Netanyahu brought the political dilemma on himself - analysis

The apparent political mistakes Netanyahu has made have put his career in jeopardy. The following five blunders could have easily been avoided.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses his supporters on the night of the Israeli elections, at the party headquarters in Jerusalem, March 24, 2021.  (photo credit: OLIVIER FITOUSSI/FLASH90)
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses his supporters on the night of the Israeli elections, at the party headquarters in Jerusalem, March 24, 2021.
(photo credit: OLIVIER FITOUSSI/FLASH90)
To remain in power, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu currently depends on his ability to reach compromises between the leader of the Southern Islamic Movement, MK Mansour Abbas, and the far-Right extremist who tried to prevent Abbas from running, Religious Zionist Party MK-elect Itamar Ben-Gvir.
He also depends on his protegé turned political nemesis Naftali Bennett, who detests him and is not permitted in the Prime Minister’s Residence by Netanyahu’s wife, Sara.
That is not an enviable position to be in. The only consolation prize is that the anti-Netanyahu camp is in even worse shape, and would require similar compromises and promise-breaking to form a government.
But it didn’t have to get to this point for Netanyahu, whose Likud Party fell less than 3,000 votes away from taking a Knesset seat away from the Joint List and winning a 60th seat out of 120 for his bloc, including Bennett’s Yamina and without Abbas’s Ra’am (United Arab List).
Netanyahu did not need to initiate the election. He could have kept the outgoing government open with relatively easy going Alternate Prime Minister Benny Gantz and his Blue and White party as his partners. There would have been a rotation in the Prime Minister’s Office that would have allowed him to focus on his trial, but then, according to the deal, he could have rotated back in.
The apparent political mistakes Netanyahu has made have put his career in jeopardy. The following five blunders could have easily been avoided.
• First, it would be ironic if Netanyahu’s apparent obsession with harming Bennett ends up boomeranging against him. In the past six elections, Netanyahu tried to take away Bennett’s votes and then low-ball him in coalition talks afterward.
After the last election, Bennett merely wanted to be health minister, but Netanyahu left him out of the coalition altogether. Had he treated Bennett with a little respect then, he may not have needed to depend on him now.
• The same goes with New Hope leader Gideon Sa’ar. Netanyahu knew that Sa’ar quit politics six-and-a-half years ago, because he was not included in the security cabinet. All he had to do this time was rectify that.
Instead, like he has done with so many of his past allies and advisers, Netanyahu pushed Sa’ar away. He promoted others ahead of him, and left Sa’ar out of his cabinet completely. He would not even give him a Knesset committee chairmanship.
• The third mistake was not accepting a debate offer from Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid, which could have allowed him to display his strengths and highlight Lapid’s weaknesses. Netanyahu had nothing to be afraid of, and he could have won the extra support he needed in retrospect.
• The fourth was wasting so much time and energy wooing Arab voters. The numbers prove this strategy was a bust.
• The final error was going too far in campaigning for the right-wing Religious Zionist Party. He needed Bezalel Smotrich’s party to cross the electoral threshold, but did not need it to get six seats plus the one he reserved for them on the Likud list.
Now, it is Smotrich and his allies who are ruling out Ra’am, which could prevent Netanyahu from forming a government.