Israel’s military campaign against Iran has proven to be a regional game-changer. Though the full extent of the damage to Iran’s nuclear project is still unclear, Israel demonstrated its ability to strike at the heart of the Islamic Republic’s strategic infrastructure, secure US cooperation, and avoid retaliation from Tehran’s regional proxies. In doing so, it reinforced its image as a dominant military force in the Middle East.
Among Israeli leaders, a growing sense has emerged: that victory over Hezbollah last year, followed by the strike on Iran, could allow Israel to “reorganize the Middle East.” This belief has been summed up by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich: “We live in a neighborhood where everyone flees the weak and sides with the strong.” The assumption is that strength will drive Arab states toward normalization and facilitate Israel’s regional integration.
Yet this concept – ”normalization through strength” – confuses deterrence with the building of long-term relations. It overestimates the appeal of military might while ignoring the real motivations that have historically led Arab states to normalize relations with Israel.
From the earliest hours after the Iran strike, messages from Saudi, Bahraini, and Emirati counterparts were strikingly consistent: Israel frightens us. Regardless of how much damage the attack caused to Iran’s nuclear project, it brought the region to the brink of full-scale war. Closing the Strait of Hormuz was on the table. For Gulf leaders, Israel is increasingly seen as a dangerous and unpredictable actor.
This misreading stems in part from a skewed Israeli understanding of why Gulf states pursue normalization. Many in Israel believe the primary driver was a shared desire to contain Iran. In reality, the Gulf’s calculations are more complex. Their vulnerabilities to Iranian attack – oil infrastructure, shipping routes – remain constant, even if Iran is weakened.
These states cannot afford to be dragged into a direct, zero-sum confrontation between Jerusalem and Tehran. Their long-standing strategy has been one of risk hedging: deepening ties with Israel while maintaining a cautious relationship with the threatening Islamic Republic. The direct escalation between the two has now made that balancing act nearly impossible.
Goals behind normalization
From the Gulf nations’ perspective, normalization serves two key strategic goals: First, stabilizing the region – to advance an economic vision, reduce the risk of war, and guard against domestic radicalization. Second, strengthening ties with Washington – normalization with Israel has been a diplomatic bridge to the US, especially for countries like Morocco, Sudan, and, until recently, Saudi Arabia, which linked normalization to a potential defense pact.
So how does the Israel of July 2025 look through Gulf eyes? It’s a mixed picture. Israel’s victory over Hezbollah is viewed as a major achievement. It has curbed Assad’s drug-smuggling operations, weakened Iran’s influence, and opened space for new political and economic arrangements in Syria and Lebanon – regions of strategic interest to the Gulf. It is seen as a “done deal,” a campaign that created a new and relatively stable reality.
In contrast, the confrontation with Iran looks like the opening chapter of a prolonged saga. Gulf states fear that Israel may now apply the same “mowing the lawn” doctrine it uses against Hezbollah to Iran – periodic military escalations aimed at curbing Tehran’s efforts to rebuild its strategic capabilities. That approach could turn the Gulf into a staging ground for recurring conflict.
As explained by Dr. Aziz Alghashian, a Saudi policy fellow at Mitvim – the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies think tank: “Some think Saudi Arabia is happy to see Iran attacked – this is nonsense. Even if tensions exist between us, we understand that what’s happening now puts us all at risk.”
The Iran campaign has also brought US–Israel military cooperation to a historic peak, marking the first time the two countries have jointly attacked a sovereign state. This could enhance Israel’s regional appeal as a US partner. However, Israel’s exclusive role as a diplomatic gateway to Washington has somewhat faded in recent months.
The Trump administration’s direct engagement with Gulf monarchies – through state visits and billion-dollar arms deals – has shown these countries they don’t need Israel to reach the White House. Still, Israel’s close relationship with the US remains a valuable asset in regional diplomacy.
Political cost of normalization
Nevertheless, normalization has never been only about Israel’s strategic value – it’s also about political cost. And that cost has skyrocketed. The war in Gaza has returned the Palestinian issue to center stage, turning it into a key condition for any forward movement on normalization. Public hostility to Israel is at a high, making overt ties politically toxic for Gulf regimes – and potentially even dangerous.
Many Arab leaders increasingly believe Israel is sinking deeper into the devastating Gaza conflict without a coherent exit plan. The current government’s hardline approach leaves little room for long-term political compromise. Efforts by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Egypt to promote post-war frameworks – such as Cairo’s “day after” initiative – have all been rejected by Jerusalem.
Meanwhile, across the region, influential voices are warning that Israel is becoming a “regional military hegemon” – asserting power by force rather than building trust.
One possible exception to this pattern is Syria. For the Ahmed al-Sharaa regime, an arrangement with Israel could help prevent renewed Iranian entrenchment while advancing two key goals: an Israeli withdrawal from parts of Syrian territory and a pathway to continued US sanctions relief and increased Western investment.
Full normalization remains unlikely – especially without concessions on the Golan Heights – but a more modest framework might be feasible. This could include a renewal of the 1974 armistice agreement, limited economic cooperation, and new arrangements around Israel’s relationship with the Druze community in Syria. Such an agreement could mark a historic breakthrough between former enemies. But it also raises deeper questions: Can normalization built on military pressure yield sustainable, long-term relations? What would it mean for Sharaa’s legitimacy to reach such a deal?
The Iran campaign has opened doors for Israel to reimagine its regional role, but it also exposes the paradox of Israel’s military power. Even as Arab states acknowledge Israel’s military prowess, they see it as a destabilizing force – radioactive in the political sense. Once again – just as in previous post-October 7 turning points – Israel seems unable to turn battlefield success into diplomatic progress.
The country again stands at a crossroads: between a historic diplomatic breakthrough – ending the war in Gaza, forging internationally-backed understandings to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and achieving normalization with the Arab World – and a historic missed opportunity that could derail Israel’s regional integration for years to come.
The writer is the CEO of Mitvim.