Israel-Hamas War: What happened on day 80?

A survey of Israel’s Arab minority, conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), found that a slight majority (56% overall) of Arab Israelis say that the Hamas attack on October 7 does not reflect Arab society and Islamic values, and that a significant majority (86.5%) support civilian efforts during the war, such as aiding evacuees or assisting the medical system. 

The poll was conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute, with a sample size of 538, interviewed by phone in Arabic. The margin of error was 4.31%. 

The question of October 7 was presented in reference to a statement by MK Mansour Abbas, who said that Hamas’s actions in the attack “do not reflect Arab society, the Palestinian people and the Islamic nation.” A significant majority of Druze (69.5%) and Christian (68%) respondents agreed with this statement, and a slight majority of Muslims (53%) agreed as well. 

A large majority of respondents (84%) reported fearing for their physical safety in the tense environment in Israel following the outbreak of the war. Asked about specific relationships, however, most respondents (about 74%) said that they have Jewish friends, and most (78%) of these people said that those relationships were unaffected by the war. 

A large majority of Arab Israelis, across religious groups, said they felt a part of the State of Israel, including its problems. 80% of Druze respondents indicated this, as did 73% of Christians and 62% of Muslims. These results varied with age, the oldest respondents being more likely to answer in the affirmative, across groups. 

Israeli border police check Arab women in Jerusalem's Old City, during the Sukkot holiday. October 03, 2023. (credit: Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)

Less educated feel more connected to the state

Interestingly, the feeling of being a part of the state was stronger among those without higher education, with 75% of those without a high school diploma saying they feel a part of the state, than among those with a post-high school degree, with only 54.5% of those with a college degree reporting that feeling.

The survey also asked respondents whom they held responsible for the deaths of Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Most respondents (58%) said that the IDF and Hamas were both responsible. 14% blamed the State of Israel and the IDF exclusively, and 16% blamed Hamas exclusively. Those who voted for Zionist parties in the last elections and those who have a higher than average income were more likely to hold Hamas responsible, while most low-income and average-income earners tended to cast blame on both Hamas and the IDF.

The IDI said that “the findings of the survey outline a complex mood prevailing in Arab society” and that differences in public opinion are “often more geographical than political.” The group also cautioned that “this survey was conducted during a sensitive period, in which a change in the social behavior of the Arab public in Israel was observed, and it will be important to re-examine the same questions, at different points over time.”  

The US military carried out retaliatory strikes on Monday in Iraq after an attack earlier in the day by Iran-aligned militants that wounded three US personnel, including one who is in critical condition, the Pentagon said.

"My prayers are with the brave Americans who were injured," US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in a statement.

The Japanese government will freeze assets and impose sanctions on payments and capital transactions on three senior Hamas members, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi said on Tuesday.

The three individuals were believed to be involved in the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas on Israel and in a position to use funds to finance such terrorist activities, the top Japanese government spokesperson said.

The IDF has announced the death of Sgt. Elisha Yehonatan, 24, of Beit El, who fell in battle in the Gaza Strip. Yehonatan is survived by his parents, his eight siblings, his child, and his wife, who is pregnant. 

"We will continue to struggle and to fight so that the goals of this war will be fully achieved. Yehonatan's death will not be in vain and only an overwhelming, total, and clear victory will calm us," said Shay Elon, head of the Beit El regional council. "The best of our children give their lives for the nation and the country and we must be worthy of them and their sacrifice."

Elisha Yehonatan, 24, fell in battle in the Gaza Strip. (credit: Courtesy)

Two launches were carried out in the last few hours from Lebanese territory toward Israel, after which the IDF attacked the source of the shooting as well as two launch positions next to other areas in Lebanon, Walla! reported shortly after 11pm on Monday, Israel time.

In addition, earlier that day, a surface-to-air missile was launched from Lebanese territory at an Air Force aircraft operating in the area. The missile did not damage the vessel, which completed its mission successfully.
 

A number of sources have been leaking, including to the Jerusalem Post, that the IDF's slight escalation of attacks deeper against Hezbollah deeper inside Lebanon has led the terror organization to voluntarily pull back half or all of its Radwan special forces from the border with Israel.

Are these leaks for real? Is the IDF starting to achieve a strategic change in Hezbollah’s force posture that could serve as a basis for a new post-war reset that would allow Israelis to return to their northern border communities?

There are at least two other possibilities that could mean that less has been achieved than meets the eye and that the big question of what will happen with Hezbollah and the North could still be wide open.

The leak could be a political move to set the ground for avoiding or fully delaying taking major action against Hezbollah even once the “main war” with Hamas ends in mid to late January.

It is well-known that Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and a number of other top IDF officials wanted to strike hard against Hezbollah on October 8 when it entered the war with Hamas. It is equally well-known that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, war ministers Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, and some other IDF officials opposed that strike, preferring to push off dealing with Hezbollah until after hopefully defeating Hamas.

Israeli soldiers guard in Metula, on the border between Israel and Lebanon, northern Israel, on May 14, 2021, after Lebanese protesters crossed the Israeli border fence. (credit: BASEL AWIDAT/FLASH90)

Maybe portions of the group wanting to avoid or further delay a larger-scale conflagration with Hezbollah are leaking partial or temporary tactical retreats by Hezbollah to justify their position.

Some of this could also be Hezbollah seeking to lure Israel into a false sense of security.

Both Hamas and Hezbollah have been surprised by the intensity of Israel’s fury against them after they attacked the Jewish state on October 7 and 8.

They had expected a more risk-averse, blood-averse Israeli public which they got used to over the last 17 years since the Second Lebanon War.

But Hezbollah has correctly diagnosed that Israel’s fury and focus are not eternal and that risk-averse trends are returning to society and will likely be more dominant once the main fighting with Hamas ends.

Hezbollah Chief Hassan Nasrallah may be betting that if he does a temporary tactical withdrawal of some units from close up to the border, then he can slowly and gradually return them over time post-war.

If the northern border goes quiet for three or six months after the main fighting ends in Gaza, will Israel really be ready to risk another major conflict simply because a few dozen Hezbollah troops move a kilometer this way or that way?   

Will Israel be ready to risk another major conflict?

Incidentally, this suspicion appears to be the reason that the IDF itself is not commenting on the issue on the record.

However, the Post has confirmed that the IDF has noticed fewer Hezbollah forces close to the border in recent weeks.

But the military feels that discussions about whether half of Hezbollah forces have pulled back, and whether they are around the Litani River is the wrong way to judge progress and the future strategic picture.

Rather, there are objective indicators, such as: are Hezbollah forces still firing rockets or anti-tank missiles on Israel? If they are, that is unacceptable, and any such forces must be attacked and destroyed.

Likewise, the Litani River is viewed as somewhat of an overused slogan because portions of it are farther from Israel and portions get quite close.

A more relevant objective indicator is whether all anti-tank missiles are eight kilometers or more away from any relevant part of Israel’s border – once again given that the border is not straight.

Eight kilometers is the range of such weapons, so that is the relevant range they must be away from the border, whereas some threats might be allowed to be closer, and some, such as longer-range rockets, would need to be even farther away.

According to the IDF, the main approach is that each kind of weapon and force should be as out of range as possible and Israel should have maximum warning time to prepare and deflect any attack.

On top of that, the IDF knows that it will need to work hard after the main war with Gaza is over to maintain a much larger troop presence on the border with Hezbollah, but still one that will be much smaller than it currently is.

Part of this will be a long-term challenge to the country since it will require much more extended reserve duty service than in past years, something which will require creativity to not harm Israel’s economy and its social fabric, in terms of reservists with families.

After all of that, the IDF is cautiously optimistic about Hezbollah’s partial withdrawals but does not feel that it can declare any kind of victory until withdrawals to more militarily relevant lines are made and attacks are stopped.

This means that both the diplomatic and bigger war options are still on the table.

An IDF commander in Golani's 51st Battalions was dismissed from his role after endangering Israeli forces fighting in Gaza City's Shejaia neighborhood, N12 reported on Monday evening.

According to the report, a company commander was dismissed and replaced by another commander after ordering soldiers to enter homes in the area despite fears over the houses being boobytrapped, in an incident that occurred some three weeks ago.

The dismissed commander's battalion chief reportedly barred his forces from entering the homes feared as boobytrapped, only to be countermanded by the company commander on the field.

There were no casualties in the incident, as per N12.

IDF soldiers operate in the Gaza Strip on December 21, 2023 (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)

Golani's heavy losses in Gaza

The 51st Brigade suffered heavy losses among its ranks since the launch of Israel's war on Hamas in the Gaza Strip, losing nearly 30 soldiers and commanders in Gaza.

The Brigade was involved in the fierce battles of Shejaia earlier in December, including one in which ambushing Hamas terrorists killed ten soldiers, including several senior officers, with a barrage of gunfire and improvised explosives.

The IDF's 828th Brigade has released a preliminary investigation into the killing of three Israeli hostages by IDF combat soldiers in Shejaia in the Gaza Strip.

The investigation reveals that on the morning of the incident, soldiers in Shejaia received new instructions to open fire on any man of fighting age that approached them after several incidents where terrorists disguised in civilian clothes got close to soldiers to attack them.

The 17th Battalion, involved in the shooting, reported that they had been fired upon by terrorists who had taken refuge in a school and were using the civilian population as cover. Meanwhile, the battalion commander was informed that an armed man in civilian attire had blown himself up in a suicide bombing after approaching IDF soldiers the previous day.

How the IDF accidentally killed three Israeli hostages in Gaza

On the morning of the accidental killing of the hostages, at around 9:00 a.m., a combat stationed on the third floor of a building, which had been searched and cleared for IDF operations, began to notice silhouettes and hear footsteps in a building a few dozen meters away. Upon spotting three people, later identified as some of the hostages who had been kidnapped on October 7, the soldier mistakenly declared them as "terrorists" and opened fire, hitting two of them while the third fled to a nearby building.

Signs on which calls for help were written, apparently using food scraps, Gaza Strip (credit: IDF SPOKESMAN’S UNIT)

The battalion commander and other soldiers in the building heard the escaping man shouting in Hebrew. The soldiers in the building were all clearly ordered to cease fire, and the third hostage, whose identity was still unknown, told to leave the area. When the battalion commander saw him, he approached and reiterated to the soldiers behind him not to shoot. Simultaneously, the soldiers were cautioned not to approach, fearing a possible attack.

However, at this critical moment, a soldier observing this fired a single bullet, hitting him. Shortly after, another soldier in the same position also opened fire, mistaking him for the enemy. According to the investigation, the two soldiers did not hear the commander's order to stop firing as they were on a different floor.

Following the shooting of the three hostages, the battalion commander, still concerned about the possibility of an attack, directed the soldiers to fire at possible points of danger in the area. Together with the company commander, he then proceeded to search the building where the hostages were located while also bringing in a bomb disposal squad was there to check for and disarm any explosives.

It was only then that the soldiers realized that one of the people they killed had a "Western appearance" and began trying to identify the bodies, which were later confirmed to be three Israeli hostages.

Although the hostages had waved a white flag at the fighters and inscribed "SOS" and "help us" on their building, only the soldier who recognized them took notice of the flag. The rest of the soldiers only discovered it during subsequent searches in the area.

No one has ever fought a war with an enemy so deeply entrenched in their civilian population, who so systematically abuses international law – as the IDF faces with Hamas, a senior IDF legal official told The Jerusalem Post.

Fighting Hamas now, when it has topped its prior use of civilians and civilian locations as human shields, is “incredibly complex” and “a new kind of case study” for the challenge of winning a war while limiting harm to civilians.

Part of the IDF’s international law department’s ability to stay on top of the vast number of legal questions regularly coming up is a jump in staff during wartime.

The operational legal advisers branch is available 24/7 and includes about three dozen full-time legal advisers, plus over 100 reservists – a significant growth from where it was a decade ago, even during wartime.

If, at one point, international law legal advisers remained at headquarters and then moved closer to the frontlines at Northern, Southern, and Central Command headquarters, they now also serve at division-level headquarters, closer to the action and real-time developments.

IDF soldiers operate in the Indonesian Hospital in Gaza, December 25, 2023 (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)

These legal advisers also work closely with the Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the Justice Ministry.

A common refrain from critics of Israel is that the IDF is killing far more civilians in this war than it did in prior rounds of conflict, which proves it is committing war crimes.

Why is the civilian casualty rate in Gaza so high?

Without endorsing specific figures, the legal adviser said there were multiple, complex reasons why the civilian casualty rate may be much higher now than in the past, none of which, though, should lead to criminal allegations.

He explained that the IDF simply does not yet know all the specific circumstances that make up the large civilian casualty estimates.

If the IDF estimate of 8,000 Hamas terrorists killed is accurate (and it does have some level of uncertainty), and the total number of Palestinian casualties put out by the Hamas-run Gaza health ministry of 20,000 is accurate (this figure has a lot of uncertainty), then the IDF would have killed close to 12,000 Palestinian civilians, when compared to over 1,000 out of around 2,100, back in 2014, during the last ground invasion of Gaza.

In percentages, that would mean 60% of those killed were civilians, compared to 40% fighters, whereas in 2014, it was about 50/50.

According to the legal official, the first condition necessary is more time to paint a clearer understanding of why so many died, what the mistakes were, and what could be classified as collateral damage – given the presence of an important target, the IDF was trying to kill or destroy.

According to him, a distinction between this much larger scale war and the other “rounds” of conflict was that Israel’s military goals in the past were more limited, as well as the approach to the military advantage needed to advance those goals.

That matters for the question of whether an attack meets the proportionality legal test, which depends on balancing the military advantage against expected civilian harm.

This time, the government set much broader goals of destroying the military and ruling capacity of Hamas. The expert explained that means deploying force at levels of greater magnitude and a different outlook on military advantage. It also means that military targets, seen as less crucial in past rounds, became more critical.

Hamas built thousands of military positions and weapons storage areas in hospitals, mosques, and schools, he noted. The IDF would criticize attempts by well-meaning US allies to compare Israel’s experience in Gaza to Mosul. Its view is rather that what Hamas did in Gaza could serve as an unprecedented case study, one of a terror group investing ten years and 40,000 fighters to transform an entire area into one extended terror playground.

The IDF, then, is tasked with destroying an unprecedented number of targets, including transformed civilian locations, to subdue Hamas.

Palestinians walk through the debris, in Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip November 28, 2023 (credit: REUTERS/SALEH SALEM)

The IDF is also encountering far more threats to force protection in the field.

Since the First Lebanon War in 1982, the IDF has not undertaken a significant invasion of foreign territory, and in all previous rounds with Hamas, if it went in, it was for a very slight and narrowly tailored invasion.

Now, there are tens of thousands of soldiers in Gaza – all exposed to Hamas lookouts, ambushes, and booby traps.

This means that there are a myriad of additional targets to facilitate. It also means that an individual anti-tank missile position or an individual tunnel shaft could be a meaningful target, whereas he said in past IDF-Gaza rounds, they might have been overlooked as unnecessary to attack to achieve more limited goals.

The official said the IDF believes it has taken all “feasible” precautions to warn civilians – only this time, “feasible” is more limited.

In the past, with the goal being more stopping Hamas from firing rockets – than eliminating its operatives – the IDF cared less about doing that or even avoided it. This meant it could provide general warnings to evacuate neighborhoods and specific warnings to civilians who ignored those warnings and remained in an area set to attack.

IDF needs to attack Hamas faster, avert dangers

IN CONTRAST, during this war, the IDF often found it unacceptable to allow Hamas to escape by giving additional warnings after issuing general evacuation warnings.

Further, he said that the IDF often needs to attack faster, leaving less time to warn due to the immediate danger the soldiers are in.

Another problem with issuing a larger number of warnings – in the early days of the war – was that many of the assets the IDF used to collect intelligence about the extent of civilian evacuations were out of place.

Due to Israel’s need to eject Hamas’s 3,000 force of invaders from 22 southern Israel towns in the week following October 7, the IDF official said that the military moved many of its aerial assets, Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) assets, and others, from Gaza to the South.

This meant that when the IDF first started to counterattack Hamas in Gaza with airstrikes a few weeks after October 7, there were fewer assets in place to track the progress of civilian evacuations.

Moreover, many assets used to track civilian movements in Gaza in past rounds needed to be shifted to the North to defend against Hezbollah or to the Gulf of Eilat and beyond to defend against attacks from Yemen’s Houthi group.

Despite these limitations, the IDF has a highly professional staff to maximize the utility of its warnings, in terms of experts in Arabic, in the analysis of open intelligence media, and in terms of lawyers to facilitate safe areas.

According to the IDF lawyer, this group has also had significant success in sending civilians to safe areas using specific streets and during specific hours.

One problem the IDF will continue to face is time. After 2014, which ended on August 26 of that year, the IDF put out an announcement on September 10 that it was opening 99 reviews and five criminal probes. This was after it was hit with criticism that the operation mounted for “only” 50 days and before the International Criminal Court (ICC) had even opened its preliminary review against Israel.

This time, the “main war” will likely have run for around 100 days, a full ICC criminal probe has been opening and running against Israel for more than two-and-half years at this point, and Chief ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan has given the IDF a detailed warning about its conduct, during a visit to Israel and the West Bank.

The IDF legal official said that because of the unusual scale of the war, it is much harder to gather all of the initial facts to make responsible and informed decisions. The officers needed to facilitate the initial gathering of facts and clarifications are also currently part of the invasion.

Despite this challenge, he said that the mechanism for initial operational probes of certain very controversial large incidents has already started, even if it is likely a reduced staff, which will only grow to its normal size once the main war ends.

It seemed he understood the IDF would need to show even greater transparency than in the past, and in that vein, the Foreign Ministry has already published a few initial reports relating to legal and factual aspects of the war.

The United States could delay sending military aid to Israel due to more than just "technical issues," Defense Minister Yoav Gallant warned Israeli officials, according to a Monday evening report by Channel 13.

As per the report, Gallant raised this concern following a rare phone conversation with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, which was not reported on by the Defense Ministry after the fact. 

The Defense Ministry refused to respond to Channel 13's report.