During the twelve-day war of June 2025, the United States and Israel devastated Iran’s enrichment facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. But the most destructive weapon Trump deployed was not military. It was cognitive: a cascade of contradictory signals.
“Everyone should leave Tehran!” followed hours later by “Now is the time for peace!” “Unconditional surrender!” and the next morning, “A real opportunity for negotiations.” The result was total paralysis in Tehran. Every possible response was mined before it could be formulated.
Eight months later, in Muscat, a systematic review of Iranian internal communications reveals something striking: Iran copied the method, refined it, and is running it back against Trump.
From the book to table
Across five rounds between Oman and Rome in the spring of 2025, Iran’s approach was straightforward: enrichment down to 3.67%, stockpile transfer to a third country. When Trump sent contradictory messages, Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei complained openly: “The contradictory messages are unhelpful.” Rounds were postponed. Then came June.
But regimes that survive 45 years are quick learners.
On February 3, 2026, Tasnim published three headlines simultaneously: confirmation of talks, a warning of war, and a rejection of negotiations under Trump’s conditions. Same outlet. Same day. Kayhan, whose editor is personally appointed by Khamenei, defended the talks on February 6 and ran “Fingers must stay on the trigger” on February 8.
Ali Shamkhani, the supreme leader’s political advisor, declared in six languages that the talks were operating “under the Leader’s command.” That same week, the IRGC unveiled the Khorramshahr-4 “Khyber” long-range ballistic missile inside an underground missile city. Diplomacy and a ballistic missile: This is exactly what Trump did in June.
Not cacophony: polyphony
The obvious counter: Iran’s system has always produced contradictory signals. During the JCPOA nuclear deal, while Mohammad Javad Zarif negotiated, the IRGC launched missiles. But in the past, the contradictions reflected genuine internal disputes. This time there is none.
Shamkhani explicitly declares that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is acting “under the order of the Leader.” The Guardian’s David Shariatmadari defends and threatens on consecutive days. The impression that “the IRGC might oppose a soft deal” is a tool in Khamenei’s hands, not a threat to him. This is not a cacophony of feuding factions: It is a polyphony with a conductor.
Three indicators support this reading. First, no leaks: Past contradictions always came with leaks about power struggles: This time, nothing. The post-January repression targeted the street, not the establishment; officials who previously leaked to Western media remain active.
Second, timing: Three contradictory Tasnim headlines on one day; Kayhan defending and warning within forty-eight hours; the Khorramshahr-4 unveiled on the eve of Muscat. These are not disagreements leaking out: they are signals sent deliberately.
Third, direction: Every contradictory voice leads to the same outcome. The hard line strengthens the negotiating position, the soft line prevents a strike – and the missile backs both. When contradictions serve the same objective, it is not disorder: It is design.
Trump versus Trump
If Iran is running Trump’s playbook against Trump, the result is an equilibrium neither side can break.
Khamenei cannot sign a real deal. A nuclear rollback dismantles his only remaining deterrent. Missile constraints cut the asymmetric advantage compensating for conventional weakness; dismantling proxies collapses his architecture of influence. Every pillar that falls brings the building closer to collapse.
Trump cannot start a real war. The armada dispatched after the January massacre in Iran created a commitment to act, but his political identity is built on “no more wars.” A regime that understands the end has come will hit American bases. One soldier killed, and Trump will have seen what Iraq did to Bush.
Regime change opens a question nobody can answer: 88 million people, dozens of ethnic groups, no opposition leader, and no plan for the day after. In June, Trump found a formula: short war, declare victory, go home. Iran is closing off that formula: The next round will not be twelve days.
Both sides need to continue the game, not end it. Trump needs the threat to project strength, Khamenei needs the talks to prevent a strike. The moment the game ends, both lose. Nour News, the Supreme National Security Council’s outlet, summed up Muscat: “The main game is still being played at the level of signals, not at the level of a draft agreement.” The talks are not the vehicle for a deal: they are the deal.
The assessment
If forced to bet, I predict that a “framework agreement” will be signed. Enrichment lowered, a symbolic transfer of material, a monitoring mechanism that looks impressive but lacks enforcement. Araghchi shakes Witkoff’s hand. Trump declares he achieved what Obama never could, Khamenei declares he gave up nothing: Both will be right. Within months, quietly, the infrastructure rebuilds.
This is unless the deal is built to crack the apparatus from within. January proved that the people are ready. But every uprising without an internal rupture ends in massacre. What is missing is not courage in the streets but a crack in the guards. A deal that damages the leadership without uniting it could be the lever. The question for Washington is whether the goal is a deal that produces a photo, or one that changes a structure.
And one more thing: Trump. This analysis assumes rational play. But the American president moved from threats to war within seventy-two hours in June. He may surprise again with a deal nobody expected – or a strike nobody recommended. His instincts override every informed assessment, especially regarding what would be unwise to do.
In June, he proved it: There is no reason to assume he will not prove it again.
The writer is vice president for strategy, security, and communications at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.