Israel faces a problem most countries don’t: it cannot trade hard power for soft power without risking the lives of millions of its citizens.
For most nations, this trade is not only possible but advisable. Prioritizing international legitimacy over military dominance, investing in diplomatic relationships over defensive capabilities, choosing approval over strength – these are the hallmarks of successful statecraft in the modern world.
But Israel isn’t like most nations. Its adversaries don’t dispute its policies: they dispute its existence. Its geographic vulnerability – nine miles wide at its narrowest point – makes territorial concessions existential rather than merely strategic. Its neighborhood offers no margin for error.
This creates an impossible dilemma. The international community demands gestures that would improve Israel’s standing abroad while fundamentally compromising its security. Consider the frequent call for immediate Palestinian statehood.
Yes, such a move would likely improve Israel’s standing internationally, at least temporarily. But it would also create a Palestinian state in the Jordan Valley overlooking a narrow coastal strip that contains 70% of Israel’s manufacturing capability and the majority of its population. For a country facing actors explicitly committed to its destruction, this isn’t a security concern – it’s an invitation to national suicide.
Enemies of Israel dispute the nation's right to exist
The pattern repeats across proposed “confidence-building measures.” Each carries the promise of international goodwill and the reality of strategic vulnerability. When your enemies don’t dispute your policies but your very right to exist, you can’t trade hard power for soft power when soft power buys you favorable editorials while hard power keeps your cities from being overrun.
But here's the crucial insight: Israel’s inability to make major territorial or security concessions doesn’t mean it faces no choices. Not all reforms carry equal risk. Some policies genuinely threaten Israeli survival; others merely serve the ideological preferences of its current government while undermining Israel’s democratic character and international standing.
The distinction matters enormously – and it points toward a path forward.
Addressing settler violence doesn’t require Israel to compromise its security. It requires Israel to enforce its own laws, protect Palestinian civilians, and demonstrate that the rule of law applies equally to all. Allowing Israeli citizens to attack Palestinians with impunity doesn’t make Israel safer – it makes it weaker, both morally and strategically.
Every unprosecuted attack, every settlement outpost built in defiance of Israeli law, every violent settler protected by the IDF instead of restrained by him, chips away at Israel’s legitimacy without adding an ounce to its security.
Distancing from racist rhetoric by far-right ministers doesn’t endanger Israeli citizens. Ministers who speak of “erasing” Palestinian villages or refer to Palestinians in dehumanizing terms don’t protect Israel – they provide ammunition to its enemies and alienate its friends. A government that tolerates such rhetoric signals that democratic values are negotiable, that human dignity is conditional, and that the rule of law applies selectively.
Israel can reject this without weakening its defenses.
Engaging in meaningful dialogue with centrist parties on fundamental democratic questions – judicial reform, constitutional frameworks, the balance between majority rule and minority rights – doesn’t compromise national security: It strengthens it. Democracies aren’t strong because they’re democratic –they’re strong because democratic systems create resilience, legitimacy, and social cohesion that authoritarian systems can’t match. When Israel’s current government bypasses democratic norms, concentrates power, and marginalizes opposition voices, it doesn’t make Israel more secure – it makes Israel more brittle.
This isn’t about choosing soft power over hard power. It’s about recognizing that some “hard power” moves aren’t hard at all – they’re just hardline. It’s about understanding that Israel can maintain its military edge, control its borders, and defend its citizens while also upholding the democratic values that justify its existence in the first place.
The reforms outlined above would bolster Israel’s standing not just in hostile international forums, but where it matters most: among Jewish communities worldwide who are struggling to defend Zionism’s values while watching its most far-right government enact policies that betray those very principles.
Young Jews wrestling with their relationship to Israel need to know that loving Israel doesn’t mean defending every action taken in its name. Israel’s genuine supporters need to see that criticism of specific policies isn’t delegitimization of the state itself.
These reforms wouldn’t satisfy Israel’s harshest critics, who object not to Israeli policy but to Israeli existence. But they would strengthen Israel’s position among those who want to support the country but struggle with the gap between its founding ideals and current realities. They would demonstrate that Israel can distinguish between security imperatives and ideological preferences, between protecting citizens and protecting political coalitions, between necessary strength and unnecessary cruelty.
Israel cannot abandon the hard power that keeps its citizens alive. No responsible government would make that trade, and no one should ask them to. The Jordan Valley matters. Air superiority matters. Intelligence capabilities matter. Defensible borders matter.
But Israel can – and must – abandon the policies that serve ideology rather than security, that undermine democracy rather than defend it, and that weaken Israel’s moral standing without strengthening its strategic position. Addressing settler violence, rejecting racist rhetoric, and engaging seriously with democratic reforms don’t threaten Israel’s security: They vindicate the Zionist vision of a democratic Jewish state that treats all people with dignity.
This is the soft power Israel can pursue – not by abandoning defensive capabilities, but by living up to the democratic values it claims to embody. Not by making itself weaker, but by making itself better. That’s not a concession: that’s statecraft.
The author holds a PhD in International Relations from Northeastern University.