The paradigm shift following the events of October 7 sparked a sharp public and strategic debate over the security worldview successive Israeli governments adopted in recent decades regarding Gaza. The guiding assumption, that Hamas was deterred and therefore did not constitute a significant threat, proved to be a flawed conception that exacted a devastating blood price. That said, it is important to note that the claim “Hamas is deterred” was only one component of the broader conception and does not capture it in full.
The government’s full conception was wider in scope and inherently political. According to this view, the split between Hamas rule in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank prevents the emergence of unified Palestinian representation, thereby thwarting any possibility of meaningful diplomatic negotiations.
However, this view disregards the security costs generated by Israeli policy. Israel assumed it could allow Hamas to stabilize its political standing while simultaneously preventing its military strengthening. To that end, Israel was required to preserve economic stability in Gaza. Consequently, it was not only necessary to permit the entry of goods, but also to allow the flow of Qatari cash directly to Hamas. This approach suffers from an obvious failure: once Hamas becomes sufficiently wealthy, it will possess the resources needed to grow stronger not only politically, but militarily as well.
Israel’s policy toward Gaza has largely remained consistent even after the lethal attack. Israel continues to categorically reject the Palestinian Authority’s return to Gaza, even as a small, partial, symbolic partner. That opposition is not rooted solely in tactical or military considerations. At its core stands the desire to prevent a reality in which a single Palestinian actor governs both arenas, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Such unification would lay the groundwork for a comprehensive political settlement in a framework that, according to the political leadership, does not align with Israel’s security needs.
Despite the criticism directed at government policy, it must be acknowledged that the “Two-State Solution” in its familiar form, as articulated for example in the Clinton Parameters roughly a quarter-century ago, no longer serves as a viable alternative for Israel. Circumstances and strategic realities have changed irreversibly. Two central security explanations illustrate why implementing this model is so difficult at present.
Why modern day security realities have evolved past the Two-State Solution
The first is strategic dynamics and the multi-front threat. In theory, one might assume that a Palestinian state within the 1967 lines would be militarily far inferior to Israel and therefore would not constitute an existential threat in a direct, conventional war. Yet that assumption ignores the broader regional context. Israel does not operate in a vacuum. It is situated in a hostile Middle East and exposed to threats from coalitions of states and armed organizations. The events of October 7 demonstrated that fighting in one arena can rapidly escalate into a multi-front campaign. In today’s era, Israel is threatened by precision missiles and drones launched from thousands of kilometers away, from Iraq, Yemen, Iran and even Turkey. In such a reality, establishing a Palestinian state in the heart of the country could become an additional risk node within a much wider tightening ring.
The second is the technological revolution in weaponry and its implications for demilitarization. In the past, proposed arrangements relied on the principle of “demilitarization,” based on the assumption that it would be possible to prevent the introduction of heavy weaponry such as tanks and aircraft into the territory of a Palestinian state. But in 2026, “demilitarization” in its classic sense is no longer relevant. The modern battlefield is built around small, lethal systems that are easy to smuggle, including drones, UAVs, rockets and advanced anti-tank missiles such as the Kornet. These can be concealed easily within civilian spaces and supply trucks, making effective oversight nearly impossible. The presence of such systems in the West Bank would pose a direct and existential threat to Israel’s main transportation arteries, including Highways 2, 4 and 6, as well as to population centers in the country’s center, severely damaging national resilience in an emergency.
From this analysis flow several key conclusions. To begin with, the Palestinian Authority’s return to the Gaza Strip does not contradict Israel’s interest and may even be preferable, from a security standpoint, to attempts to establish local “peace” entities or to preserve Hamas rule. The argument that preventing progress toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict justifies Hamas’s existence and governance in Gaza has proven to be a grave error.
Moreover, the “Two-State Solution” in the classical framework is no longer feasible in light of the technological and strategic changes described above. Israel must therefore formulate a strategy grounded in this security reality, including in its international discourse, rather than relying on diplomatic formulas that no longer reflect the battlefield or the region.
At the same time, the dichotomous approach claiming the only alternatives are permanent Israeli control over all of the West Bank or the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state under the known “Two-State Solution” model should be rejected. Intermediate solutions and other political models exist that may provide a reasonable answer to Israel’s national security needs while also reducing the conflict.
Finally, rather than preventing the possibility of international discussion on the conflict, Israel should seize the issue head-on and explain that the military risk posed by a Palestinian state in borders close to the 1967 lines is plainly unreasonable. In that spirit, the “Two-State Solution” as commonly understood from 2000 and 2007 should be taken off the agenda, not for political, nationalist or religious reasons, but for clearly defined security reasons. Other solutions may exist that can benefit Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians themselves, and on that basis Israel should first conduct a dialogue with the United States.