Recent reports of Islamic State members escaping from a detention facility in northeastern Syria might appear to be another isolated security incident in a region long plagued by instability. These events reflect a recurring pattern rooted in a persistent regional failure to confront terrorism at its source. For years, officials framed the issue as one of short-term containment; in practice, this approach merely postponed and accumulated instability.
In early 2026, authorities transferred hundreds of detainees, then thousands, from prisons in Al Hasakah to facilities in Iraq. The move came amid escalating unrest and aimed to prevent the total collapse of the detention system. It signaled international recognition that this issue demands coordinated management.
The United States endorsed the transfer. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Washington appreciates Baghdad’s leadership and supports this initiative to ensure that ISIS fighters cannot move freely. He urged other nations to repatriate their citizens to face trial and described the operation as part of a long-term strategy to prevent the worldwide jihadist organization from regrouping.
The deeper problem extends beyond logistics. Terrorism remains politically useful. The region continues to offer fertile ground for it: exhausted governments, weak borders, fragile economies, and active conflicts. Under such conditions, terrorism thrives as a low-cost, high-impact tool in complex struggles. The real danger emerges when it receives treatment solely as a security matter, obscuring its function as a reusable political instrument.
Terrorism has evolved beyond fixed organizations. It now operates as a flexible political force, easily transferred, rapidly mobilized, and reshaped to suit shifting agendas. Simple narratives, sharp slogans, and a clearly defined enemy often prove more valuable than formal structures.
Religious and sectarian rhetoric supplies potent fuel, transforming political disputes into doctrinal wars.
Hatred of Jews used to encourage terrorism
Antisemitism and hatred of Jews have proved especially effective for emotional mobilization, framing defeats as sacred struggles and recasting violence as a moral duty. In this form, terrorism becomes an exportable commodity, adaptable across conflicts while adhering to a single logic: converting hatred into operational power.
ISIS was never entirely independent of regional power calculations. In earlier phases, it served to destabilize territories, weaken states, and complicate the positions of its rivals. When the costs grew too high, it was abandoned. Today, its remnants languish in overcrowded prisons, forming a reservoir of violence available to any actor seeking to reactivate it under a new banner.
Iran’s role here warrants attention. With deep influence in Iraq and Syria and networks of allied militias, Tehran possesses the means to shape this dynamic through controlled chaos: facilitating movement, tolerating breaches, or engineering security crises that renew demand for terrorist services.
In this framework, ISIS functions as a pressure tactic, reactivated when regional tensions require a disruptive element. The gravest risk lies in the illusion of control: the belief that chaos can be directed without consequence.
Two decades of regional experience tell a different story. Every actor who has played this card has eventually paid a price, often in the form of internal instability.
The critical question centers on who benefits from keeping terrorism alive and who stands ready to deploy it when regional balances shift.
Terrorism has become a tradable political instrument. The problem is not the group itself but the system that sustains it, exploits it, and pretends to oppose it. We face a persistent engine of chaos – and those who believe they can control its release may find themselves its first casualties.
The writer is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate.