brothers” of the “axis of resistance,” considered them hardly more than cannon fodder. In contrast, the clerical autocracy was particularly sensitive to the loss of its citizens’ lives and to potential economic damage from targeted attacks on critical infrastructure.
Bennett’s short tenure and the return of the Likud coalition in January 2023 made the Octopus Doctrine redundant. Whatever the merits of attacking Iran directly, the government prioritized pacifying Hezbollah and Hamas. The former built up a large arsenal of missiles, rockets, and drones that threatened Upper Galilee and beyond. The latter used its own considerable arsenal to leverage its demands by periodically barraging Israel.
Each attack was followed by an IDF response, an unsettling reality for settlements along the Gaza border and up to the center of the country. In the years since Israel unilaterally disengaged from the Strip, the military launched numerous reprisals: Operation Summer Rain (June 2006), Operation Autumn Clouds (November 2006), Operation Hot Winter (February 2008), Operation Double Challenge, Operation Cast Lead (December 2008), Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012), Operation Protective Edge (July 2014), Operation Black Belt (November 2019), and Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021).
Ironically, the brutal attack of October 7 reconfigured Israel’s security paradigm. The ongoing war in Gaza has resulted in over 1,800 deaths among soldiers and civilians so far. Concurrently, almost daily fire exchanges with Hezbollah have forced around 100,000 residents to flee their homes.
Houthi attacks on Israeli-owned vessels passing through the Bab-al Mandab Strait, coupled with sporadic bombings near Eilat, have escalated tensions. Drone attacks by Iranian-linked militias in Syria further exacerbate the situation, contributing to a near-worst-case scenario as outlined in the ring of fire playbook.
The strikes in Iran signal a return to the Octopus Doctrine minus the Bennett fanfare. Yoav Gallant, the defense minister and a retired general, is said to support a hardline approach toward both Iran and Hezbollah.
The time is certainly opportune to confront the regime bedeviled by a severe economic crisis, including a staggering budget deficit, skyrocketing inflation, and growing dissatisfaction among the population.
A Farsi-language report titled “The Actual Budget Deficit in Iran’s Economy” sheds light on the severity of the situation. Accordingly, the government is grappling with a budget deficit of some $18 billion and an astounding debt of three quadrillion tomans, equivalent to $71 billion, approximately 31% of Iran’s gross domestic product.
Internal issues in Iran have led to nationwide protests
The economic hardships have led to waves of nationwide protests over the past four years. Labor unrest has also been prevalent. In 2023 alone, Iran has witnessed at least 320 labor-related gatherings and 111 labor strikes, with workers demanding improved wages and working conditions.
The water crisis, or as it is called “water bankruptcy,” is potentially more destabilizing. The situation is particularly critical in the southern provinces of Sistan and Baluchestan and in Khuzestan, southwest of Iran, but other provinces are not immune, given the failure to institute water conservation measures.
Experts predict that in a few years, water availability will drop to 500 cubic feet per person, the level of absolute scarcity. With farmers abandoning land in the affected areas, extreme migration into the cities is expected to create social chaos within two decades.
Social protest stemming from the killing of Mahsa Amini has diminished due to brutal suppression, including long-term prison sentences and even executions. However, signs of dissatisfaction remain, with some women resisting the hijab law. The regime’s legitimacy has been in constant decline, reaching a new low in the March election, where only 41% of eligible voters cast their ballots, the lowest since 1979.
While the extremely hardline government is not about to change its direction, especially on social issues like women’s rights, the leaders worry about additional Israeli hits that can further destabilize the country. So much so, that the head of the IRGC Quds Force, Ismael Ghani, ordered Hassan Nasrallah to claim in public that Hezbollah “will not drag Iran into a war” should Israel attack.
Israeli leaders should take notice. From an Iranian perspective, the first test of the ring of fire not only failed but exposed the regime’s fear of the type of economic dislocation that the pipeline attack has brought.
The writer is the director of Charles Malik Institute in Washington, DC.